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ABSTRACT
The purpose of the research is to contribute to a better understanding of the relationship
between business strategy and the management of labour. This is an area which, while
acknowledged as being crucial to an understanding of industrial relations, has received relatively
little attention in terms of detailed case study research. A review of relevant literature exposed the
gaps in the subject area and enabled the identification of key issues and areas of concern. In
particular there appeared to be an inadequate understanding of the process of strategic change.
The methodology adopted was a top down qualitative approach following the practice of
multiple triangulation which enabled the research to focus on the process of change.
The case study of the Co-operative Bank examines the response of the Bank to the changing
competitive environment and links the adoption of a more market oriented approach with a shift
from old style personnel management towards a more pro-active strategic human resource
management. The research looks at how human resource policy was formulated and
implemented and the problems encountered. The thesis shows that while there was relatively little
detailed consideration at top management level, a new policy based on H.R.M. ideas and
emphasising labour as a resource rather than a cost was of key strategic importance to the Bank.
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CHAPTER ONE	 INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
This chapter sets the scene for the rest of the thesis. It explains how the research began and the
principles upon which it was based.
The subject of the thesis stemmed from the nature of the collaborative award of the
Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC), under which the research was undertaken and
the researcher's own interests after a review of the literature In the broad area defined by the
award. The award, designed to foster links between industry and academic institutions, involved
spending an extended period of time with the institution concerned, in this case the Co-operative
Bank, and this also influenced the method of research.
The actual topic to be examined was the relationship between business strategy and the
management of labour through a case study of the Co-operative Bank over a period of two years
between 1986 and 1988. While the traditional focus of Industrial relations had been union-
management relations, usually at shop floor level (and most often In manufacturing) there has
been Increasing recognition of the need for more work which takes a top down approach,
examining corporate decision making and its impact on industrial relations. As Marginson puts it:
"the extent to which the policies and practices observed have their origins in the
corporate, divisional or regional offices at the large enterprise of which many
workplaces are a part has remained largely unexplored." (1981, p1)
Furthermore while there has been Increasing acknowledgement of the importance of
corporate decisions on industrial relations there was a need to provide more analysis about how
this operated In practice.
In particular the focus of the research was to examine the impact of the changing
competitive environment on business strategy and the management of staff and the influence of
Human Resource Management (H.R.M.), both of which have been the subject of recent attention.
Sisson and Sullivan, reviewing development of personnel practices in the 1980s, express
scepticism as to the nature and degree of change and observe that:
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"By and large, British management does not have a strategic approach to the
management of people, pragmatism or opportunism continue to be very much
the order of the day." (1987, p429)
D. Metcalf in an article extolling recent advances made in manufacturing productivity
evaluates the contribution of H.R.M. and sees the extent of change In the 1980s, compared with
the 1970s as 'little' and its likely contribution to co-operation in the 1980s as 'none'. In a book
which comes up with an entirely different assessment of recent changes In industrial relations,
Maclnnes (1987) has nothing at all to say about H.R.M. in a recent survey of large companies
there was little evidence to be found of a more strategic approach to managing employees
(Marginson et al 1988).
Yet there is general recognition of the importance of the people input to business success
whether negatively e.g. the obstruction of change (Willman & Winch 1985) or more positively in
creating conditions for organisational entrepreneurship (Kanter 1983). The 'Excellence' studies
have also stressed the contribution of the management of employees to commercial success
(Peters & Waterman 1983; Goldsmith & Clutterbuck 1984). As Guest observes:
"Because they are the most variable, and the least easy to understand and
control of all management resources, effective utillsation of human resources is
likely to give organisations a significant competitive advantage. The human
resource dimension must therefore be fully Integrated Into the strategic planning
process." (1987 p14)
H.R.M. is said to offer much more than the traditional techniques of personnel
management, to management who are Interested in a strategic approach to managing their staff.
The notion of strategy Is of course bound up with product market considerations and the Harvard
Business School approach is concerned to link H.R.M. to strategy. As they argue:
"An enterprise has an external strategy - a chosen way of competing In the
marketplace. It also needs an internal strategy to determine how its human
resources are to be developed, deployed, motivated and controlled".
Furthermore,
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"The veiy idea of an internal strategy implies there is consistency among all of
the specific tactics or activities which affect human resources." (Beer et al.,
1985 p13)
Yet, as we have noted, these notions have been deemed to have little applicability in the
U.K. although they continue to be the focus for much discussion.
The literature review served to highlight the principal areas where the research effort
could be directed. In particular the case study afforded an opportunity to contextualize
developments in H.R.M. and provide an examination of the Issues in some detail, rather than
adopt the broad brush approach of surveys. Furthermore the banking sector has not been the
focus of research, yet as a sector characterised by non-conflictual industrial relations and
suffering little from the 'British diseases' of industrial action and demarcation associated with parts
of manufacturing, it may have more to offer as an explanation of continuity and change in
industrial relations in the 1980s.
The Co-operative Bank was of particular interest given its small size and hence sensitivity
to the competitive environment and its unique history.
The thesis takes the following shape. The next chapter contains a literature review of
three areas identified as being significant for this topic: firstly, an examination of the development
of clearing banks Into the 1980s; secondly, looking at employee relations practices in banking;
and thirdly, an overview of the literature on management strategy, particularly that pertaining to
industrial relations. Such a review provided the researcher with a broad understanding of the key
Issues and a number of areas to focus on. Chapter Three explains the methodology in terms of
the overall approach adopted and the actual techniques involved, especially the practice of
multIple triangulation and also discusses the research process In terms of case study work and
problems of access. Chapter Four provides an historical overview of the development of the Co-
operative Bank with the general theme of the Bank moving away from identification within the co-
operative movement towards the financial sector. Chapters Five, Six and Seven contain the
empirical woii and form the main body of the thesis. Chapter Five discusses changing business
strategy in the Bank in the context of a fast changing competitive environment and focuses on a
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new Corporate Plan and two years later a Strategic Plan designed to address the problems the
Bank was facing. Chapter Six looks at the shift away from personnel management towards a
more strategic approach to the management of labour with the adoption of human resource
management and Chapter Seven examines the implementation of the policies and the problems
Involved in such an approach. The final chapter, Chapter Eight, draws together the thesis with a
summary of the research, a broadening of the discussion to examine business strategy and the
management of labour generally, and some ideas for future research.
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Introduction
This chapter encompasses a review of the literature on three areas:
Development of the clearing banks
2	 Employee relations in the clearing banks
3	 Management strategy.
All three topics are essential to an understanding of the topic of research - business
strategy and the management of labour. The first section examines the macro-economic and
sectoral developments in banking and their impact on organisational structure so as to provide
the context for developments in the Bank; the second looks at the past and present pattern of
employee relations in banking to enable us to see the historical development and how the
approach to managing staff has changed with growing competition; the final section dIscusses
the relationship between business strategy and industrial relations strategy, and examines the
conceptual underpinning of existing theory for utilisation In the thesis.
1 The Clearing Banks in the 1980s
(a) Introduction
In this section an account is provided of the changing character of the banking sector.
We first examine the basic structure of the industry, and the criticisms of conservatism levelled at
it. We then look at the changing context of the 19805, and the effect this has had on strategies
and organisatlonal structure.
(b) Basic Structure
The banking Industry and the whole financial sector are going through a period of
unprecedented change with the main forces being deregulation, competition and new technology
(LJewllyn 1985, Rybcznski 1984). Banks are offering housing services and developing merchant
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banking activities; building societies are offering banking services; large department stores are
also entering the financial sector. Hence, banking in the future will be very different from what we
think of as banking today.
"What is in doubt, however, is what it will really look like. Almost certainly there
will be no typical bank."
(Frazer and Vlttas 1982 p125).
Historically, the traditional function of the clearing banks (so called because indMdual
transactions between them are cleared through the London Clearing House) was to take in retail
consumer deposits and to lend them typically to finance industry and trade (although by 1981
almost a quarter of total clearing bank lending was to persons). These services were provided via
a network of extensive national branches (some 11,000 today) which were linked to a clearing
house to allow money transmission and debt settlement (Shaw and Coulbeck 1983). Thus:
"The banks are essentially financial intermediaries. They make their money by
taking deposits and lending on to other customers at a margin; to attract
customers they did not leW a true cost for their services such as cheque clear-
ing, but subsidised these from profits made by not paying Interest on current
account. At the heart of the bank's operational monopoly in the retail market was
the ownership and control of the clearing system, and this contributed to the
highly segmented financial market structure by placing a significant barrier to
erstwhile competitors."
(MorrIs 1986 p15).
While banks and building societies both competed for deposits, they provided for a
different market In terms of lending, banks typically lending short term unsecured loans by
overdraft (thus requiring the assessment of credit risk), although the overdraft was also used to
finance long term projects since they were commonly rolled over from one year to the next while
the fiction was maintained that they could be recalled on demand (Grady and Weale 1986).
Building societies, on the other hand, made loans for house purchases, i.e. long term secured
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loans. The segmented financial structure ensured that there was little competition with the
merchant banks who financed trade by long term loans or the issue of company shares. Thus the
capital market was separate from the retail banking sector.
Among the clearing banks the degree of price and product competition has been limited,
competition being expressed in the number of branch outlets. Over the years they followed
broadly similar growth strategies: expansion of the branch network in the 1960s; development
abroad in the 1970s, encouraged by authorities to lend to banks and governments in lesser
developed countries so as to recycle the surplus built up by OPEC countries. Problems with bad
debts are apparent in the 1987 profit figures (see Table 2.1). In the 1980s there has been a search
for diversification outside retail banking (Morris 1986). In terms of profitability the clearing banks
have been very successful. Between 1969 and 1977 the consolidated pre-tax profits of the 'Big
Four' more than quadrupled and they dominate the retail banking sector to the extent of having
80% of all bank accounts in Britain. Since 1977 profits have risen steadily (see Table 2.1)
However, it is a matter for debate whether these huge profits reflect outstanding
management performance or owe more to the powerful position they have as a result of
monopoly of the clearing system and to external factors, particularly the high-interest-rate policies
of governments in the attempt to control inflation, which produced the so-called endowment
effect.
Table 2.1: Pre Tax Profits
Barclays	 Uoyds Midland
	
Nat West
1978
	 373
	
189
	
231	 306
1980
	 523
	
305
	
230	 415
1982
	 495
	
329
	 251	 449
1984
	 655
	
468	 135
	
671
1985
	 840
	
561
	 351	 804
1986
	 895
	
700
	
434	 1,011
1987
	 339	 -248	 -505
	
704
Source: Annual Reports
Page 8
CHAPTER iWO
	 UTERATURE REVIEW
Table 2.2: Network Size and Market Share
No. of Branches	 Market Share
1986	 Current Accounts
Barclays	 2,843
	 21.3
National Westminster 	 3,133	 19.8
Midland	 2,211	 15.9
Uoyds	 2,152	 15.3
Trustee Savings Bank	 1,576	 14.0
Royal Bank of Scotland
and Williams and Glyn's 	 842	 4.0
Yorkshire	 287	 3.7
Co-operative	 84	 2.5
Source: Annual Reports Committee of London and Scottish
Clearing Banks (CLSCB)
Furthermore, the trend towards bank accounts has been important: the number of
workers being paid in cash has been reduced from 75% to 54% between 1969 and 1979. It has
also been pointed out that despite the fact that only 20% of clearing bank profits has been paid
out in dividends since 1970, the ratio of equity capital to total bank assets has fallen to the point
where capital Is scarce (Bevan 1985).
(C) The 'Soporific' Clearers
The result of natural market dominance was "Innate conservatism" (Nevin and Davis
1970). The banks perceived their main role to be to obtain the savings of the personal sector via
its branch network as cheaply as possible, and then lend this to industry and commerce with the
personal customer coming second. This conservatism was reinforced by the banks' position at
the centre of the monetary system and their being used as a major instrument in the
implementation of national monetary policy. Government guidelines, both qualitative and
quantitative, on lending acted as a constraint on bank policy (Crawley 1982). The banks were
consequently unhappy with the description of them given by the Monopolies Commission in 1968
as 'soporific'. They were inhibited from innovatory activity by the cartel agreement which fixed the
rates they paid for deposits and the minimum rates charged for overdrafts. The latter were linked
to the Bank Rate and were thus effectively determined by the Bank of England. Hence this
political contingency (Femer 1985) created conflicting objectives of national Interest and private
Page 9
CHAPTER TWO	 LITERATURE REVIEW
profit. The banks saw themselves as public utilities offering facilities which were not profitable,
e.g. free bank managers' advice and helping the government administer exchange controls, for
which they were not directly rewarded (MacCrae and Caimcross 1985).
There were two major changes in the early 1970s. Firstly, In 1970, true profit figures were
published for the first time, which enabled shareholders to assess performance more accurately.
Secondly, the new policy of Competition and Credit Control in 1971 ended ceilings on personal
lending, with banks being encouraged to manage both the assets and liabilities sides of the
balance sheet (Blanden 1982). However, the conservative approach remained. This owed
something to the fact that services were interdependent on the clearing system and the
opportunity to compete by product innovation was limited. Thus:
"the advantage of being first to launch a new service is usually veiy short-term
because there are no secret formulae and nothing patentable - all the
'ingredients' are disclosed in the first advertisement or pamphlet so that the time
for computer re-programming Is usually the main constraint on competitors bent
on imitation." (Crawley 1982 p72).
This could be seen In the immediate response to the launch of Barclaycard with the creation of
the joint credit company by Nat West, Uoyds and the Midland. Furthermore, the Supplementary
Special Deposit Scheme (the so-called 'corset') was introduced in 1973 and continued until 1980
and this Involved a progressive tax on the growth of interest-bearing sterling deposits.
Overall, as Howcroft and Lavis argue, the environment:
"created a concentration on low risk credit formation as the main dynamic of
management with the money transmission mechanism seen in administrative
and functional terms, and the collection of deposits either as an Incremental
aspect of the system or provided through a treasufy function via the wholesale
markets." (1986 p194).
The banks were, in fact, regarded as embodying the British virtues of conservatism, reliability and
security. The other side of this coin, however, was the creation of a gulf between the ordinary
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customer and the bank, with the banks being aimed very much at the top end of the market.
In the 1980s a rude awakening has taken place, with the banks having to examine new
and better ways of providing service, and this has entailed a radical shift in its method of operation
to a more consumer-orientated, marketing-based structure and style. Thus one way of bridging
the gap between the customer and the bank is through the staff themselves. Table 2.3 shows the
growing hold of the building societies on the liquid assets of the personal sector.
Table 2.3: Personal Sector Uquid Assets 1981-7
(end year figures In million)
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
end
Sept
BANK DEPOSITS
Sterling	 Foreign
Sight	 Time	 Currency
	
17,143	 29,219
	
1,265
	
19,445	 30,562	 1,615
	
21,601	 31,898	 1,625
	
24,933	 31,661	 2,378
	
31,406	 30,082
	
2,213
	
38,125	 31,361	 2,296
	
44,817
	
31,836
	
2,114
BUILDING	 NATIONAL	 TOTAL
SOCIETIES	 SAVINGS
NSB	 Other* Other**
	
56,699	 4,553	 13,601	 414	 122,894
	
66,993	 5,357	 16,316	 388	 140676
	
77,243	 6,030	 18,557	 412	 157366
	
90,492	 6,553	 21,350	 422	 177,789
	
103,806	 7,075	 23,296	 389	 198,267
	
115,653	 7,669	 25,213	 361	 220678
	
123,934	 8,194	 26,729	 337	 237961
* NSCs, bonds and SAVE
** tax instrument and short term local authority loans
Source: Mlnteil Report
(d) All Change
The forces of change have come from two main directions: the market itself with
deregulation and Increased competition and, secondly, technological change which is breaking
down barriers between financial Institutions (Uewllyn 1985). The result of these changes will be a
shift away from bank-oriented towards a more market-oriented approach (Rybcznskl 1984). This
will involve a blurring of the lines between capital and credit markets and a greater reliance from
the credit market rather than savings from the personal sector.
(I) The Market
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The challenge to the banks' oligopoly has largely come from the building societies who
have been successful in attracting customers by attractive rates, successful marketing and longer
opening hours (including Saturday opening). They were helped by special tax concessions such
as paying depositors Interest net of tax (extended to banks in 1984) and favourable treatment on
guts investments (recently withdrawn). In addition, they have had a favoured market position In
that mortgage interest received tax relief, they were free from the restraint of reserve requirements
and operated a far more limited range of services. This has resulted In bank complaints that,
since they had to subsidise the money transmission service by deposit accounts, this reduced
their ability to compete equally In the savings market and the tax privileges were, therefore, dis-
criminatory (Leigh-Pemberton 1979, Boleat 1980).
In this context the building societies have expanded their share of resident sterling
deposits from 15% pre-war to 44% by 1985, while the banks' share has fallen from 55% to 33%
(Bevan 1985).
The erosion of the banks' retail deposits was caused partly by their emphasis on the
wholesale money market so as to compete for corporate business (Howcroft and Lavls 1986). In
the 1970s the banks were squeezed by low cost competition on the wholesale side by the
American banks and by the erosion of current and deposit accounts by the building societies and
National Savings on the other. However, the erosion of the banks' position was alleviated by the
growth in domestic lending (some 20% pa) and the growth in Euro markets. Furthermore, the
'endowment' effect of high interest rates Increased the value of current account balances
although public criticism of surplus profits led to the 'windfall' tax in the 1981 Finance Act (Bevan
1985).
However, when in the mid 1980s interest rates fell and with the bad debts abroad this led
to even fiercer competition in the domestic market; the banks responded to the challenge of the
building societies by entering the mortgage market, after the phasing out of the direct monetary
controls in 1980/1 (Hall 1987). This was a dramatic shift in strategy. In the 1978 Annual Reports
there was not a single reference to the housing market (Davies and DavIes 1984). By 1982 the
banks had 40% of the market although this had fallen to 16% by 1985. The gap in the market was
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the result of building societies (at least until the abandonment of the cartel) setting rates at levels
at which there remained unsatisfied demand for funds.
However, this did not prevent continued loss of deposits and the banks were forced to
rely increasingly "on expensive and perhaps footloose wholesale deposits" (Bevan 1985 p2).
Hence in 1950, 75% of the clearing banks' deposits were non interest bearing but by 1985 this had
fallen to 26%. In addition to pressure from building societies there was the competition from
National Savings, as the government could set unrealistic rates to fund the public sector (Quinton
1982). While one attraction of the move into the mortgage market was that it could help offset the
adverse effect of falling interest rates, the banks were well aware that if demand was at a level that
could not be funded from retail accounts they could be pushed into the wholesale markets where,
if rates exceeded those in the retail sector, they would be forced to operate with very fine margins.
Nevertheless, another attraction was that It could be used as a vehicle to introduce other seivices:
insurance, loans for home improvements, etc.
The 1986 Building Societies Act has further increased competition by enabling them to
compete on the asset side of the balance sheet for unsecured personal loans and other banking
business as well as expansion into housing related services: conveyancing, estate agency, etc,
whereas previously the range of activities was heavily proscribed. Furthermore, they are able to
provide money transmission services and obtain funds from the wholesale markets (albeit limited
to 40%). However, some of these opportunities are only available to the largest building societies
and the Act still requires that 90% of assets are used to offer mortgages to owner occupiers.
Thus, Abbey National proposed during this time to become a public company to escape the
restrictions of the Act.
The TSB flotation further added to the competitive pressure and with 1.5 billIon added to
its resources It was expected to target the profitable upper end of the retail and business market,
the Big Four becoming the Big Five, and is already considered a financial services group as much
as a bank. Increasing differentiation has taken place as the National Westminster and Barclays
have become bigger and more international than the others.
The growth in the presence of foreign banks in the U.K (now 400), origInally the result of
Page 13
CHAPTER iWO	 LITERATURE REVIEW
currency markets, has also been important and they now account for 1/4 total corporate lending
In the U.K. Hence, while the volume of business may have increased, profit margins were
squeezed in the 1970s. This was accentuated by deregulation by the government and new
technology which broke down the banks' hold on their markets (Morris 1986). Furthermore, the
banks' continued reliance on all purpose branches and failure to develop specialist service to
corporate customers at the price required, contributed to loss of customers (Plender and Wallace
1985).
The much heralded 'Big Bang' while mainly connected with the Stock Exchange, did raise
serious questions as to the future of banking strategy, with financing from the securities marketing
becoming Increasingly popular. Corporate clients have decided that it is cheaper to borrow by
going to the market and issuing paper than it is to get a bank loan. Furthermore, it is also very
flexible: it can be short term or long term, fixed or floating rate, and may contain elements of debt
and equity (Hamilton 1986). In addition cash surplus is better invested direct in the money market
rather than on deposit in a bank. The banks have faced up to securitisatlon by entering the
traditional area of merchant banking, offering securities to investors on behalf of companies
instead of channelling money through their own books. This was also the result of turning to fee
Income products to increase their capital base with the withdrawal from loan commitments
abroad (Coggan 1986). All the Big Four (except for Lloyds) acquired stockbroking and jobbing
firms before the 'Big Bang'.
In terms of the reta market, the opportunities are to become the main seller of investment
services in the high Street - the so-called financial supermarket or universal bank. indeed the
banks have been criticised for their failure to utilise the branch network to cross-sell financial
products, one of the keys to success in a sector where barriers between different types of
Institution are being eroded. While the banks have within the financial group a comprehensive
range of services, customers go outside the group for their financial needs. An organisatlonal
problem was that each section responsible for handling particular products was administered
separately. Banks are likely to be more active in promoting their products to spread the cost of
the branch network and achieve synergy.
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In the long temi the banks also have to face a challenge from outside the finance sector.
Thus established department stores now provide personal loans, travellers cheques, etc. Marks
and Spencer introduced their credit card In 1985 and in 1988 unveiled an In-house unit trust
scheme, and Debenhams have since followed. While the incursion so far has been limited, the
American experience, based on retailers like Sears Roebuck, suggests that they are well equipped
to launch a drive into banking territory using trusted brand names. Furthermore, they have the
advantage of the 'green field site syndrome' with the opportunity to utilise the latest technology
and working methods.
Overall, it is clear that the banks needed to promote a more attractive image; to move
away from the position where a visit to the bank is only slightly preferable to a visit to the dentist,
towards the American style of a more active marketing approach (KIng 1981). The Midland Bank
launched a new designer image with the bank becoming more like a shop. Iioyds' 'customer first'
workshops were similarly designed to promote customer orientation. Customer loyalty (or Inertia)
can no longer be taken for granted: the customer is more sophisticated and demands a higher
level of service - nearly 10% of customers shift their allegiance each year compared with 2% in the
1970s. The clearing banks' strategic business matrix had never previously regarded customer
attitude as central but, as indicated by the rise in advertising, this Is now changing. The banks
require a shift of presentation away from being regarded merely as a provider of money
transmission services to a provider of a range of financial products and consequently a more
innovative pro-active role (Howcroft and Lavis 1986).
All these pressures are forcing the banks to change. As Bevan observes:
"with so many currents clearly moving against banking as a whole it could be
represented today as a high-risk tailing margin industiy beset by competition on
all fronts - from overseas banks and the new issue market In the corporate
lending sector and from building societies and National Savings on the personal
front with no surge in lending to float it out of trouble." (1985 p2)
With the non-performance of sovereign debt, focus has returned to the domestic market,
although this will squeeze margins further.
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However, the gloom of the early 1980s has been replaced by cautious optimism. The
demand for bank services is still increasing particularly in the areas of home loans and consumer
credit but there is also scope to increase payments via bank credit transfer, and still unexploited Is
diversification into ancillary financial services, e.g. estate agencies (Rajan 1984). In 1986 the pre-
tax profits of the Big Four rose by 20% to 3 billion with over 70% of profit coming from the
domestic side, which was responsible for all the growth. Furthermore, balance sheets were
strong after a high level of retention and capital raising. While Interest rates have fallen, the banks'
policy of making fixed rate loans when rates were high has reaped rewards. The attractions of the
domestic sector were emphasised by the efforts of Standard Chartered and the Hong Kong and
Shanghai Bank to buy a slice of the market with their rival bids for the Royal Bank of Scotland
Group, and the attempt of American-owned money shops, including Boston Trust and Citibank, to
build up their U.K. retail operations (Blanden 1982).
Recently, there have been indications of a more competitive spirit among the clearing
banks: Barclays' Saturday opening in 1982 so as to take on the building societies; Uoyds' bid for
Standard Chartered in 1986; the end of the traditional system of clearing without charge the items
of each others' customers. The banks have begun to offer Interest on current accounts to meet
the challenge of the buildings societies. Furthermore the old style of cross-subsidising in the
account-charging structure is under threat as the process of 'unbundling' takes place (Morris
1986). There have also been link-ups by Midland with the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank, and by
Uoyds Bank with Abbey Life Assurance. Table 2.4 shows how the banks have responded to
buildIng society dominance in the mid 19805.
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-311
39
70
158
96
n/a
4,275
3,788
3,222
3,318
5,139
8,465
5,856
4,182
3,522
2,911
3,317
2,469
2,510
1,629
15,645
17,293
16,422
19,954
21,080
22,306
13,727
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987*
7,082
10,294
10,250
13,249
13,314
11,235
6,242
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Table 2.4: Personal Sector Uquid Assets Annual Inflows 1981-7
Banks	 Building	 National
Societies	 Savings
m
	
m
	
m
UTERATURE REVIEW
Other**	 Total
m	 m
* Jan-June
** tax instruments and short term local authority loans
Source: Mintell
Banks have never obtained the full costs of customer transactions but have subsidised
this by not paying on current accounts; however, as banks lost deposits to building societies and
are forced to pay interest on cheque accounts (problems worsened by technological advance
which enables account holders to operate with low working balances) a new strategy has to be
adopted (Hammond 1981).
In the credit card market the late 1980s have seen the introduction of credit cards by
building societies (Halifax and Leeds), foreign banks (Chase Manhattan) and financial companies
(Save and Prosper). Reference to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission also gave
competition a push, and banks are now members of both Mastercard and Visa operations.
(ii) Technology
The pace of change In information technology in banking has been intense. In 1973 253m
was invested by the banks. By 1981 this had risen to 750m. This has enabled the volume of
business to be expanded without a comparable rise in employment.
There have been two main and overlapping phases in the development of new technology
in banking. Firstly In the 1980s there was investment in mainframe computers which enabled
central processing of bank accounts; following from this the Bankers' Automated Clearing
Services (BACS) allowed inter branch bank transfer of funds by magnetic tape to take place.
Secondly, In the 1970s new technology began to come to the branches themselves; back office
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terminals - in effect, on-line mini computers which collected information during the day and then
transmitted this for central processing. These were later followed by the automatic teller machine
(ATM) (Rajan 1984), the dramatic expansion of which can be seen In Tables 2.5 and 2.6.
Table 2.5: Total Number of Cash Dispensers and ATMs
1975	 1977	 1980	 1981	 1982	 1983
	
1984	 1985	 1986
565	 875	 1,735	 2,846	 4,061	 5,740
	
6,815	 8,851	 10174
Source: CLSCB
Table 2.6: Buiidln9 Societies' ATM network 1982-85
No of ATMs
1982	 6
1983	 112
1984	 291
1985	 652
Source: CLSCB/Mintell
ATMs exemplify the difficulties in drawing clearcut distinctions between product and
process technology (Rajan 1984). Wiilman and Cowan (1984) explain how they fit both
categories: a new product (I.e. 24 hour banking) and also account Information storage. ATMs
have been Introduced both to contain rising costs and improve the quality of service. However,
their development raises important questions in terms of the size of the branch network as
building societies move in to provide money transmission services without incurring the cost of
the present paper based system. Furthermore, sharing facilities, e.g. Abbey National and the Co-
operative Bank, enables smaller institutions to overcome the problems associated with size and
target profitable activities.
Nor are AIMs all of one type: while almost 2/3 are through the wall, others are placed
inside the branches so as to maintain interpersonal contact and expose the customer to the range
of services or more remotely placed in shopping areas so as to attract a wider range of
customers. The banks have used ATMs to support a variety of objectives (Wiliman and Cowan
1984) with Barclays particularly slow to install them, preferring to use Saturday opening to attract
customers.
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In the clearing process there have been two major innovations recently: the Society of
Worldwide Inter-Bank Financial Telecommunications (SWIFT) began operating in 1977 to allow for
the electronic transmission of messages; and the Clearing House Automated Payment System
(CHAPS) came into operation in 1984 to allow same day' settlement of funds in excess of 10,000
rather than use the manual clearing system.
The two major developments for the future are Electronic Fund Transfer at Point of Sale
(EFTPOS) and home banking. The former allows the by-passing of existing operations involving
the handling of cheques and cash by the electronic transfer of funds from the buyer to the seller.
The implications of the scheme are not yet fully clear.
"It is an open ended question then whether developments in EFT will render
large branch networks redundant. If that proves to be the case then existing
institutions with substantial networks would be at a ma/or cost disadvantage until
they had dismantled them or utilised them in some other profitable way. It would
also mean that small localised banks or building societies could operate
nationally at relatively low cost." (Shaw and Coulbeck 1983 p5)
The problems and concerns, particularly for the consumer, have not yet been settled (Marti and
Zeilinger 1982) and, given that restrictive practices legislation will prevent the banks having a
closed system, the banks still fear that building societies will get a "free ride" (Quinton 1982).
Home banking will be the most significant of all delivery systems, although it is unlikely to
have much of an impact until the 1990s, in that it does not depend on an established customer
franchise. In Britain, Nottingham Building Society and the Bank of Scotland have operated
Homellnk since 1983 and TSB have launched Speedlink this year.
(e) Impact on Organisatlonal Structure
The breakdown of barriers between financial institutions has called into question the
whole concept of a clearing bank (Cooke 1986). The importance of the branch structure was
related to its being essential to the money transmission mechanism, and the fact that the number
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of outlets was re9arded as the main method of competition (Blariden 1982).
As Frazer and Vittas point out:
"conventional wisdom until recently has been that branch networks should be as
large as possible. There are good reasons why in the past this was a correct
view. Convenient branch location is a major factor in customer choice, so the
banks with most branches tended to get most customers. Convenience was an
almost overwhelming factor in the days when there was little to differentiate the
products of different banks. Large branch networks also provided a higher level
of service to customers travelling away from the vicinity of their own branch.
Banks with large branch networks traded on the convenience they offered
customers. Because personal customers were interested in having a safe place
to put their savings, with easy access to them In time of need, high street banks
could afford to pay low rates of interest. The core of bank saving accounts still
represent cheap money since customers are prepared to accept a relatively low
rate of interest in return for convenient withdrawal facilitIes." (1982 p106)
Furthermore the branch was a major barrier to entry although this has now been eroded
by technological developments which, as has been noted, enable new entrants to compete
without Incurring the huge fixed costs. Hence the:
"fundamental aspect of their business, the branch, is growing less relevant:
more centralised management functions, such as business development,
marketing and control of the balance sheet, are shifting the focus of organisation
from the diffuse and largely unstructured branch network towards the centre.
Developments In telecommunications and electronic technology are the main
arbiters of this shift. Communication and In formation permit a much greater
degree of central management, and hence strategic control, of the business. In
effect, the banks are now in a position to structure their response to the
environment, rather than, as in the past, the environment tending to dictate the
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organlsational form." (Howcroft and Lavis 1986 p192)
Changes in strategy are likely to place a greater emphasis on marketing and the structure
will move from being mechanistic and problem solving (suitable for a stable environment) to a
more organic structure (Cowan 1982). As Large argues:
"the bank needs to be structured around its customers' financial needs and
problems rather than its own operational procedures." (1980 p99)
Paradoxically, one of the main features of the breakdown of distinctions between different
types of institution is to increase the individuality of these institutions: no longer will it be possible
to generalise about 'the clearing banks' or 'the building societies'. Wtth the end to segmentation
of the financial markets caused by regulatory or technological constraints it may be difficult for
Institutions to distinguish themselves either by cost advantages or product differentiation. A
different strategy matrix is the 'focus strategy'. This means Identifying limited groups within the
industry-wide clientele for whom particularly advantageous packages of accounts, credits and
services can be constructed, and making one or more of these limited groups the core of the
business (Sontheimer and Thom 1986 p116). The very broadest choice here would be to decide
whether to compete in the retail or wholesale sector or both. Even though:
"financial products may be similar for these two markets, the business of serving
them are quite different, requiring different management skills." (Pollock 1985
p38)
The pressures Indicated do not necessarily signal the end of the branch network system
(see Table 2.7). As Shaw and Coulbeck observe:
"it Is not possible for the large banks to divert veiy quickly from such enormous
commitment to premises, equipment and staff so that a steady progress of
streamlining Is likely to take place." (1983 p58)
Furthermore branches still remain a barrier to entry (although diminishing); they project the
corporate image and meet the customers needs; rationaiisation could lead to the loss of some
accounts ar J costs will be incurred by transferring accounts and moving staff (Pattison and
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Quelch 1979, MorrIson and Frazer 1982).
Table 2.7: BrItish Bank Branches 1975-88
1975	 15,102
1976	 15,102
1977	 15,093
1978	 14,911
1979	 14,828
1980	 14,767
1981	 14,749
1982	 14,681
1983	 14,500
1984	 14,377
1985	 14,143
1986	 14,005
Source: Committee of London and Scottish Bankers (CUB)
Branch segmentation and downgrading seem set to continue as the function of each
branch is defined more closely to the market It serves. In part this can be seen as a shift towards
price competition with each branch needing to justify itself in financial terms. Barclays with 2,850
branches In 1985 aim to reduce this by 500 withIn ten years with a further 500 downgraded to
money shop operations (Turner 1985). Midland have closed 500 branches in the last ten years,
over 17% of the total network, and 300 in the last three years, although they have had to open
new branches in the south at the same time (Gregson 1987). Changes within the branches are
also taking place: open plan branches to allow greater scope for marketing products. Barclays
are aiming to distribute shares through its branch network to personal customers, which would
also alleviate cost pressures on the branches. Insurance broking is being pursued by Uoyds
through the Black Horse Estate Agency, which, with 80% of the customers from other banks, will
provide it with the opportunity to recruit new customers.
Cleaily the clearing banks have the advantage of several million customers for whom the
branch network is still important, although Plender and Wallace (1986) argue that this means the
banks had never had to fight for customers or experience fierce competition. It is only in the last
twenty years as the personal customer has become more important that the clearing banks have
accepted the concept of marketing.
One of the fears for the future of banking Is that:
"the current pace of change is greater than at any time In the past with the
possible danger that it would lead to ill considered decisions about future
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strategies and business options taken under the impetus of immediate
competitive pressure."	 (Uewllyn 1985 p20)
(f) Summary
This section has examined the development of the clearing banks over the last twenty
years and the shift which has taken place from conservatIsm, stemming from a natural market
dominance to being more market driven with the end to the oligopoly. In addition, with increasing
intensity of competition and the fragmentation of markets, there is increasing differentiation
among the banks and also organisational change so as to enable the banks to respond more
effectively to customer needs. The thesis is concerned to explore the impact of these macro-
economic changes on the Co-operative Bank, the manner in which the Bank perceives and reacts
to the competitive environment, and how it seeks to position itself in the financial sector. While
there is consensus that banks are becoming more market driven, there is a need to examine what
this actually means in strategic, organisational and human resource temis.
2 Employee RelatIons In the Clearing Banks
(a) Introduction
There have been several studies of employee relations in the British clearing banks, in
particular Morris (1986) analysed changing business strategies and their impact on the
management of labour over the last twenty years. Other studies focusing more narrowly on
industrial relatIons Include Alien and Williams (1960), Blackburn (1967), Robinson (1969) and
Heritage (1983). The extensive literature on white-collar workers, the dual labour market, new
technology and gender issues is also of relevance, e.g. Prandy (1965), BaIn (1970), Doeringer and
Plore (1971), Roberts et al (1972), Prandy, Stewart and Blackburn (1982) and Crompton and
Jones (1984). In this section we examine the system of paternalism which has characterised
employee relations in banking and also the dual union structure. We then look at the trends in the
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1980s as the changing nature of the industry has impacted on employee relations.
Retail banking has traditionally been characterised as a highly labour intensive industry
with labour costs some 70% of total operating expenditure. The banks have been regarded as
highly mechanistic organisatlons (Burns and Stalker 1961, Cowan 1982) with staff seen as a fixed
cost because of their association with money transactions and the branch structure (Morris
1986a).
Despite rapid automation and increasing competitive pressure, banks have not had to
institute Job cuts and indeed employment has expanded although not at a rate comparable to the
volume of business (Rajan 1984).
The finance sector may provide a partial explanation of the paradox posed by industrial
relations experts of enormous continuity in the institutions of industrial relations along with the
evidence of enormous change at the workplace (Batstone and Gourlay 1986). At the same time
competitive pressures in the 1 980s have led to a shift from a national system of bargaining to an
enterprise based system.
(b) Paternalism in the banks
The banks have been characterised by apparently harmonious industrial relations and
have not suffered from the 'British disease' of Industrial action associated with the manufacturing
industry (Palmer 1983). The banks' oligopoly in the product market was reflected in similar
management styles across banks. The banks have followed a strategy of bureaucratic
paternalism similar in some respects to the Clvii Service, ICI and some large private sector
companies. The banks have promoted unitarism (Fox 1974) encouraging an ethos of teamwork,
shared interests and loyalty. It Is true that to some extent white collar workers have in any case
been seen to Identify more with managers, holding a 'prestige' hierarchy view of status rather than
a polarised two-class concept (Lockwood 1958, Prandy 1965, Crompton and Jones 1984). Unlike
blue collar workers, there is not a clear dividing line between management and workforce.
Furthermore as LOCkWOOd points out:
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1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
285,773
291,177
295,379
296,980
318,323
329,235
1975	 244,522
1976	 248,535
1977	 255,907
1978	 262,886
1979	 278,413
1980	 191,793
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"the outstanding fact which all but the most biased observer of the class system
must recognise is that, although he shares the property-less state of the manual
worker, the clerk has never been strictly proletarian, in terms of income, job
security and occupational mobility." (1958 p203)
The banks wanted a commitment beyond the cash nexus and reinforced what could be
regarded as a natural IdentificatIon by Its policy of paternalism. Paternalism was thus to be seen
as a strategy as well as a conditioning set of values (Morris 1986 p23) and, following Morris, it
should be regarded as a multi-faceted concept.
As a result of the banks' position in the financial system, the banking manager was
regarded as a 'financial GP', with responsibility to a wider community and not solely concerned
with making money. The banks were thus distinct in some genteel fashion from the more vulgar
occupations of industry and commerce (Nevin and Davis 1970 p198). A clearing bank chairman,
speaking after the Second World War, claimed banking was not a business but a public service
(Bevan 1987).
Secondly, banks were concerned with the 'whole man'. Lifetime employment was the
norm for career staff and this was made possible by rapid expansion and high profits. Table 2.8
shows the growth in employment in banking.
Table 2.8: British Banks' U.K. Staff 1975-86
Source: CLSCB
As Lockwood observed:
"Job security did constitute a partial alternative to ownership." 	 (1958 p204)
There was also a social wage in the form of substantial fringe benefits: non-contributory
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pensions, subsidised loans, etc. Enterprise consciousness was engineered by social activities
(e.g. sports facilities) designed to encourage employee commitment (and also to some extent to
discourage unionisation). Such benefits form part of what D. Roy terms the 'sweet stuff'
employers' strategy (see Crouch 1982 p48).
From early on, banking employment was regarded as different to other forms of
employment. Thus W. Gilbert, a Victorian banker, wrote that:
"there would be considerable difficulty In applying the rules laid down by
political economists with regard to the wages of labourers to the case of the
bank clerk. A banker does not hire a clerk because he is the cheapest man he
can get, nor does he dismiss him as soon as he can get another man to do the
same work at a lower price. He would not find it in his interest to do this; for his
work is of a peculiar kind. This clerk must have a certain degree of education
and of manner and be taken from a certain class in society. They are not
allowed to engage in any other employment. They have to maintain a
respectable appearance. They must be prepared to take higher posts should a
vacancy occur. And in every post they are entrusted with a large amount of
property and upon their integrity and prudence reliance must at all times be
placed."	 (quoted by Cowan 1984 p9)
Thirdly, and most importantly, the career structure was vital in ensuring loyalty of
employees. A system of Internal promotion was underpinned by an unwritten agreement between
the banks on no poaching. Hence opportunities for career advancement were with the one bank
and, in theory, all who entered the banks' employment had the opportunity to reach the top
management positions. This appeared to be supported by the fact that most senior management
had risen through the clerical grades (the basic job structure In banking being four clerical grades
and above that appointed and managerial posts). The total dependency on the internal labour
market contributed to the ethos of legitimate management and forms part of the system of
bureaucratic control (Edwards 1979). Thus the internal labour market within the individual bank is
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more consistent with Edwards' argument on increasing control and dependence that the
Doeringer and Piore (1971) thesis of skill specificity related to uniqueness of production and
technology, for while banking skills themselves may be specific, there is little evidence to suggest
that skills within one bank are non-transferable. Furthermore, the emphasis on general skills
served two functions for the banks; it ensured the flexibility necessary if job security was to be
guaranteed; secondly, it prevented or hindered thinking along careers based on specialisms
which are self-evidently transferable (Marsden 1982). This cult of the all-rounder - the banker who
can do anything - has clear parallels with the CMI Service, which has similar principles of job
security, seniority promotion and lifetime careers; the bank manager is very much an
'organisation man' (Whyte 1960), who does not just work for the bank but belongs to the
organisation. There are some similarities with the corporate paternaiism found in large Japanese
companies (Hill 1981 p53-60). Such a system rewarding loyalty and experience, for instance, by
age-related increments for clerical staff seemed appropriate, given the stable product market.
For many white collar workers, careers are at the centre of their value system.
Paternalism, and the loyalty it engendered, rested partly on the opportunity of career
advancement for the bank employee. Bain, Coates and Ellis (1973) give it as one reason for the
moderation of male bank staff. While managers only represent 7.1% of all staff (or 15% of men
over the age of 25 - the age when turnover fails sharply), above half can expect to hold a
managerial position at some stage in their employment In the bank (Marsden 1982). For this to
occur, there must be a high degree of wastage from the clerical grades. In 1968 the wastage rate
for women aged 18-23 in the clearing banks was 25% pa (Heritage 1983). As we have noted,
historically it was the pattern that men were regarded as future bank managers and hence studied
for professional exams while women would work only until marriage. While It was undoubtedly
the case, particularly In the 1 960$, that many women who entered banking were not Interested in
a career, bank policies on recruitment and personnel policies reinforced this. Thus the banks laid
down minimum education levels for men but not for women. Hence In 1979, 52% of women had
less than four 0-levels as against 22% of men (Egan 1982) and so there were human capital
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divergencles, themselves partly the result of recruitment; potential was assessed at different
stages using different standards (Povall et al., 1982); age Incremental scales In the 1960s
progressively narrowed for women but widened for men after the age of 24; as recently as 1975
Midland Bank asked male applicants only if they were willing to undertake banking exams. In any
case, study leave and access to training courses was very much at management discretion.
Hence for some bank staff, there was a job rather than a career, and this tended to reflect gender.
There is an extensive literature on the two-tier career structure, e.g. Blackburn 1967, Egan
1982, Heritage 1983, Crompton and Jones 1984. Blackburn's reference to a "clearcut sex
distinction" still holds true. While 60% of the workforce in the clearing banks are female (c.f. 37%
in 1948), fewer than 17% of supervisors and junior managers are women, and above that no more
than 3% (Boydon and Paddison 1986).
The work situation reinforced a co-operative ethos (Lockwood 1958). The majority of
bank employees work in small high street branches where the work Is not very fragmented and
mutual co-operation is vital for the branch to function (Heritage 1983). With an average 14.2 staff
at each branch (Child and Tarbuck 1985) this clearly facilitated informal communication and less
rigid hierarchical structures. As Heritage (1983) notes small branch size leads to common and
overlapping experiences of work and concentrates to 'branch norms' which Influence attitudes at
work.
Collective representation in banking has been characterised by dualism: representation of
staff by 'internallst' staff associations and by a national union existing side by side. This reflects
banks' attitudes and strategies. Initially banks were hostile to collective representation and
pursued "forcible opposition" but this changed to "peaceful competition" to head off union
growth (8am 1970) and the attempt to shape collective representation was reflected in the
'internalism' of staff associations which were initially set up, supported and encouraged by the
banks, and Indeed were dependent on them (Ailen and Williams 1960). They were also facilitated
by the internal labour market and the ambivalence of bank employees to unionisation.
Intemaiism has been described as:
Page 28
CHAPTER TvVO	 UTERATURE REVIEW
"system by which the staff of any particular business organise themselves to
negotiate with their own management on all matters concerning staff conditions,
with an emphasis upon the common interests of employer arid employed."
(Cowan 1984 p15).
Hence the company-based staff associations have been in conflict with the national
Banking, Insurance and Finance Union (BIFU). While the terms and conditions in banking, and
indeed the experiences of banking in general, are virtually the same in each bank, staff have not
identified strongly with those in other banks, and this has been encouraged by the banks'
emphasis on the enclosed culture of each bank.
Historically it has been true that for the average career oriented male clerk, the prospect
of advancement was such that Joining the union was likely to have the effect of hindering him,
since union involvement and management status were regarded as incompatible. Women tended
not to join, allegedly because of the expected short term nature of their employment and the fact
that marriage awaited them. The work was also seen as fairly pleasant. Furthermore the
opportunity to join the union was hindered since, without recognition, there was no access to the
workplace and norms in small branches as we observed were heavily influenced by branch
managers (Heritage 1983). Blackburn (1967 p51) suggested that white collar attitudes tend to be
unfavourable towards unionism and, to the extent that white collar workers have joined unions,
this has usually been explained as a defensive reaction to declining status (Strauss 1954, Mills
1951, Allen 1971, Roberts et al 1972), purely instrumental, accepting a loss of prestige for
economic gain and very much motivated by a desire to maintain differences vis-a-vis the manual
worker.
As noted, white collar workers are generally regarded as being more individualistic and
less militant than manual workers, and bank workers in particular have been seen as the "ultra
middle class group of workers" (Lockwood 1958 p176). The forerunner of the union, the Bank
Officers' Guild, was keen from the inception to avoid association with the manual trade unions
and maintain professional status (Blackburn 1967).
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Between them the BIFU and the staff associations represent some two thirds of the
250,000 staff in the clearing banks. Also, the Manufacturing, Scientific and Finance Union (MSF)
have a presence In the Midland Bank, having absorbed (when they were the Association of
Scientific, Technical and Managerial Staffs - ASTMS) the Midland Bank staff association. Hostility
between the two bodies has not abated, although the staff associations have become noticeably
more unionate (Blackburn 1967) and there has been fierce competition for membership between
the two.
The BIFU, formerly the National Union of Banking Employees (NUBE) has, as the
changed name indicates, moved from a banking union to a more broadly based finance union,
with less than 50% of its membership in the banking sector. The diversification was an attempt to
respond to financial and organisational difficulties, but paradoxically, in order to make the union
more attractive, power has been decentraiised to the sectors and BIFU has adopted a more
enterprise oriented approach - hence, close to the staff associations in this respect ('Wiliman and
Morris 1985). Thus, the bank clerical worker is no longer at the core of BIFU membership.
After the NUBE complaint to ILO and the resulting Cameron Report in 1965, government
pressure and industrial action led to the establishment of joint representation at both national and
domestic levels. However, NUBE withdrew from the Negotiating Joint Council in 1977, ostensibly
because of opposition to the pay claim, which went against the government's income policy, but
also as part of the Union's strategy to pursue majority membership by showing its greater power
(Morris 1986b). In 1980 the Clearing Bank Union was founded by the staff associations of
Barclays, National Westminster and Uoyds and collective bargainIng was re-established with
separate but identical arrangements for the BIFU and the CBU in 1983. While merger talks
continued with the aborted Association of Banking and Finance Unions (ABFU 1973-6) and the
Johnston Report of 1978, they were dogged by ideological difticulties and disagreement over
control of subscriptions, employment of officials and the question of branch structures (Morris
1 986b).
The collapse of the Federation of London Ctearing Bank Employers in 1986 also spelt the
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end for the Cearing Bank Union but this has not yet led to the re-establishment of merger talks.
Overall, the management of labour has been important in the contribution to the banks'
commercial success even if only in the negative sense of not preventing or hindering change.
Paternalistic policies, dMded staff representations and weak shopfloor organisation all enabled
management to have a high degree of control and retain prerogative. The next section explores
two key themes: firstly, changes in the context of banking and the destabilising effect this may
have on paternalistic policies; and, secondly, the extent to which it is no longer enough for
management to see labour as merely a facilitatIng force. As banks become more market driven, it
is argued that far more active co-operation is required from employees and they must contribute
in a positive sense to the commercial success of the organisation.
(C) The End of Paternalism? - Employee Relations in the 1980s
(I) Settin9
Much of the literature on the future of employment in banks (both in terms of quantity and
quality, has been pessimistic (BIFU 1983, 1984) and draws from the work of writers on technology
in general, e.g. Braverman (1974). In practice, many of the fears have proved to be unfounded
(Cooke 1986). The impact of technology has been mediated by economic, social and
organisational moderators (see Figure 2.1).
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Figure 2.1: Conceptualisation of the Technological Impact on Jobs
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in the 1 970s the rate of volume growth, the lack of trained specialists, customer attitudes
and technical difficulties limited the realisatlon of the full potential of technology. However, in the
1980s competitive pressure has acted as an accelerator and employment growth has already
slowed (Rajan 1984). Even in the 1970s, while business growth was 7% in real terms,
employment only grew by 2%. It Is difficult to estimate the effects dosely since they vary between
different levels of application. While some Innovations are concerned with automating existing
processes, others are designed to create new services and may, therefore, result In net
employment creation (Cooke 1986)
The end to the ollgopolistic structure of the sector In the 1980s has shifted strategic
thinking away from the traditIonal problem solving approach (appropriate in a stable environment)
to a more creative approach. Thus one banker observed that:
"Banks are moving away from being successful bureaucracies - conservative,
stable, formalistic, hierarchical and reactive; staffed by prudent career-minded
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professionals, mlnimising risk (both corporate and personal) - to engagement in
a wider spectrum of increasingly diversified and inherently more risky and less
stable activities on a global basis."
	 (Mosson 1986 p53)
As each bank decides what package of financial services It will provide, this will lead to re-
assessment of organisational structure and skill requirements. Given that industrial relations is not
seen as an autonomous function but essentially facilitative and determined by 'first order'
business objectives, changes in business objectives will affect the approach to the management
of labour. The withdrawal of Midland from the Federation of London Clearing Bank Employers
(FLCBE) in 1985 was a good example of product market change affecting labour relations. The
Midland Board stated that: "we can't go on paying all the staff on the same time honoured
basis", and argued for the need for more flexible pay structures so as to be more closely aligned
with business strategy. Midland were also said to be motivated by the failure of the CBU and
BIFU to establish a reasonable working relationship. Furthermore, the collapse of their US based
subsidiary, Crocker Bank, had placed the Bank in a difficult financial position. This took place at a
time of increasing domestic competition and concern with Third Wotid debt.
Midland's withdrawal was, in retrospect, the beginning of the end for the FLCBE and
national pay bargaining. In 1987 the FLCBE (consisting then of the Nat West, Barclays and
Uoyds) collapsed under the combined pressure of growing competition for staff (Nat West's
problems in recruiting staff in London being the trigger point), industrial action over pay and the
product market changes outlined. it seems clear that, as the banks diversify, the traditional
policies to manage labour will require change. This move to enterprise level bargaining is, of
course, in line with national trends (Brown 1983). The national bargaining structure had been set
up at a time when demand for staff was high, especially for whIte collar workers, and the product
market was stable, and hence the structure had effectively taken wages out of competition. By
1987 the banks were positioned differently in the market.
Cost pressures are paramount. Even with increasing automation there was a belief that
the banks were overmanned (Fanning 1981). Furthermore, given that some 60% of staff were
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employed in the money transmission system, there is concern with the development of EFTPOS
and home banking. The need to contain labour costs was evident in the withdrawal of the
clearing banks from their commitment to unilateral arbitration in 1981, on the grounds that they
did not want decisions on pay and, therefore, costs left to outside bodies. This illustrates how the
priorities of conflict avoidance of the late 1960$ clashed with the cost priorities of the 1 980s
(Morris 1984).
There are fears that this will threaten the paternalistic policies of the banks with an end to
the notion of a fair wage and possible leapfrogging. It remains to be seen whether a pay club or
round table network will take the place of the Federation.
The failure of the unions to control the process of technological change explains their
pessimism. Both the BIFU and the CBU would like new technology agreements to ensure
negotiating rights and job security, although this has so far only been achieved in the Co-
operative Bank and the Yorkshire Bank, with watered down versions in the TSB and the Royal
Bank of Scotland. Neither union is opposed to its introduction and both believe It could remove
the drudgery of paper work and, for instance, bring a shorter working week. The BIFU
Microelectronics Committee argue for the acceptance by the United Kingdom financial
management of complete trade union involvement in the process of change. It is argued that if
they are short sighted enough to resist participation, they should be warned that they must take
full responsibility for the organised resistance of the workforce (BIFU 1982).
In practice, BIFU have had two major problems. Firstly, there is management insistence
on prerogative, when it comes to technology, which they argue is justified by competitive
pressure, and hence this means the unions have consultation rights only (Child and Tarbuck
1985). Secondly, of course, there has been difficulty mobilising members whom the union
regards as complacent. In addition to fears of job loss, the main concern is with career structures
and part-time working (Wlllman 1986). Yet, despite union pronouncements, banking seems well
in tune with other sectors in terms of the 'lack of trauma' over the introduction of new technology
and the relative stability of management-union relationships (Batstone et al 1987).
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There are a number of explanations for this. Firstly, change has taken place over time
and in a piecemeal, incremental manner. Secondly, it has taken place In the context of growth.
Rajan (1984) has referred to the virtuous circle of growth - technical Innovation and new business
growth - although he does indicate that with more mature technology and a more competitive
environment the honeymoon period may be over. Thirdly, the impact on employment may be
much more complex than a one-dimensional view. For instance It may Improve the content of
jobs while restricting career opportunities. Fourthly, the paternalistic system could successfully
be utilised to lubricate the wheels of change.
(II) Implications for Employee Relations
The effect of changes in the finance sector in terms of employee relations is wide ranging:
"As the range of business options is extended and as problems become
Increasingly uncertain and strategic options more risk prone, this requires
cultural changes and a new approach to recruitment, training, career
progression and motivation." (Howcroft and Lavis 1986 p13)
Cowan describes banks as:
"Typical mechanistic organisations and this type of structure has served them
very well In the past. The question is whether it will serve them well In the future
in a rapidly changing economic and technological environment. It would be
wise to assume not, and human resourcing managers should be considering
how their organlsatlon becomes more organic." 	 (1983 p22).
Much speculation has taken place on future career patterns. It is clear that more (high
calibre) graduates will be recruited into what were previously specialist functions. This has
already happened with the electronic data processing function. Furthermore, the traditional
system of top managerial posts only being available to those with long branch experience is
threatened. Thus many of the new recruits are not bankers at all but financial market experts,
computer systems designers, etc. The banks are no longer able to meet requirements by in-
Page 35
CHAPTER VvVO
	
UTERATURE REVIEW
house training. This is consistent with Handy's (1984) predictIon of ever-increasing reliance on
outside professional expertise. As Segal-Horn points out:
"these are all groups with very real external labour markets and no acquired
socialisation Into the banking industry."
(1986 p15)
Hence different st1es of management, career paths, remuneration packages, etc are required.
A broader question relates to the general polarisation of career structures Into career and
non-career. The more routine jobs, e.g. cheque clearing, and those not requIrIng intensive
training will be filled by the non-career scheme or married women, mostly part-timers. Hence the
traditional model of careers in banking as a simple pyramid, Implying that all who enter at the
bottom have the opportunity to reach the top, Is being modified, so that for many a non-career
path is made clear from the start. As Rajan (1984) states, no longer will banking represent the
principle that "every private carries a field marshal's baton in his knapsack".
One must be careful not to see a two-tIer career system as a sudden change - in many
ways it could be seen official recognitIon of what In reality, was In practice two tier. in fact, multi
tier recruitment has been takIng place for some twenty years. Thus the traditional homogeneous
entry of 16 year olds was replaced in the 1970s by a mixture of 16 and 18 year old school leavers
(Mosson 1986). However It is the case that, it Is unlikely for instance, that a 16 year old school
leaver would become a branch manager by 45. With shrinking opportunities for many recruits at
the lower level, and more women being career-oriented, this has Implications for the
proletarlanisatlon of the workforce. Thus if:
"only a minimum of women achieve promotion then this will constitute a serious
threat to the established pattern of male non-manual careers." (Crompton and
Jones 1984)
'Career' staff will thus consist of the new layer of specialists and a re-skilled group of generalists.
The notion of core and periphery categories of workers, applied particularly In the manufacturing
sector, Is of relevance (AtkInson 1985). Nat West and Uoyds, In 1983 and 1984 respectively,
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ended their programme of day release to study for lOB exams for all except those on
management trainee schemes. Barclays has ended time off for the majority of new entrants,
which has been interpreted by BIFU as an acknowledgment that career prospects are limited.
While lip service has been paid to providing greater opportunity for women, with career breaks
schemes being introduced by Midland, Nat West and Barclays, only highly qualified staff are
eligible (Boydon and Paddison 1986). There are also few examples of positive action in terms of
provision of child-care facilities, opportunities for part-time working in more senior management
or a high provision of maternity leave above what is statutory (Povali et al 1982).
Segal-Horn argues that changes in the career structure shows how poorly established
banking has been as a profession:
"The professional qualifications offered by the Institute of Bankers ser'ed as an
artificial and purely internal labour market since the banks had always controlled
both the supply and the number of new entrants as well as career progression by
operating a no poaching policy." (1986 p15)
In a sense, then, exams were more important as a reflection of attitude than ability.
Traditional managers will have to adapt to a more pro-active approach, although some
will have reservations about doing what they regard as a salesman's Job. Hence the
"management of exit" will become increasingly important (Hunt 1984). With new technology
there will be a shift of staff away from processing items in the clearing system to marketing new
products. As banks become more like retail shops, tellers become sellers, open plan banking
becomes the norm and operations are divided into corporate and personal, the staff recruited will
change to reflect this.
The extent to which the changes outlined are detrimental to bank staff has yet to be
determined. One must be careful not to follow the Braverman type analysis (1974) which, by
associating new technology with deskilling, assumes a technological imperative. New
technology, for instance, could lead to greater variety and autonomy within the Job, since it
facilitates the making of more routine decisions at a lower level; Job enlargement, if not
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enrichment, with tellers performing back-office functIons as well as speeded up front-office
functions. The machine room in 'on-line' new technology branches' processes works via on-line
terminals, and this requires the skill at the terminals and a more rounded task. Lobby work can be
divided Into bank tellers' Jobs, routine and non-routine tasks, and the 'open plan' screenless
counter has reduced their role. Child et ai (1985) noted the differing responses of full-time and
part-time cashiers to these changes and the divergence between what each sought from work
was apparent. This raises questions on recruitment and motivation. In the very different
occupation of industrial technicians, Roberts et al observed that:
"as a solution to the lack of career advancement opportunities, management in
some cases was adopting a policy of job enrichment and enlargement. It was
hoped that by extending jobs by the addition of extra tasks and responsibility this
would give the employees a greater sense of achievement and go some way to
satis4'ing the aspiration of technicians for promotion and more control over their
work." (1972 p325)
In the 1980s:
"automation has moved into the front office as well as proliferation of
communications network and micro-computers designed to support
management decision making. This has vastly expanded the range of jobs
affected directly by changing technology." (Cooke 1986 p15)
This would facilitate branches performing functions previously under Head Office control
and hence line managers could become more involved in both setting objectives and assessing
performance.
Thus, even a tentative examination of some of the changes makes it clear that existing
personnel policy in recruitment, Job design, remuneration, training, management development,
etc will have to be re-examined. As noted, it has been external market pressure that has been
responsible for the banks re-assessing their approach to the management of labour. As in other
sectors, 'flexibility' is in fashion. The dual labour force is one aspect of this. in terms of pay
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structures, there is likely to be a reduction in grades and incremental steps to ensure greater task
flexibility and less rigidly defined jobs - although this has never been a problem for the banks.
While job evaluation may determine the rate for the job, performance related increments will
become increasingly important. Such remuneration packages have received most attention in
connection with the City and the 'Big Bang', but the financial sector as a whole has experienced
ripples from this.
With the banking culture now being oriented towards results the pay system is being
adapted to reflect and reinforce this. Profit sharing has helped In the development of 'flexibility'
since the payments are usually non-pensionable and thus not a fixed cost. Specialists require a
different pay system altogether, since they may not be suitable for promotion within the general
pay structure.
The building societies, with Abbey National at the forefront, are also in the process of re-
assessing pay structure and abandoning across the board increases in favour of performance
related pay.
However, concern should be expressed on the way such systems are being introduced:
profit sharing for many banks has become very much the response to the market and hence one
of the benefits expected to accrue from such schemes, a greater commitment and identification
with the organisation, may not occur unless it is more fully integrated with a programme of
information sharing and better communication. There is also a need to reward innovative
behaviour. As Cowan observed, in the traditional banking days, It was the case that:
"If you want to get on, you observe strictly the norms and conventions of the
organlsatlon....(and thisJ encouraged imitative behaviour at all levels." 	 (1983
p.41)
Targeting may also be part of the package for some employees. Barclays have in
Nottingham introduced a Personal Target System (PERTS) on the selling of loans etc. Such
schemes bring echoes of the theory based on the manufacturing sector, that tighter product
markets and slacker labour markets will lead to an increase In direct control (Friedmann 1977).
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The process of change has also focussed attention on communication:
"this reflects a paradox, in that as the business environment becomes more
competitive, the need for staff co-operation and commitment Increases yet
uncertainty is more likely as the old assumptions about Job security and career
progression are eroded."	 (MorrIs 1985 p69)
Hence there are video presentations for managers on corporate strate9y, experiments with quality
circles and schemes designed to tap employee potential. This is consistent with policies pursued
in other sectors (Bassett 1986), although It should be noted that the cause for such schemes is
essentially product oriented and not concerned with employee satisfaction per se. The
experience of Joint consultative committees in 'Scotbank' is not encouraging, given Its minimal
impact on staff (Cressey et al 1985).
It Is, of course, of far greater Importance in the service sector to Instil the right attitudes In
staff. Given that the banks do not yet produce significantly different products, customer choice Is
often based on convenience and image, the latter of which Is partly created by staff (90% of
service organisatlon staff have direct contact with customers, as opposed to 10% of
manufacturing staff). Hence customer consciousness and sales ability, rather than administration
skills, are increasingly Important and this will clearly affect recruitment policy (Irons 1983).
Hence, Job security, career advancement, social esteem and rewards for loyalty have
been characteristic of banking, and were Indeed part of the implIed contract. However, market
changes and Increasing cost pressures are threatening the entire notion of paternalism. Whether
or not the erosion of entrenched values will destroy unitarism and lead to a rise In militancy is
debatable (Hepburn and Handy 1985). The banking unions are in a difficult position with the
spread of banking outside the traditional sector. Thus as:
"banking moves out of the industiy, BIFU's problem is the same as the NGA in
tiylng to organise the entire product market."
	
Milman 1986 p31)
There Is also concern that American practices of de-unionlsatlon may be followed; how far
Barclays' and Nat West's refusal to recognise the unions in the merchant banking arm forms part
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of a trend remains to be seen (Midland, for example, have set a minimum target figure to trigger
recognition). There are, of course, wide differences In the degree and influence of unionisation In
the banks.
It is possible that the exercise of management prerogative may create "reluctant
militants" (Roberts et al 1972) concerned with their future careers. Changes In Saturday opening
in 1967 galvanised many bank staff to join the union and take part in strike action. In a three
month period the aggregate female membership went up by 60% (Heritage 1983). Barclay's
return to Saturday opening in 1982 provoked protest from both the BIFU and the CBU. Midland's
rationalisation process, involving a national reduction of 3000 by 1987, is an example of
management's insistence on the right to manage, 'justified by reference to product market
pressures. Barclays have stated that:
"for the first time we are giving a clear sign that we do not Just want to manage
but that we want to be seen managing. We are adapting to a new industrial
climate in which it is essential that management tells Its staff where it wants to go
rather than let other people do it for them." 	 (Financial Times 30.10.87)
Overall there is increasing attention in the banks to the management of human resources.
There is greater emphasis on manpower planning and management development programmes.
With the increasing competitive pressure and end to national bargaining, banks are developing
more enterprise based policies. There are, of course, common themes: all the banks are
becoming more market driven and performance oriented and are trying to promote active co-
operation rather than mere compliance from staff. The erMronment and organisatlon seem to be
ripe for applying the ideas of human resource management, and banks are placing greater
emphasis on staff as a resource rather than a cost. Furthermore, the unions are apparently
unable to Influence much of management activity, which has remained unchallenged within the
managerial prerogative. Much of the literature reviewed was pessimistic In nature and tended to
assume the banks would be unable to meet the challenges of the 1980s. In fact, the banks'
commercial success In the 1980s is well documented and, while there are cost pressures, the
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impact of these on staff Is alleviated because it is taking place in the context of high profits and
rising employment within the sector. While change is taking place, it is long term and incremental.
The last ten years have witnessed the resilience of existing banking employment practices and
procedures.
(d) Summary
A review of the literature on this subject has shown that employee relations in banking has
been dominated by a paternalistic ethos, largely non-conflictual and underpinned by steady
growth and high profits. A national system of bargaining evolved in the 1970s under the
conditions of a stable product environment which effectively removed labour costs from
competition, and enabled the banks to take a fairly passive role in managing staff.
However, in the 1 980s a more dynamic market has led to diverging corporate strategies,
and the break up of the national system of bargaining. One of the main challenges is the
maintenance of a paternalistic ethos at a time when there is pressure both to contain labour costs
and develop staff as a resource. Hence the thesis will examine these issues.
3 Management Strategy
(a) Introduction
This section examines the nature of management strategy. It looks at the problematic
nature of the concept, and discusses some of the recent work on business strategy, applying this
to the banking sector. It also analyses the nature of industrial relations strategy and in particular
the recent interest In Human Resource Management. It goes on to examine management
strategy in practice and the influence of culture. Finally it suggests that industrial relations needs
to draw from this literature and that the strategic approach to banking has value.
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(b) Concepts
Chandler defined strategy as:
"the determination of the long term goals and objectives of an enterprise and the
adoption of courses of action and the allocation of resources necessaiy for
cariying out these goals." (1962 p13)
While Chandler was essentially concerned with decisions on market and product positions and
the relationship between strategy and structure in enterprises involved In continuous expansion,
his emphasis on a long term approach is important since It contrasts with a process of 'muddling
through'.
Nevertheless, the concept has been criticised for its emphasis on an analytical, de-
personalised and rational approach. Firstly, it may Impose a rationality which does not exist on a
series of merely ad hoc decisions (March and Olsen 1976). Secondly, it assumes a direct
relationship between intention and implementation. Thirdly, decision making by managers may
have more in common with political deals than strategic choice (Thurley and Wood 1983, Cyert
and March 1963). Hence, Pettigrew argues that:
"decision making in organisations is not merely a thought process that balances
goals and means, or a choice process in which the environment is discriminated
as a limit to choice only through the mind of the decision-maker. Rather, it may
be understood as a political process that balances various power sectors."
(1973 p196)
Fourthly, the assumption that strategy is an output rather than a process has been attacked. Thus
Mintzberg (1978) regards strategy as being consistency over time In a "stream of decisions" and
the testing of alternatives, making a distinction between intended and realised strategies and
developing the concept of emergent strategies, whereby there is consistency of action over time
without prior purpose of It. Hence deciding on a course of action is only a small part of the
process. Quinn writes of:
"logical incrementalism - a patterned set of initiatives and responses which is
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not muddling through, but properly managed, It/s a conscious, purposable,
proactwe executive practice." (1980 p17)
Spender agrees that management do not systematically evaluate all the strategic options but will
apply solutions in line with previous experience. in other words, the pattern of values and
experiences helps define the area in which the solution must be found (Grinyer and Spender
1978), e.g. Figure 2.2
Figure 2.2: Dynamics of Recipe Change
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(c) Business Strategy
The distinction between corporate and business strategy is that, while the former relates
to the concept of the firm's business which provides a unifying theme for all its activities (Ansoff
1969), the latter relates to the level of the indMduai business unit. Nevertheless, the terms are
often used interchangeably. Ansoff regards business strategy as essentially concerned with the
choice of product market portfolio, which was itself dependent on the environment in which the
enterprise operated; strategic decisions are distinguished from operational or administrative
decisions in that the former relates to the external environment. The process Is analytical, and
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rational changes in the environment would produce strategic changes which would affect
management control decisions on e.g. investment and then operational decisions in a cascade
like flow. The aim was to produce synergy.
Strategic planning grew out of two streams of thinking on the management of production:
the programmes of planning and budgeting during the Second World War; and secondly, the
influence of the Harvard Business School in the 1950s, arguing for more explicit attention to the
process of formulating strategy (Porter 1987). In the 1950s, long range planning was in vogue,
with the implication that the future was predictable by the extrapolation of historical growth.
The 1 960s saw an explosion of schools of thought on how to create order from chaos.
Portfolio planning became the order of the day, the most famous being the Boston Consultancy
Group, who stressed the importance of 'relative market share' based on the 'experience curve' (a
concept based on the relationship between accumulated experience and the ability to cut costs).
Other models include the growth/share portfolio, the product life style based framework, the Profit
Impact of Market Strategy (PIMS) programme, the company position/industry attractiveness
service, and various other forecasting models (see Porter 1987, Taylor and Sparkes 1977, Thomas
1983).
Corporate planners were criticised by Argenti for:
"devoting immense energy to making cash flow calculations on a computer or
the building of elaborate manpower models, while gWing no thought whatever to
such clinical questions as to whether the company is too large or too small."
(1974 p3)
Argenti stressed that corporate planning was for the company as a whole and not the whole
company. Partly as a response to criticism of over prescriptiveness, partly as a response to the
break of the continuity of post-war expansion, corporate planning evolved into strategic planning,
which emphasised 'doing' as well as planning.
Porter (1980. 1985), drawing on micro-economic theory, has developed a set of analytical
'techniques' for developing strategy. There are five competitive forces acting on the firm:
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(I)	 threat of entry
(ii) Intensity of rivalry among competitors
(iii) threat of substitution
(iv) bargaining power of buyers
(v) bargaining power of suppliers
Figure 2.3: The Five Competitive Forces
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Thus, according to this model, profits will be low when threats of entry are high, the threat
of substitution Is greater, the bargaining power of buyers and suppliers is high and rivalry is high.
Mathur (1986) comments that the model is important In what it omits: there is no explicit
consideration of technology or government regulation. Thus the model implies that these are
reflected In changes in the intensity of the five forces, so do not require explicit attention.
Hence this analysis is illustrated with respect to the U.K Financial Services Industry below
(Johnson and Scholes 1984, p.71):
The U.K. Financial Services Industry - 1983
A structural analysis highlights the competitive forces at work in the environment thereby
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providing management with a basis for strategic evaluation.
This is a brief summary of a piece of research which employed structural analysis to study
the U.K. personal financial services industry from the point of view of the U.K. clearing banks.
Particular attention is given to the current account segment because of Its Importance in being a
stepping stone to 'selling' other services such as loans and deposit accounts. Four key sources
of competitive forces were examined.
Threat of entry. The main barriers to entry are: strict government regulation, the
experience of the industry already gained by the banks, and the large capital requirements.
Building societies are considered potential entrants because of their related experience in
operating various savings accounts. However, the barrier they face is whether they can obtain
cheque clearing facilities. The capital required to set up a clearing system similar to that already
operated by the banks would be considerable.
The power of buyers and suppliers. Buyers (borrowers and buyers of services and
advice) and suppliers (depositors) exert little bargaining power over the participants of the
industry. Rates of interest remain the same between banks, being determined by macroeconomic
factors. The large number of buyers and suppliers means that the individual customer will have
little bargaining power.
The threat of substitute service. Substitute services come directly from the state in the
form of Girobank and the National Savings schemes. Whe being a potential threat, they are not
intended to capture the market, rather their role is one of funding the Public Sector Borrowing
Requirements.
The tivairy amongst existing competitors. Competitive forces that result from internal
jockeying for position' are low (though growing) because of the lack of product differentiation
and the oligopolistic nature of the industry. The main source of competition takes the form of
extensive advertising campaigns.
Conclusions. The analysis indicates that the major competitive force facing the industry
comes from the possible entry of the Building Societies, especially Into the current account
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segment. Management therefore needs to pay particular attention to monitoring their movements
and to prohibiting their entry to the cheque clearing system. Alternatively, the banks may
consider allowing the Building Societies to use their cheque clearing facilities providing they could
reap some benefit from letting them do so. Competitive forces resulting from internal rivalry were
low at the time of analysis but warrant careful monitoring as a potentially significant factor.
Substitute services could be a threat If the Government had to finance a longer PSBR.
Porter (1980) argues that there are three "generic strategies" to sustain a competitive
advantage (see Figure 2.4):
(I)	 Overall cost leadership,
(ii) Differentiation of the product or service so as to be unique
(iii) Focus strategy - to target a particular group or segment of the market so as to achieve
low cost or differentiation for that segment. (This is basically a narrower scope of one of the
above.)
For Porter the greatest danger is to "stuck in the middle". Such a firm:
"lacks the market share, capital investment and resolve to play the low cost
game, the IndWidual differentiation necessary to obviate the need for a low cost
position or the focus to create differentiation or a low cost position in a more
limited sphere." (1980, p41).
There are also risks associated with each of the generic strategies (see Table 2.9).
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Figure 2.4: Three Generic Strategies
STRATEGIC ADVANTAGE
Uniquencu Perceived
by the Customer	 Low Cost Position
IduUn,wide
x
U
114
Part iculir
Segment Only
OVERALLDIFFERENTIATION COST LEADERSHIP
FOCUS
Source: Porter 1985
Table 2.9: Risks of the Generic Strategies
RISKS OF COST
LEADERSHIP
Cost leadership is not
sustained
* competitors Imitate
* technology changes
* other bases for cost
leadership
Proximity in
differentiation is
lost
RISKS OF
DIFFERENTIATION
Differentiation Is not
sustained
* competitors Imitate
* bases for different-
iation become less
important to buyers
Cost proximity Is
lost
RISKS OF
FOCUS STRATEGY
Focus strategy is
Imitated
The target segment
becomes structurally
unattractive
* structure erodes
* demand disappears
Broadly-targeted
competitors
overwhelm the
segment
* the segments
differences from
other segments
narrow
* the advantages of
a broad line
increase
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Cost focusers achieve	 Differentiation	 New focusers
even lower cost in 	 focusers achieve	 sub-segment the
segments	 even greater	 industry
differentiation in
segments
Source: Porter 1985
Porter's model has been subjected to empirical testing and refinement (e.g. Mathur 1986).
For instance, the notion of a single business strategy has been said to be misleading and choice
is in any case qualified by the nature of the market. In commodity markets for example, non cost
leadership is likely to be difficult (Morris 1987).
Furthermore, Mathur (1986) argues that two generic strategies overlap. Differentiation, he
says, relates to the external dimension of customer perception, cost leadership, however, is
concerned with inputs. Hence:
"Cost leadership achieved by internal savings in factor costs is quite compatible
with a high level of external non-price differentiation." (1986 p92)
Finally, Porter has very little to say about the organisatlonal constraints on strategy. His
model assumes that the main constraint on the firm is the existing state of the market and that
organisations will respond rationally to market analysis. However, as Pettigrew points out:
"The rational approach describes and prescribes techniques for identifying
current strategy, analysing environments, resources and gaps, revealing and
assessing strategic alternatives and choosing and Implementing carefully
analysed and well thought-through outcomes. This rational picture of business
problem-soMng has as its concern the content or what of strategy - the outcome
which Is sought - and has nothing to say at an explicit level of how to achieve that
outcome. In other words; it has no process theoiy within it of how and why to
create the strategic outcomes so perceptively and logically derived from the
analysis of competitive forces." (1985 p19)
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(c) Industrial Relations Strategy
Thurley and Wood define industrial relations strategy as:
"long term policies which are developed by the management of an organ/sat/on
in order to preserve or change the procedures, practices or results of industrial
relations activities over time." (1983 p198)
The link between industrial relations and business strategy has on the whole been
neglected, partly because of the difficulty of access, partly because of the self-Imposed
parameters of the discipline and concentration on workplace collective bargaining (see e.g.
Timperley 1980, Winchester 1983, Wood 1982), but also owing to the lack of explicit attention
given to industrial relations matters at the top strategic level. The CIR Report on the Role of
Management in Industrial Relations (1973) argued that industrial relations was too easily
neglected by top management, who concentrated on purely business objectives and played
industrial relations 'by ear'. Winkler (1974) wrote of an "avoidance strategy" whereby
management had in effect subcontracted responsibility to local management, with industrial
relations being regarded as "external to the enterprise". Furthermore, the dominance of financial
control has been said to militate against serious consideration of labour relations at top
management level (Batstone 1984). It is also rare in the U.K to have Directors for Personnel on
the main Board.
One reason that there has been little discussion of industrial relations at the corporate
level is the lack of union influence at this level (partly because of union bargaining being based at
plant level). Hickson and Mallory observed that the scope of management choice in the making
of strategic decisions appeared to be affected more by the prior "programming decisions of the
decision makers themseives than by union power" (1981 p59). Of course that does not exclude
the possibility that such decisions do not have significant consequences for labour.
A different approach is used in the labour process literature, e.g. Braverman (1974),
Edwards (1979), Thompson (1983), which assume that management strategies are formulated
with labour's role in the production process as central to thinking. Nichols and Beynon (1977)
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argue that business strategy demands an industrial relations strategy of 'control', choice existing
only In regard to the means of control. However, the labour process school has been criticised
for monist preconceptions and the:
"assumption that capital must and can devise a coherent system of control to
ensure the structurally necessaiy extraction of surplus value." (Storey 1985
p194)
and is not backed by empirical work which shows neglect of industrial relations considerations at
the highest level.
The entire notion of strategy in industrial relations was strongly criticised by Anthony
(1977) in a critique of the CIR viewpoint that it was advantageous to have a clearly defined
industrial relations strategy in order to promote consistency in business decisions and create a
high trust relationship which would facilitate change without disruption. Anthony argued that it
was:
"naive to talk of industrial relations strategies given that firms were not in
business to develop industrial relations policies (the business of business is
business) and hence pragmatism would predominate - Industrial relations
should not be seen as an autonomous function but essentially facilitative. The
business of the Industrial relations specialist is to see to it that business can get
done." (1977 p26)
Such non-strategic industrial relations, the so-called 'fire fighting' approach, has been
characterised by Mler as Implying a function which is:
"separate from the business; reactive; short term; of no interest to the board of
directors; constrained by a legalistic and Institutional definition such that It Is
concerned principally with lower level employees." (1987 p352)
The assumptions implicit in the CIR approach were that good industrial relations were
somehow an objective in their own right. However, the same could be said with regard to
production and marketing - these are regarded as more strategic but are also facilitative.
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A middle view would be that although management do think ahead systematically about
industrial relations, in terms of practices and procedures this is fairly well downstream in
corporate planning. Nevertheless, while the above may represent a fairly accurate picture of the
corporate mind and perhaps reflects a greater degree of unpredictability in industrial relations as
opposed to other areas, It is "a dangerously simple model with which to gauge its importance"
(Miller 1987 p348).
Indeed, the growth of interest and emphasis in human resource management has been
regarded as a reflection of the growing appreciation of the importance of employee relations,
although some would undoubtedly regard it as the 'flavour of the month' and no more than 'old
wine in new bottles'. There have been a number of reasons for this Interest: more competitive
product markets, the Japanese example and the decline of union Influence which has enabled
emphasis to be placed more on individualism than on collectivism (Guest 1987).
The importance of ensuring the commitment of employees across industry has been
emphasised, for example by Walton (1985), who argues that there is a shift away from
emphasising control to one of commitment, but this can be even more significant for the service
sector. In retail banking, the banks do not yet provide significantly different products and hence
consumer choice is heavily influenced by convenience and image, the latter partly created by
contact with staff, and there is thus a clear strategic link with quality of service and quality of
employees (Irons 1983). Yet in banking, traditionally staff have not yet been recruited or
developed for customer contact skills but for technical and administrative ability. Furthermore,
with banks wanting to move away from being regarded as merely providers of a money
transmission service to the selling of a range of financial products and services, the organisation
will, in Bums and Stalker's terms (1961), become more organic and less mechanistic, and this will
require greater commitment and active co-operation rather than mere compliance from its staff,
hence the appeal of human resource management.
MUler, borrowing from Porter, defines strategic human resource management as:
"those decisions and actions which cover the management of employees at all
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levels in the business and which are related to the Implementation of strategies
directed towards creating and sustaining competitive advantage." (1987 p352).
Those companies with a reputation for progressive human resource practices are significantly
higher in long term profitability than their counterparts (Kanter 1983 p19). Hence, unlike
personnel management, which has usually been regarded as a peripheral function, human
resource management attempts to:
"relate personnel practices to beliefs, to link each and every process of
recruitment, induction, training, appraisal, rewarding of individuals, to an avowed
set of articulated beliefs of the organisation." (Hunt 1984 p16)
Behind all this Is a belief that It will release greater commitment from employees although one has
to be careful to examine the extent to which:
"human resource management Is genuinely concerned with creating a new
equal partnership between employer and employed, or are they really offering a
covert form of employee manipulation dressed up as mutuality."
(Fowler 1987 p3)
Hence It is significant that human resource management was, particularly in the USA, Initially
associated with non-union companies.
Human resource management is part of the shift away from a concentration on
management and unIon relationships to management-employee relations. To that extent, it may
reflect the changing balance of Industrial power rather than changing kleology.
While human resource management Is regarded as having a strategic element, unlike
personnel management, there is a danger, as Guest (1987) suggests, of comparing an ideal type
of human resource management with a descriptive view of personnel management (see Table
2.10).
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Table 2.10: Stereotypes of personnel management and human
resource management
Time and planning
perspective
Psychological
contract
Control systems
Employee relations
perspective
Preferred
structures/systems
Roles
Evaluation
criteria
PERSONNEL
MANAGEMENT
Short term
reactive, ad hoc
marginal
Compliance
External controls
Pluralist
collective
low trust
Bureaucratic/
mechanistic
centrallsed,formal
defined roles
Specialist/
professional
Cost-minimisatlon
Source: Guest 1987
HUMAN RESOURCE
MANAGEMENT
Long term
proactive, strategic
integrated
Commitment
Self control
Unitarist
individual
high trust
Organic
devolved
flexible roles
Largely Integrated
into line
management
Maximum utilisation
(human asset
accounting)
Despite the greater emphasis on employee relations in corporate thinking and the growth
in importance of the human resource management function, the function still has lower status and
Is accorded less significance than other functions, e.g. finance and marketing (Kochan and Cap-
pelll 1983), and Is largely Ignored in business policy and strategic management texts, e.g. Ansoff
(1984). Nevertheless, there are said to be clear benefits from adopting such an approach (see
Table 2.11).
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Table 2.11: PolIcies for Identifying human resource and
organisatlonal outcomes
POUCIES
Organisational and
job design
Policy formulation
and implementation/
management of change
Recruitment
selection and
socialisation
Appraisal
training and
development
Manpower flows -
through, up and
out of the
organ isat ion
Reward system
Communication
systems
HUMAN RESOURCE
OUTCOMES
Strategic planning/
implementation
Commitment
Flexibility!
adaptability
ORGANISATIONAL
OUTCOMES
High job
performance
High problem solving
Successful change
Low turnover
Source: Guest 1987
(e) Management Strategy In Practice
Chandler's classic account (1962) was concerned with strategic decisions taken with
regard to the firm's product line and organisatlon and essentially he was examining boardroom
decisIons, corporate blueprints with clearcut distinctions between the 'executives' who
determined corporate objectives and were responsible for structure and 'managers' who were
responsible for the day to day operation of the enterprise.
Such analysis seems to be very much based on idea! types. As Johnson and Scholes
point out:
"solutions are not so much likely to be adopted because they are shown to be
better on the basis of some objective yardstick but because they are acceptable
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to those who influence the decision or have to implement it." (1984 p37)
Hence one needs to see solutions in a political as much as a technical light, with the prospect of
intra-organisational bargaining (Walton and McKersie 1985) and the possibility that what produces
major changes is a process of adjustment and adaption with the development of sub-strategies,
rather than corporate blueprints. Thus Alford (1976 p57) suggests that discussion of grand
diplomacy and of major crises, Involving so-called key Individuals should be treated, if not with
scepticism, then with great caution. Dalton (1959) illustrated the discrepancy between formal
charts and lines of authority and the reality of management in practice and behavioural scientists
have shown how managers pursue sectional rather than official goals.
The difficulty of formulating and Implementing strategy in a changing environment with
strong external constraints has been noted by Kochan, McKerzie and Cappelll:
"Strategic decision making can only occur where parties have discretion over
their decisions, that is where the environmental constraints do not seriously
curtail the parties' choice of alternatives." (1984 p21)
If knowledge of the environment was perfect, parties could formulate and implement policies while
allowing for contingencies. However, in a complex and dynamic environment this is not possible.
Thus, in a case study of the insurance industry, Knights and Willmot (1987) demonstrated
the difficulty of making high level broad ranging executive decisions on situations of extreme
uncertainty and with incomplete information. Hence there are cognitive limits to rational decision
making.
Clearly partIes under certain conditions may be compelled to adopt short-term actions to
meet Immediate product market and financial demands and hence the business strategy for the
appropriate condItions In the Thurley-Wood typology below may be called into question.
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Table 2.12: Various Types of Strate9y and Situation
EXAMPLE
Department Store
e.g. Harrods,
John Lewis
Banks, Insurance
BUSINESS STRATEGY
Economic Mission
based
APPROPRIATE CONDITIONS
Stable single market
environment with
established market
share
Rational long term	 Low level of techno-
pursuit of objectives 	 logical innovation
given by founders e.g. 	 Hegemony of top
service or provision 	 management established
of products for profit
I.R. STRATEGY
	 APPROPRIATE CONDITIONS
Recognition/Non
recognition decided
by top management
beliefs
Selection of employees
according to these
criteria (non-union or
closed shop possible)
Narrow scope for
collective bargaining
Labour market allows
selection to be severed
and dismissal a real
possibility
Tight managerial control
over work operations
Source: Thuriey and Wood 1983
However, one must be careful not to regard a lack of autonomy due to constraints, and
strategic thinking as necessarily Incompatible. For to:
"argue otherwise is to make the very common mistake of associating choice
with freedom and treating its opposite as determinism." (Thurley and Wood
1983 p12)
Thus Kelly's (1984) examination of strategic choice in two BSC plants showed how management
faced with similar constraints produced very different policies.
The Thuiley-Wood typology, while useful at a simple level, Is clearly inadequate in that it is
forced to overtook fundamental differences within the sector considered, In both product and
labour markets (Morris 1986). Furthermore with the breaking down of the formerly clearcut
distinctions within the financial markets between banks and buUding societies, for Instance, there
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is Ukely to be increasing heterogeneity among banking strategies.
Product market shocks can spark off a whole re-assessment of business strategies and
organisational structure, for example,
Figure 2.5: Sequence of Business Strategy Decisions Affected By
Product Market Changes
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Source: Kochan et al (1983)
Hence, as Kochan et al observe:
"Regardless of the cause, a sharp increase in competitive pressure forces firms
to make a series of decisions whose effects reverberate throughout the
organisatiori and its industrial relations system." (1983 p24)
The extent to which such decisions are affected by industilal relations considerations is,
as we have noted, debatable. Kochan et al suggest that:
"while those business decisions are typically made unilaterally, they are
influenced by the histoiy and current state of industrial relations in the firm and
industiy." (1983 p26).
The relationship between structure and strategy was explored by Chandler (1962) who
produced the dictum that "structure follows strategy". Clearly this is too deterministic and the
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relationship may be symbiotic rather than causal; structure may constrain strategy, the process
being interactive. Hence Supple comments that the goal of the institution or business may have
to be adapted to the organisation rather than the organisation of the business having to be
adapted to the goals (quoted by Aiford 1976 p60). Pettlgrew argues that the:
"pattern of change at IC! was a complex and Iterative process of adjustment in
core beliefs of top decision makers followed by changes in structure, systems
and rewards, with the bulk of business strategy emerging and being imple-
mented rather more slowly after the change in beliefs, structure and systems had
been legitimated and substantially implemented." (1987 p423)
Furthermore if the firm has a strong position in the market it can pass on the costs of mismatch
(Galbraith and Natranson 1978).
(1) Value Systems and Culture
The so-called soft aspects of management: style, shared values, staff and skills, have
been the subject of much recent attention (e.g. Ouchi 1981, Pascale and Athos 1981, Peters and
Waterman 1982). These wrfters have argued that financial goals are not sufficient in themselves,
but need to be underpinned by a broader set of societal values. 'Excellent' companies create a
sense of identification with the company and Its own ethos.
Purcell points out that:
"The new Industrial relations, the growth of Interest in human resource
management, the move to decentralise and emphasise the role of line
management and new approaches to personnel management, are all Indicative
of this search for a management style linked to business policy."
(1987 p547)
However, the advantages of 'strong culture' firms should not be assumed. As Kochan and
Cappelli observe:
"they may be less responsive to short-run changes In external environmental
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pressures than the firms where top management has not fully intemalised these
values and diffused them through the organisatlon." (1984 p150)
Pettigrew (1983, 1985) examined strate9lc thinking in terms of changes In leadership and
organisational ideologies. He argued that, given that major strategic changes require the
attention of the organisational ideologies about Itself in relation to the competitive environment,
for such changes to occur there needs to be some sort of 'shock' or 'crisis' to bring this about.
However, the 'crisis' required to produce the desired change in organisational ideology need not
necessarily be that resulting from objective change In business conditions. Pettigrew emphasises
the role of management in the perception of choice and action and lays weight on both real and
constructed crisis. Miles and Snow (1978) have examined the influence of the value systems and
ideology of organisations through contrasting 'defenders' and 'prospectors'. Defender
organisations, with conservative values, tend to adopt strategies which concentrate on achieving
a niche, while prospector organisations, with more dynamic values, look to innovation. Hence
one cannot simply match organisational resources to the environment to produce strategy.
Strategic choice is influenced by such values.
(g) The Parameters of industrial Relations
Timperley pointed out that:
"many of the major decisions in industrial relations are themselves contingent
on other higher level context creating decisions which do not necessarily appear
as industrial relations decisions at all,
argues that:
"we are deluding ourselves if we assume that industrial relations activities would
or should form a major or even moderate part in the determination of corporate
strategy unless the level of labour unrest was of such magnitude to deflect the
organisatlon." (1980 p42)
Hence in the car industry labour relations were seen as crucial to the success of the
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company and the implementation of the industrial relations strategy was regarded as the key
aspect to Improvement in performance (Wiliman and Winch 1985, Marsden et al 1985), but
contrast this to Williams et al (1987).
Certainly there are a number of first order business strategies which while not directly
concerned with industrial relations, clearly affects the parameters in that it concerns plant size,
locations, closure, diversification, etc. However, these are areas where unions have little or no
input and are not usually the subject of collective bargaining.
If the subject area is broadened to include management development, training,
motivation, etc (that is employee relations rather than merely industrial relations) then it is
apparent that such issues do receive the attention of top management. The implications of the
literature on management strategy and industrial relations are: firstly, to look more broadly at
employee relations as indicated and, secondly, to examine the relationship between business
strategy and employee relations which shifts the discipline and the traditional workplace focus
(Poole and Mansfield 1980). As Timperley points out:
"traditionally the approach within organisations has been to look at industrial
relations from the bottom up, perhaps a top-down approach, using a time
dimension to study the process of decision making and following through these
decisions over time, observing both effects and the feedback Into subsequent
decisions, could be more beneficial."
(1980 p43)
There is also the need to adopt a more flexible definition of strategy. As Child observes,
the problem the:
"stringent definition of management strategy has is its failure to allow for the
possibility that managerial strategy in the labour process may be more complex,
less direct than a stringent perspective allows." (1985 p110)
A loose definition is provided by Littler and Salaman (1984) who argued that the notion of strategy
suggests no more than some degree of purposiveness or self-conscious deliberation on the part
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of management.
One reason for the lack of emphasis on business strategy and employee relations is that
personnel has traditionally never had a very prominent input into strategic development, being
regarded as "managers in ambiguity" (Tyson 1983) and suffering from a crisis of legitimacy
(Legge 1978). Yet, however good the strategy, It needs to be successfully implemented and this
depends on the effective management of human resources. A case illustrating this is provided by
Manning (1983). He gives the example of a frozen food company who act on the advice of
consultants to institute a new corporate strategy. However, this implied a shift of resources from
sales to marketing and also a redefinition of the role of senior manufacturing managers. However,
the organisation lacked the necessary marketing skills, and long serving manufacturing managers
(the main asset to the organisation) were outraged and left to join the competitors.
(h) The Strategic Approach in Banking
As Morrison and Frazer observe:
"While the time horizon in retail banking is a long one, there remain many short-
term considerations on what the banks can hope to achieve. Their plans can
easily be blown off course by such external developments as changes in money
and credit controls or In industries' demand for finance. Moreover, the scope for
formulating a truly distinctive approach to business development is heavily
circumscribed by factors such as the practical difficulty of departing from the
general level and structure of interest rates and the need for close co-operation
with other banks in the smooth running of the money transmission system. So,
although planning is of great importance and is taken Increasingly seriously -
within the Individual banks - there are very real limits to what can be planned."
(1983 p106)
With a more dynamic environment, there is a greater than ever need for strategic thinking
in terms of identifying the niche the bank wishes to compete in, but at the same time, with a state
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of flux in the sector, contingency planning and flexibility are predominant to strategic thinking
(Kudla 1982).
In terms of employee relations in banking, the strategic approach embodying a top-down
approach has a great deal to commend it. Monls argues that there are a number of reasons why
such analysis is appropriate. Firstly, the highly centralised nature of management control, with
little discretion on either substantive or procedural issues at the local level, and the degree of
centralised control has increased over time, further reducing autonomy of branches. Secondly,
the emphasis on generalist skills, the all rounder, has prevented the emergence of an independent
personnel function. Finally, the business environment has been conducive to long term planning
and a strategic approach (1986, p6-7). However, in the 1980s, with a great deal more uncertainty,
it is possible that the achievement of good industrial relations may not be compatible with other
primary goals of the corporate strategy.
(I) Summary
The review of the literature on management strategy has noted the evolvement from
corporate planning to strategic planning against the backdrop of a break in the continuity of post-
war economic expansion. It also explored the increasing dissatisfaction with normative rational
models of strategic decision making and an Increasing concern with processual and incremental
approaches. The notion of strategy In the management of labour was shown to have been
strongly criticised and to have little empirical basis. However, we noted increasing interest in
modem works on strategic human resource management, although It remains largely ignored In
business policy and strategic management texts. In this thesis we will explore the way changed
market conditions impact on management strategy and employee relations.
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Literature Review - Summary
The literature on the three chosen topics is inter-related in terms of the thesis topic.
However, the topics are by no means related at the level of the literature. This largely stems from
the very different disciplinary approaches of writers on each of these areas. The literature on
clearing banks is heavily descriptive, economic and historical, while the area of employee
relations in banking has been most explored by sociologists interested in class analysis. Hence,
one subject linking these two areas, the contribution of the management of labour to the
commercial success of banks, is not considered by either of these areas of literature. Our third
section, on management strategy, offers up a number of concepts and tools of analysis which can
be utilised in the thesis. At the level of the literature, however, the concepts have rarely been
applied. Few writers on management strategy have examined financial services. Furthermore,
while the approach of writers like Porter is useful in understanding the banking environment, there
is little evidence that bankers think in terms of a business policy rather than a financial policy
model. The aim of the thesis is to link up these discrete elements of literature, to explore the
subject of the relationship between business strategy and the management of labour.
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(a) Introduction
This chapter examines and explains the research methodology that was employed In the
research and the problems and Issues that were faced. It looks firstly at the nature of the scheme
under which the research was supported and then examines the conceptual approach adopted,
and discusses the actual process of investigation.
(b) ESRC Collaborative Award
The research was sponsored by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) and
was a Collaborative Award in Social Sciences (CASS). The scheme was "designed to foster
closer links between social scientists and non-academic organisations".
The advantage to the researcher is that "the organisation will be involved with the
student's research from an early stage, in co-operation with his or her academic institution,
principally as regards offering guidance and supervision and making facilities and perhaps
relevant data available". Under the terms of the CASS award a senior member of the organisation
is assigned to liaise between the organisation, the student and the university. In this case there
were two individuals from the organisatlon: the Employee Relations Manager and the Assistant
Employee Relations Manager, both of whom were members of a steering committee set up to
monitor the progress of the research at regular intervals. The former was to have overall
responsibility and control the direction of research, while the latter had day to day responsibility
and arranged Interviews, etc.
Over time, the Bank people on the steering committee came to act more as informants'
than 'respondents' (Denzin 1978). The respondent is someone who has a passive role, reacting to
requests by the researcher and sticking close to their official role. The informant is far more in-
volved. Denzin says they should:
"ideally trust the investigator; freely give information about their problems and
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fears and frankly attempt to explain their own motivations; demonstrate that they
will not Jeopardise the study; accept in formation given to them by the
investigator; provide in formation and aid that could Jeopardise their careers.
(1978 p198)
In practice, the Bank staff did not provide all these ideal characteristics but they were a source of
information on issues and events to which the researcher did not have access, for instance, Board
level meetings, and were also able to provide advice and guidance on the viability of certain
proposals and to comment on propositions of the researcher. Crompton and Jones comment on
the researchers' difficulty in achieving access as a:
"long and often uneven iful vetting by mostly suspicious management before he
could even commence fieldwork." (1988 p68)
This was avoided, and the collaborative nature of the work was especially valuable for the high
degree of access it afforded.
The Bank input into the co-ordination of research changed over the period of research. A
Human Resources Manager was appointed and he, together with the Employee Relations
Manager, performed the role of liaison until the latter moved to another department and was
replaced by the former Assistant Employee Relations Manager. The change in staffing did cause
some problems, especially In the creation of some uncertainty on the part of the Bank as to what
the research was about and how it fitted in with Bank expectations, which themselves changed
over time. The original programme was for the researcher to pilot and be involved In the conduct
and analysis of an Industrial Relations Audit which the Bank was planning to carry out. It was
agreed that this would be a good vehicle for the researcher to gain insight into the organisation.
However, after the piloting stage, the Employee Relations Manager was transferred to another
department and the Audit was postponed and then eventually abandoned. This was early
evidence of the dangers of having too rigid an approach to the research.
The advantages of the collaborative scheme have been outlined. There were also
corresponding disadvantages, particularly in relation to loss of objectivity by over-identification
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because of the close association with the department (sometimes referred to as 'going native)
and also of being seen by others in the Bank to over-Identify with one particular department.
Thirdly, the department may well set limits to the scope of the research (Dalton 1959 p275) and
this is especially dangerous when the department is one of the key actors in the area being
researched. To some extent, one is always dependent on the goodwill of the organisationai
'gatekeepers'.
The nature of the scheme raised the issue of feedback and reciprocity. Buchanan et al
suggest that reports of the work should be made available first to the organisation to enable
respondents to indicate sensitive information. This was the procedure agreed with the Bank. The
censorship process has been criticised (e.g. Bulmer 1988 p155) but, as has been argued, in
practice such an agreement Is less restrictive as respondents are generally more concerned with
accuracy rather than sensitivity and, moreover, such constraints tend to be relaxed over time as
trust builds up and the passage of time removes the sensitivity of material (Buchanan et al 1988
p58).
(C) Approach
A literature survey was undertaken on three main areas, management strategy, the
clearing banks, and employee relations In the clearing banks. This served two main functions:
firstly, the negative one of avoiding the errors of previous work or merely reiterating findings of
previous research; and, secondly, the more positive side of developing concepts and ideas from
existing work (Silverman 1985 p9).
The topic of business strategy and the management of labour suggested a top-down
approach as the most suitable method of examining the process of strategic change and indeed
filling in the gaps in the existing literature. Purcell has argued that:
"there is a need both to examine Industrial relations In the broader context of
how the corporation manages the employment of labour, and to shift the focus of
study away from what has become an almost exclusive concern with
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workplace...(and thatJ the boundaiy definitions of industrial relations should be
broadened to include corporate decision-making and the effects on labour, and
to be more concerned with the whole gamut of employee relation policies and
actions." (1983 p1-13)
Furthermore, as Timpeiley points out:
"traditionally the approach within the organisations has been to look at
industrial relations from the bottom up; perhaps a top down approach, using a
time dimension to study the process of decision making and following through
these decisions over time, observing both effects and the feedback into
subsequent decisions, could be more beneficial" (1980 p43)
Part of the reason for such a pattern of research, despite the recognition that
management activity is primarily responsible for industrial relations within an organisation, relates
to problems of access. Hence, this research was in an Ideal position to carry out what Timperley
suggests. A 'cascade' approach to the process of strategy was seen as worthwhile: that is
following a decision down through the organisation, enabling one to see the disparity between
policy and practice. Such an approach may be especially fruitful in the banking sector, where
control is highly centralised (MorrIs 1986).
The approach was characterised by taking a broad holistic view of the organisation. The
common danger in focusing on single variables is that It is too easy to assume that there are
relationships between them, as they are the only ones being examined, in the banking
environment, where chief concerns are related to uncertainty and change, it was deemed more
valuable to analyse the reverberation within the organisation and the relationships between
different areas, for instance, how a marketing plan of extended opening hours was achieved by
offering profit sharing to the union. This is clearly not Just a matter of listing every factor
influencing the situation, which can become indiscriminate multi-causality, but examining the
relationship between factors and seeing events in their setting or context. Such an approach is
particularly important In analysing strategic change which is both complex and dynamic. Thus
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Pettigrew argues for a contextualist approach, on the grounds that one needs to:
"understand the emergent situation and holistic features of an organisatlon or a
process in its context, rather than divide the world into limited sets of dependent
and independent variables isolated from their context." (1985 p228)
in terms of examining the management of labour this would be seen broadly, and include
consultation, remuneration, training, recruitment, etc rather than concentrate on the traditional
industrial relations focus of collective bargaining and union-management relationships, which is
not generally recognised as being too restrictive (e.g. Edwards 1987 p168). Furthermore, In the
finance sector, with a relative absence of conflict and a high degree of managerial prerogative, a
broader approach Is more applicable, since the absence of overt union resistance makes It more
difficult to see where the changes are taking place.
A qualitative approach was adopted. As Fineman and Mangham observe:
"if behaviour is viewed as situationally specific, idiosyncratic, multi-variate or
holistic, then a 'richer', more descriptive analysis may well be taken to be
worthwhile." (1983 p296).
The objective of qualitative research is to:
"describe, decode, translate or otheswise come to terms with the meaning, not
the frequency, of certain, more or /ess naturally occurring phenomena in the
social world."
(Van Maanen, cited by Das 1983 p301)
Qualitative research is now more fashionable than in the 1 960s when the stress on
objectivtty' and 'reIIablty' meant posltMsm, and the attempt to simulate the natural scientific use
of theory was the norm. The archetypal approach was the application of a formula: a statement or
hypothesis to be tested; an account of sampling and methods; and, finally, a description of results
and a discussion of the implications (SIlverman 1985 p3). Such a model has been criticised on the
grounds that research in the real world does not fit this textbook model. In contrast, qualitative
research tends to generate data In a non-standard fashion and hence has been described as an
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attractWe nuisance" (Miles 1979 p590). Furthermore, the process of analysis Is said to be:
"essentially Intuitive, primitive and unmanageable In any rational sense." (ibid.
p597)
Walker puts It less strongly:
"Analysis of qualitative material Is more explicitly interpretive, creative and
personal than in quantitative analysis, which Is not to say that it should not be
equally systematic and careful." (1985 p3)
Turner has written that:
"interest in qualitative methods for the study of organisatlons has grown,
especially as such methods have come to be seen to be applicable to matters of
urgent practical interest." (1988 p108)
The thesis subject Inclined the researcher to a relatively open-ended approach. Das
states that:
"longitudinal, in depth and open ended research design has almost become a
necessity to capture the complex and multi-dimensional behaviour patterns
within organisatlons."
(1983 p385)
However, despite the work of Chandler (1962) and more recently Pettigrew (1973, 1985), such
research is relatively rare.
Given the broad remit of the subject, it followed that no explicit hypotheses were set up In
advance to be tested, although a number of Issues were thrown up by the literature. Glaser and
Strauss (1967) have emphasised the evolutionary nature of research, especially in the fieldwork
phase. They point to the danger of sticking to a prescribed research design as this may lead the
researcher to be less sensitive to theory and new Ideas by the ImpositIon of his own meaning on
social relations, through his own prior definition of concepts. Thus, Glaser and Strauss warn of the
dangers of developing theory from 'a priori' assumptions, and they criticise concentration on the
verification of a priori theories.
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Hence, in the eatly stages of the research. the remit In terms of the gathering of data and
collection of material was very broad. Issues and questions emerged from the data and, as the
process continued, the focus of the research narrowed so as to collect what was relevant, rather
than what was merely interesting. Nevertheless, a degree of flexibility had to be maintained in
order to allow the research to be re-specified. This was necessary as access to certain areas may
have ceased or others opened, and it would also allow for a change of emphasis if there was
dissatisfaction with the areas being explored (Silverman 1985 p22).
The research was a case study. This was defined by the sponsors of the research, the
ESRC and the Co-operative Bank. It is generally recognised that, while survey work, e.g. Edwards
Manaciing the Factory (1987), captures overall patterns, actual processes are best explored by
case studies. However, the conventional view Is that case studies are limited, in that they have
limited generalisability. As Mouzells states:
"It is obvious that, however ingenious the testing of hypotheses in one
organisation, we can never be sure of their generalised validity. On the contrary,
we can be almost certain that such hypotheses are only valid under certain
conditions and for certain types of organ/sat/on. This being the case, the only
way to find out what these conditions are is by the appropriate comparison of
more than one case." (1967 p178)
Such a view, however, has considered only one dimension of generalisability - statistical.
However, the prospective generalisation of a case study lies In analytical generalisation. As Yin
puts It:
"case studies, like experiments, are general/sable to theoretical propositions
and not to populations or universes. In this sense the case study, like the
experiment, does not represent a 'sample' and the investigator's goal is to
expand and generailse theories (analytic generailsatlon) and not to enumerate
frequencies (statistical general/sat/on)."
(1984 p21)
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(d) Process of Investigation
The main method of research adopted to explore the thesis topic was longitudinal and
contextualist, so to enable the research to capture the change taking place over the two years. it
should be stressed that regular contact was maintained throughout the time of the research, and
extensive periods were spent both at the Bank's Head Office and also at six other sites, including
four branches. As Pettigrew observes:
"without longitudinal data it Is impossible to ider,ths,i the processual dynamic of
change, the relation between forces of continuity and change and, therefore, the
indissoluble link between structure and process." 	 (1985 p233)
Nevertheless, while the research had the advantage of having longditudinal data and
therefore not being a single snapshot, the researcher was obviously not present at all the events
described. In a sense, then, the research can be seen as a series of snapshots supplemented by
the perception of events by indMduals who were there.
There is a tradition in the social science literature of emphasizing the advantages of
multiple methods (Moser and Kalton 1971). PartIcipant observation, interviews and documentation
were the main methods employed. This procedure Is known as 'triangulation' (Denzin 1978); the
aim is that by:
"combining multiple observers, theories, methods and data sources,
sociologists can hope to overcome the intrinsic bias that comes from single
method, single obser'er, single theor,' studies." (1978 p317)
Hence different dasses of data (observation, interviews and documentation) would help
to overcome partial views so as to give a complete picture (Denzln 1978). Furthermore, multiple
sources enabled the process of change, events and issues to be seen from a range of different
perspectives and help overcome potential bias. Hence interviews took place in different
departments and at different levels in the organisatlon. Documentary material also came in
different forms: minutes of meetings, papers circulated for discussion at meetings, officll reports,
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company manuals, etc.
As we have noted, the aim of triangulation is to improve the validity and reliability of the
research material, and It is argued that this approach has the virtue of at ieast recognising that In
the social sciences:
"empirical reality is a reality of competing definitions, attitudes and personal
values." (Denzin 1978 p294)
Nevertheless, triangulation has its own difficulties. Garfinkel has introduced the concept of 'irony'
and warns of the temptation of treating behaviour and opinions in one setting as necessarily
undercutting what appears to be happening in another setting. In other words, action makes
sense in context and should be understood in those terms, rather than as a corrective to what Is
taking place elsewhere (See Silverman 1985 p21).
(i) Documentation
Documentary material was collected throughout the period of research, spanning
November 1986 to December 1988, from a variety of sources. The most useful papers were those
from the Policy Committee (the main policy making body below Board level) and two of the major
subordinate committees, the Product and Technology Committee and the Human Resources
Committee. Minutes were obtained from these meetings, together with discussion papers and
other documents, including letters, agendas, announcements, administrative documents etc,
which allowed the researcher some insight into the range of options envisaged and the different
views existing, which was vital in terms of discussing the issue of 'strategic choice'. The problems
relating to documentary material are well rehearsed and focus In particular on the issue of
selective deposit and selective survival. Furthermore, some documents may be of limited value.
For instance, the minutes of Policy Committee meetings clearly showed what had been settled
rather than what had been discussed, and it was said that the Chief Executive liked very short
minutes so as to emphasise agreement and collective decision making.
Other Important documentation Included the Corporate Plan for the period being
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researched, and previous plans, which enabled one to see the development of corporate strategy
over time and the gap between formal plans and practice; also personnel manuals, union
agreements, etc. Consultants' reports provided an outsider's view of the organisation. Use was
also made of more public papers: annual reports, Bank newspapers, press cuttings, bank
Journals, union papers and reports.
The aim in collecting and analysing such documentation has been well expressed by Yin:•
"For case studies, the most important use of documents is to corroborate and
augment evidence from other sources."
(1984 p80)
(ii) Interviews
These took place between November 1986 and December 1988 and were both semi-
structured and unstructured. The former were open-ended and ranged from being short chats to
more formal three hour interviews. The interview was kept flexible, allowing the interviewee to tell
the story in his own words, allow his priorities to dictate the discussion and let him introduce
topics himself, rather than impose on him the issues and structure in which the researcher was
interested, although there was a checklist which was referred to.
Nevertheless, there are problems wtth such an approach. As SeIitiz et al observe:
"the flexibility frequently results In a lack of comparability from one interiiew with
another. Moreover, the analysis is more difficult and time consuming than of
standardised Interviews." (quoted by Silverman, 1984 p160)
As a general rule, the more senior the interviewee, the more open-ended was the
interview. Many took the form of "conversational interviewing" (Dafton 1959 p280), which allowed
better and richer data and the opportunity to probe for more sensitive data by being less openly
obtrusive. As Ackroyd and Hughes observe:
"the non standard interview Is very often used when Interilewing key personnel
in an organlsation when richer and fuller material is required." (1981 p73)
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Hence, when discussing employee relations, the interviews with senior staff in Personnel
were less structured than when interviewing branch managers on the same issues. Such an
approach had other difficulties: it was difficult to cut In on irrelevant monologues, and occasionally
the researcher was given the official stance of the organisation (the espoused policy)
masquerading as the operational policy, which was contradicted by other sources and
occasionally in the same interview. For instance, the Head of Personnel said at the beginning of
one interview: "we consult with the union on ever/thing which is being done", but admitted later
In the interview: "we by-pass the union on a daily basis".
The researcher used a tape recorder which, In the words of Buchanan et al (1988), has
become 'accepted technology'. The advantages are well known: the ability to pick up much data
and verbatim quotes, more time to concentrate on the interview and probe deeply rather than
spending time on 'note taking' and hence perhaps losing course of the interview flow. The main
disadvantage relates to microphone shyness, which is not an insignificant problem when
discussing sensitive organisational issues.
For most interviews recorders were used; they were used especially when interviewing
senior managers to whom access was difficult and insight was significant. it was used less
frequently for those less directly involved in the issues being discussed, where the information had
to be filtered more for relevance. In certain contexts they were not deemed appropriate: for
instance, where the interviews took place in an open plan office or 'conversational interviewing'
was taking place without the realisation of the interviewee. In the former situation brief notes were
taken, with fuller notes being written up afterwards; in the latter, the researcher had to rely on
committal to memory before being written up, a process known as 'memory dumping'.
Certainly, much useft information was gathered informally, with chats and observation at
tea breaks, lunches in pubs, travelling with Bank employees and staying at the homes of Bank
staff (In one instance for a period of four weeks).
Interviews took place with a wide range of people in the Bank over the two year period.
Naturally, attention was focussed on those directly involved in business strategy and employee
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relations, for instance, a great deal of time was spent with senior managers in Group Development
(the Bank think tank) and the Personnel Department, where the researcher was based for part of
the study. However, time was also spent with those less directly Involved with strategic
development, for instance, branch managers, whose concerns and insights could then feedback
into interviews undertaken further up the hierarchy. It was not the intention of this research to take
a bottom-up approach with a survey of staff members in the Bank. Hence the research was not
strictly concerned with, for example, the impact on staff of organisational change and new
technology per Se, but only In so far as it affected management strategy and thinking.
Union representatives were also interviewed: these included the national negotiating
officer for the union in the Bank, the control clerks (seconded staff), area officers and office
representatives. Furthermore, in an attempt to place developments within the Bank in the context
of other banks and the financial sector in general, a number of people outside the Bank were
interviewed. These included national union officials at the union head office, various managers In
other banks and building societies, staff in the Federation of London Clearing Bank Employees
and representatives from the Co-operative movement.
Many of these interviews could not avoid problems of confidentiality, especially when
exchange of information was expected to be reciprocal. Such difficulties are inevitable in this type
of research.
Much of the research adopted the opportunistic approach endorsed by Buchanan et al,
who argue that:
"Fieldwork is permeated with the conflict between what Is theoretically desirable
on the one hand and what Is practically possible on the other. It Is desirable to
ensure representatives in the sample, uniformity of Interview procedures,
adequate data collection across the range of topics to be explored, and so on.
But the members of the organisations block access to information, constrain the
time allowed for inteiviews, lose your questionnaires, go on holiday and Join
other organisatlons In the middle of your unfinished study. In the conflict
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between the desirable and the possible, the possible aM'ays wins." (1988 p53)
(iii) Observation
The researcher began his fieldwork with a two week period of famillarisatlon at the Bank
Head Office in November 1986. This was important for the research for several reasons. The
researcher had little knowledge of retail banking in the U.K and almost no knowledge about the
Bank. The period was valuable in allowing the researcher to immerse himself In the Jargon of
banking and the culture of the organisatlon. Furthermore, as Glazer points out:
"insight gathered during this period contributes to developing or modifying the
research design. It can alert the investigator to the reality of his research goals
and to the possibility of him completing his work, given available time and
resources. It can also sensitise him to the many pitfalls he must face as he
continues In his research effort." (1972 p49)
The researcher was for this familiarisation period placed in one of the offices occupied by two of
the personnel managers. This was not perhaps ideal, since much of the department was open
plan and such a location did not facilitate the gathering of Informal material by observation and
chats. However, time was spent visiting several departments so as to gain insight into the
workings of the Bank and examining and collecting data. Furthermore, a number of people were
met and contact established, and this enabled the researcher on his return to the organisation to
be received with more confidence, having been 'seen around' the organisation regularly over a
period of time, and hence established a relationship with the Bank.
Part of the research undertaken was participant observation. This is defined by Denzin as:
"a commitment to adopt the perspective of those studied, by sharing their day to
day experiences.., defined as a field strategy that simultaneously combines
document analysis, respondent and Informant Interviewing, direct participation
and observation, and introspection." (1978 p182-3)
The rationale for such a method was well put by Olsen and Whittaker:
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"Since the choice of method should be suggested at a!! times by the subject
matter and the subject matter in our case was process, the choice of participant
obseivation as the principle way of investigation seemed a good choice. Our
rationale was that the best way to understand a process was to become part of
it." (quoted by Pettlgrew 1973 p53)
The problems associated with observation are well documented. Briefly, It is heavily time-
consuming and hence Is best confined to a limited number of situations. There are dangers of
bringing the researcher's own perceptions to the observation and hence the results may show
more about the researcher's values than those of the observed. The presence of the observer may
contaminate the 'data' in that he may affect the process being observed although triangulation
reduces such a risk.
Denzin (1978 p182-3) describes four ideal types of participant observation:
1. Complete Participation
In this role the researcher aimed to become an ordinary member of the group and his full Intent is
not revealed.
2. ParticIpant as Observer
Here the observer makes his role as an observer clear to the subjects.
3. Observer as PartIcipant
In this role the contact Is brief and formalised by a questionnaire and no relationship is
established.
4. Complets Observer
The researcher Is removed completely from interaction wIth his subjects.
The research under discussion falls most easily Into the second Ideal type. Hence, the
researcher aimed at avoiding Intrusion. His position as an academic observer was usually made
clear and, when he attended meetings, he was generally seated well away from the main body of
actors and in one case even sat In another room, being able to hear If not to see what was taking
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place!
Over the research period, the following meetings were attended:
Human Resources Committee (see Appendix A8)
Product and Technology Committee (see Appendix A9)
Negotiating Meetings
Personnel Managers' Meetings
Job Evaluation Meetings.
These were valuable for offering insight into both the changing events in the Bank and the
process of change itself. Access to Board and Policy Committee meetings was not gained, and
this reflects one of the problems of triangulation:
"that much involves the inaccessibility of critical data areas or levels" (Denzin
1978 p306)
and hence the researcher had to rely on minutes of the meetings, together with interviews or more
informal discussions with people who had attended such meetings. Cross-checking also took
place with other sources.
(iv) Action research
The above refers to participant observation. There was more direct involvement: an
element of action research. Clark writes that:
"action research must possess an aspect of direct Involvement in organisational
change and simultaneously it must provide an Increase In knowledge...(and that)
one of its main attractions is that it provides access to otherwise hidden
processes." (1972 p23)
The researcher's involvement with the Industrial Relations Audit has been mentioned
briefly. Together with one of the employee relations officers, a pilot was carried out, the results
analysed and a revised version drawn up. In the event, the audit never got off the ground, but it
was valuable in several ways: the student got an insider's lnsi9ht Into the organisation, as he was
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regarded as working for the Bank, and into the attitudes of the staff; he was able to observe the
intra-organisatlonal conflict and the lack of communication between Head Office and branches or
centres outside of Manchester; this was evident when the I-lead of the Customer Service Bureau
failed to fill in his copy of the pilot audit, claiming that Head Office had not informed him that he
needed to complete it.
A second period of action research took place when the researcher was involved with the
introduction of a new disciplinary code and team briefings as one of the tutors. Initially the Bank
wished for a very full and active role, including co-ordination of the series of workshops taking
place around the country, but the amount of time and commitment this would involve in an area
not central to the research, led to a very much more limited role. The researcher attended a one-
day tutors' workshop and was one of the Bank tutors in the workshop held for the managers in the
North-East. Again, being regarded as an 'insider' enabled much valuable material to be gathered
In terms of attitudes to many of these personnel initiatives.
(e) Conclusion
The researcher adopted a top-down, qualitative approach to the research, which enabled
the 'capture' of strategic change to take place, which was deemed as most suitable for examining
the relationship between business strategy and the management of labour. Following the concept
of methodological triangulation, interviews, documentary analysis and participant observation
were combined so as to provide a fuller and more accurate picture than that provided by a single
research bias. The sponsorship of the research by the organisation enabled a high access to be
achieved.
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE CO-OPERATIVE BANK
(a) Introduction
This chapter traces the historical development of the Bank from its early days as the
banking arm of the co-operative movement to its coming of age as a fully-fledged bank. It sets
this against the backcloth of the changing fortunes of the movement as a whole.
(b)The Co-operative Wholesale Society
In this section we examine briefly the development of the Bank's owners, the Co-operative
Wholesale Society and the movement in general, so as to explain the pressures which the owners
have been under, which is the context in which the Bank has been working, and also the unique
culture of the Bank, strongly influenced by its association with the movement.
The Co-operative Bank, while one of the main clearing banks In the U.K., operates in a unique
fashion in that it Is owned by the Co-operative Wholesale Society (CWS) and hence is banker to
the movement.
The origins of the movement itself has, of course, been well documented, as has the topic of
Owenism'. Owen Is generally regarded as the "father of co-operation" (Bonner 1961) and the
man who "set men's minds on the track of co-operation" (Holyoake 1903) although he was never
very interested in the idea of co-operative retail societies, which were some way removed from his
ideal of universal co-operation.
While co-operative societies had existed before the Rochdale Pioneers, they are regarded as
the founders of the first model co-operative society. It was rooted In a Lancashire textile town in
Victorian England, where the transformation from the domestic to the factory system was taking
place; "workers were seen as hands", as expendable resources for whom the employer had no
responsibility beyond the legal obligations of contract (Bamber and Snape 1987 p35). The
environment was one of harsh living conditions and inadequate consumer protection, with
adulterated food being facilitated by the practice of Truck.
Workers responded to this In different ways: one response was unionism; another was co-
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operatism, workers joined together to purchase basic foods on behalf of their members and a
share of the profits (or surpluses In co-operative terminology) were returned to members in
proportion to their purchases - the dividend (or 'divi' as it later became known). Hence the co-
operatives differed in both structure and objectives from conventional companies, which exist to
produce profit for the share-holders, whose voting power and profits are determined by the
number of shares owned. In a co-operative, capital was not the crucial factor, and each member
was entitled to one vote, regardless of the number of shares owned.
The development of the movement was based on the application of the Rochdale Pioneers
Principles of:
1. Open membership
2. Democratic control - one member, one vote
3. Payment of fixed interest on share capital
4. Distribution of trading surplus to members in
proportion to their trade with the society
5. Provision of education for members and workers.
The co-operative retail societies were organisatlons set up to supply their members on a
mutual basis with the basic necessities of life, with surplus being distributed as above. However,
the pioneers of the movement had much broader concerns than merely that of being a distributive
organisation operating for consumer Interest, and had ambitions for control of each facet of
economic life - to Indude retail trade, wholesale redistribution, organised buying and production,
shipping, banking and insurance.
The CWS was formed in 1863 as the manufacturing and trading arm of the co-operative
movement. It was the Industrial and Provident Societies Act which made possible the
establishment of a federation of societies by enabling a society to hold shares in another. The
CWS was re9istered as the North of England Co-operative Wholesale Industrial Provident Society
Ltd, but 'Industrial' and 'Provident' were deleted in 1867 and 'North of England' In 1872. The
establishment of the CWS was motivated partly because of a reluctance by traders to supply co-
operative stores and partly a belief in the advantages of large scale buying, especially the cutting
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out of middlemen. After many unsuccessful ventures with producer societies, the CWS decided it
should produce Its own goods and began with the production of biscuits arid shoes, followed by
farming, clothing, tea making, furniture making and the processing of fish. Henceforth, the co-
operative ideal was that goods sold in co-operative stores should be made by the co-op for the
co-op.
With the merger of its Scottish counterparts in 1973 the CWS covered the entire U.K. and
is one of Europe's largest wholesale organisations. In the year ended January 1987, the CWS had
a turnover of 2.4 billion. Despite rationalisation of the manufacturing units, the CWS still has one
hundred productive operations. However, the output of the CWS factories now is supplied to
customers outside the movement. The CWS also has 35,000 acres of land in England and
Scotland. it is Britain's biggest commercial farmer and biggest milkman. Regional distribution
centres are used to supply the retail societies and 60% of the brand goods of the co-op brand are
still made in their own factories.
The CWS employs some 22,000 people and is responsible for providing advisory services
beyond the capacity of Individual retail societies, e.g. advertising consultants, computer experts,
etc. Furthermore, the CWS is responsible for both the Bank and the Co-operative insurance
Society (CIS). The latter has some 15 million life, household and motor policies in force and, after
making provisions for reserves, distributes profits to policy holders in line with co-operative
principles. In addition, societies are offered special 'cost price' terms and the CIS aiso pays a
dividend on their premiums from the profits of the non life business as a whole.
The CWS itself is owned by some 100 retail societies (in 1900 there were 1,400), which
have eight million members and over 5,000 shops employing 80,000 staff. The retail societies
elect a board of directors for a three year term and these are usually retail officials and members
of retail society boards. It is by this complex mechanism that the CWS is accountable to the
societies, and hence, more indirectly, the Bank.
In theory the Bank's ownership means it is more responsive to the consumer than other
banks who, being Joint stock companies, are operating for the benefit of shareholders. It is
probably fair to say that the Bank is not under the same pressure to make profits, although It has
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to achieve a reasonable return on reserves.
The societies themselves are autonomous organisatlons with each society responsible for
its own policy on pricing and procurement. The capital of the CWS consists of shares taken up by
each corporate member of the CWS with the number of shares subscribed being directly related
to the number of the societies' own members. CWS members receive a restricted rate of Interest
on their Invested capital (not withdrawable) and also receive dividends payable In proportion to
their purchases from the CWS. Voting rights are also proportionate to purchases from the CWS.
The above has presented a general picture of the structure of the movement and the CWS
in particular, and something of the historical background. In fact, the picture of the movement
since the Second World War has been one of continual decline; thus:
"The American statesman, Dean Acheson, once said that in the postwar world
Britain had lost an empire and failed to find a role. It could be said of the Co-
operative Movement In the same period that it had lost its place on a road of
progress that had been unbroken for a century and was still struggling to find its
way back." (Richardson 1977 p149)
In the 1980s the movement was under great pressure. Its membership declined from 13
million members In 1964 to eight million by 1987. The number of co-operative societies has
declined from 1,438 in 1900 to 100 In 1987. Many mergers have taken place between societies In
financial and trading difficulties, and the retail operating group of the CWS has also been active.
In many cases 'merger' has been a euphemism as many of the societies taken over have ceased
to exist as local entitles (McDougall 1985).
The co-operative Ideology has been criticised for lacking relevance In an era of
individualism. While educational, cultural and leisure activities remain evident in the movement,
many shoppers perceive the Co-op as just another multiple retailer competing In the market
place. The Co-op thus faces a dilemma In attempting to stay true to Its traditions of social
responsibility by keeping open small uneconomic stores when economics dictate the opening of
large superstores. People have higher expectations of the Co-op in such areas. Nevertheless
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values of the movement, expressed by profit-sharing (high dMdends for members), consumer
service (involving cross-subsidising), fair prices and equity are still regarded as being relevant in
the modern context.
The decline of the movement has many causes. One, mentioned above, has been the
growth of indMdualism. In the long term has been the growing irrelevance of the objectives of the
founders of the movement, born of particular circumstances, namely the exploitation of
consumers in the 19th Century. A failure of management is a third factor, especially in terms of
handling the change to more sophisticated consumer shopping techniques in retailing. The 1964
abolition of resale price maintenance proved to be a turning point, with the rapid decline of the
independent small shopkeepers and the rise of the multiples. In 1961, the multiples had some
29.2% of the retail trade and by 1982 this had risen to 50.2%.
Many of the problems of the movement stem from its heritage. A strength of the
movement has been its democratic and local structure, with each society making its own
decisions within its own geographical territory. Hence there are eight million customers and
members are share-holders in 95 retail societies, but a third of these are tiny, with a combined
turnover of less than 1% of total Co-op sales, while the largest 25 account for three-quarters of
sales. Societies, however, remain fiercely independent, although successive Co-op Congresses
have formulated plans for 25 large regional societies, urging others to merge. It was proposed in
1983 that the CRS merge with the CWS, the former being under strain from its role as 'ambulance'
to the movement, but negotiations broke down.
In practice then the movement has a strongly centralised wholesale manufacturing
organisation linked with a fragmented group of retailing operations, who have no overall
marketing policy and meet only annually to discuss strategy, and without any mechanism to
impose decisions. This contrasts with the autocratic, centralised, national organisations of the
multiple retailers. Recognition of these problems is not new: between 1953 and 1964 there were
four major inquiries regarding the movement's constitution and trading methods; for example,
Richardson examines the 1954 review:
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The report said: "One of the major difficulties facing the CWS is lack of co-
ordinated demand of retail societies. This militates against efficient planning of
production on the one hand and effective exercise of the warehousing function
on the other. As a result, the Co-operative Movement Is failing to secure the
maximum economies possible from mass production and bulk buying
respectively ... This is particularly evident In the thy goods trades where the
multiple organisations are increasing their share of retail trade at the expense of
both Co-operative and departmental stores." (1977 p203).
The next two sections outline the development of the Bank from its inception to the present day.
(C) The C.W.S. Bank 1872-1971
The Co-operative Bank was established in 1872 under the name of 'Loan and Deposit'
Department of the Co-operative Wholesale Society (CWS), which itself had been incorporated in
1863. The latter had been set up so as to supply the needs of the retail co-operatives within the
U.K.
The specific context which led to the formation of the Loan and Deposit Department was
the growth in numbers and size of the societies in the 1 850s, with consequent problems relating
to control of cash. Redfem (1938) recounts how the treasurer of a co-operative society in Stock-
port:
"took up the boatd of the bedroom floor and hid the money as far underneath as
he could reach." (cited by Richardson, 1977, p.357).
The committee of the Campstall Society in Cheshire, believing that banks were not for the 'likes of
us', resolved at a meeting in 1857 that:
"If suppliers won't come for their money, [the Shopmanj Is to buy the goods from
the person who will come. The committee were not agreeable for him to go to
Manchester with any large sums of money." (ibid).
These types of security system were clearly inadequate, set against a background of emergent
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Joint stock banking.
The Idea of a separate bank or banking department had been mooted at the 1869 Co-
operative Congress, where papers were presented, and In 1870 informal discussions led to a
banking conference' at Buty of co-operatives' representatives. J.M. Ludlow Qater to be Registrar
General of the Friendly Societies) agreed that there was no reason why there should not be a
bank "in closest association with the wholesale". There was the example of experiments in
Germany and France, although admittedly the Credit au Travail failed because of lack of financial
expertise. Agreement was reached on the desirability of the co-operative bank, but the exact
form of such an institution was debated. The major problem was the current status of the
societies under the law. While Parliament in 1852 had given legal status and protection to co-
operative storekeeping, and in 1862 allowed societies to join in federation (thus enabling the
formation of the CWS), the Industrial and Provident Societies Act had debarred co-operative
enterprises from entering banking. There was also debate over whether the bank should be under
the wing of the CWS or a separate federation of societies and unions in which the CWS could
participate.
On 4th May 1872 a shareholders' meeting of the CWS passed the following resolution:
"That It should be a recommendation to the quarterly meeting as a means to
commence and gradually develop a co-operative business, that they give us
authority to receive surplus capital from the members, withdrawal at call and
subject to the current bank rate of interest, the same to be used in our business
or lent out on approved security."
The potential advantages of a co-operative bank were seen broadly. It would, for
instance, be able to bring together co-operative retail societies which had surplus funds, and co-
operative production which lacked the capital required for further development. The Bank would
provide money for expansion in a boom and help societies out during a downturn in the trade
cycle, and hence insulate the movement from the vagaries of capitalism; it also provided an
opportunity to be more independent of outside financial control. This also was part of the
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principle of mutual self-help. Furthermore, In addition to financial considerations, Ludlow agreed
that the formation and operation of the bank would contilbute to the unification of the movement,
and this:
"might in this way give unity to the movement which, so far as I can see it, it can
hardly attain otherwise."
(Speech to Co-operative Conference, Bury, April 15th 1870, quoted by Redfern
1938)
After a confirmatory meeting of shareholders in August 1872, banking commenced under
the title of the Loan and Deposit Department; the legal restrictions prevented banking being part
of the name, although it was clearly a banking operation. in 1876 a consolidatory and amending
Industrial and Provident Societies Act removed the ban on banking by societies and the
organisation became known as the CWS Bank or bankers department.
The debate over the role and structure the organisation would take continued to be a
matter for contention. For instance, should the Bank be run solely by the CWS or a separate
federation of societies Including the CWS and trade unions? Productive idealists wanted an
independent bank to finance independent production (Redfern 1938).
In the same year that the Loan and Deposit Department was set up, the 'Industrial Bank'
was launched at Newcastle-upon-Tyne. Inspired by Dr. Rutherford, a Congregational minister and
prominent northern co-operator and educatlonalist, It was registered as a joint stock bank, and
had as Its main objective the assistance of the Ouseburn Engine Works. The collapse of both,
associated with the onset of the Great Depression, resulted In both the CWS and the retail
societies losing money. There were many other Initiatives, especially after the turn of the century,
notably the People's Bank (1912), PIoneer Mutual Banking Society (1918), National Co-operative
Bank (1921) and the International Co-operative Bank (1921). Attempts were also made to change
the CWS control of banking, but the Bank considered the CWS the appropriate body and was
against fragmentation of the co-operative enterprise (Bonner 1961).
The Bank made slow progress in the early years and Its ambitions were limited. At a time
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when the CWS assets were only 0.5 million, the Bank's assets rose from 214,000 (1 882) to
1,629,000 (1902). The few hundred accounts were those of co-operative societies. With the
appointment of Thomas Goodwin as manager in 1907, the Bank began to encourage private
customers, although in practice they were mostly the accounts of CWS officials which were
credited there. In 1912 the Bank targeted the unions, and events like the miners' strike in that year
led to favourable publicity. As Richardson describes It:
"When the Northumberland Miners Association was refused accommodation by
a Joint stock bank during a strike in 1912, an application to the CWS Bank met
with a prompt response. Experiences such as this were noted and learnt from by
trade unionists, and active co-operators who were also prominent in their unions
were not slow to press home the message to union conferences and
executives."
(1977, p339)
After the First World War, total assets were 10.8 million, turnover 0.5 million and the Bank
had 5,300 current accounts, but the Bank had been under some pressure, having financed CWS
capital extensions and lent to the state (the latter signifying that it was rather more than simply the
internal organ of the CWS). Furthermore, shop price rises after the war affected the retail
societies, who were the Bank's main customers, in the carrying of stocks at higher prices, while
there had been over-investment in Government War Issues. In 1918 the Bank was invited to apply
for clearing house membership, but the branch structure and overhead costs involved deemed
this unviable and, in any case, the Bank regarded itself as a centre of retail trade, for which it
formed its own clearing house (Redfern 1938 p192). To help the movement over the post-war
period two issues of development bonds were made.
By 1924 the Bank had total assets of 6 million, a turner of 522 million and 18,700 current
accounts. The 1912 campaign to obtain trade union accounts had been a success, the number of
accounts had increased from 49 (1913) to 1,980 (1938), although this greatly underestimated the
growth of trade union business, taking into account the increasing centralisation of unions in the
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Inter-war period. The 1926 General Strike had displayed the flexibility of the Bank's retail society
agency system, with instructions being telegraphed to co-operative societies to cash cheques for
strike pay.
The inter-war period also gave birth to the first branches of the Bank being opened In
London, Newcastle and Bristol. International connections were also established with Russian co-
operatives (for the purpose of importing grain), Australian co-operative wheat pools and New
Zealand co-operative dairy farmers. These associations continue to the present day by
membership of the International Co-operative Alliance, which meets regularly to discuss and
exchange Ideas. With retail societies acting as agents of the Bank In accepting deposits and
cashing cheques, this encouraged the development of personal banking and by 1939 total assets
had risen to 114 million (from 28 million in 1926).
As In the First World War, the Bank took a wider role and was responsible for mobilising
sums from the CWS and retail societies which contributed to wartime national savings (ministerial
control ensured that capital expenditure was limited, with CWS funds rising from 113 million to
259 million, and over the war period the Investment portfolio rose from 99 million to 237 million).
Richardson (1977) refers to the "accelerated pace of development" after the war and the
election of a Labour Government in 1945, with Labour also doing well locally, led to Increasing
Interest in the Bank, which took advantage of the opportunity and made headway in the public
authority sector. Between 1946 and 1951 some 100 councils transferred their accounts to the
Bank, including Derbyshire, Durham, Essex, Glamorgan, Monmouthshire, Northumberland,
Nottinghamshlre and Staffordshire County Councils, and the Corporations of Barnsley, Derby,
Gateshead, Grlmsby, Newport, Salford and Stoke-on-Trent.
However, a political element was part of the debate and some of the transfers were
controversial and were opposed especially by local private traders and Conservative councillors.
At Salford the Conservatives were divided, although the superior terms of the Co-operative Bank
won the day. This sector has always been a great strength of the Bank, and In 1976 it was banker
for one-third of the new Metropolitan County Councils, one-quarter of the new Metropolitan
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County Council and London Boroughs, and one-tenth of all district councils.
A new phase of branch expansions took place, including Birmingham, Cardiff,
Cheimsford, Derby, Durham, Grimsby, Leeds, Newport, Northampton, Nottingham, Sheffield,
Stafford and Stoke, and by the mid 1950s there were more than 20 Bank branches. The Bank
began to develop along more conventional lines. In 1947 It was recognised as an Authorised
Bank under the Exchange Control Act and hence could participate in foreign exchange business.
Changing economic and social conditions and the rise In Income and associated demands for
consumer credit, were a great opportunity for the Bank, especially with its distinctive mix of
branch and store banking and also the association of many co-operative shoppers with semi-
banking business within the stores, e.g. the paying of club contributions and payment and
withdrawal of loan deposits.
The CWS Board of 1967, in recognition of the way the Bank was developing, agreed that
it should be re-named the Co-operative Bank, which preceded the radical structural re-
organisatlon two years later. There was also the establishment of a new subsidiary company, Co-
operative Commercial Bank Ltd, to handle Euro-currency transactions, inter-bank markets and all
the services required by the corporate sector; at the same time, a major shareholding was
acquired in F C Finance Ud, a publicly-quoted finance house of medium size, so as to enable the
bank to be Involved with hire purchase transactions (the so-called secondary banking sector).
In January 1970, the CWS Board set up a sub-committee with the remit of examining the
question of establishing the Bank as a separate legal entity under the Companies Act (this issue
had been raised much eatiler in 1954 by a CWS enquiry Into the future direction of the movement
but a minority report suggesting 'hMng off the bank had been defeated). In 1970 it was proposed
that the new company would be a wholly-owned subsidiary of the CWS, with the Board being
comprised of the CWS Chief Executive Officer as Chairman, the General Manager of the Bank and
other senior Bank and finance officers. The CWS would maintain control and accounts would be
published as before with the CWS report and balance sheet. The advantages would be that the
bank could participate in the main banking forums, the British Bankers' Association and the
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Clearing House; It would furthermore be able to enter wholeheartedly the national banking market
which, in turn, would enable it to provide extra funds for the movement. In other words it "would
mark out the Bank in every sense as a bona fide bank". After approval by the Board, Parliament
passed The Co-operative Bank Act in 1971, which was the wheel turning full circle, Parliament
enabling the bank to operate as a separate part of the banking system after having forbidden co-
operative banking In 1862.
(d) Development of the Co-operative Bank 1971-1986
Since its establishment by the 1971 Act of Parliament the Bank has grown strongly, albeit
from a small base, quadrupling its customer account base from 250,000 in 1973 to one million by
the end of 1981, and its development has seen a decline in importance to it of the societies, who
represent no more than 10% of deposits. The Bank had a strong Image because of the link with
the co-operative movement and its in-store network, and promoted itself as the 'third force' in
British banking (after the London Clearing Banks and public sector banks) with a reputation for
innovation in customer service.
In 1972 the Bank became a member of the British Bankers' Association and in 1974
became the first new member for 30 years to join the London Clearing House. Prior to this,
cheques had been cleared by the National Westminster Bank but this was regarded as expensive
and administratively inefficient, hence:
"This decision was a commercial one, balancing the rapidly increasing charges
required by the agent against the high equipment and joining costs of setting up
its own function. This was very much an operating decision, with no impact on
the Bank portfolio or business or relationship with the co- operative movement.
(The Yorkshire Bank chose not to join the Clearing House but their decision was
no doubt influenced by the fact that they were already provided with a lower cost
clearing service, being a jointly owned subsidiary of the major clearers
themselves." (Bank paper, 1978)
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The Bank had assets of over £1.5 billion in August 1987 and operates via a network of 90
branches and since the First World War via agency points within the stores of retail societies. The
transactions are carried out at some 4,000 banking points within the store network (the largest in-
store network In Europe) and are dealt with by retail society rather than Bank employees.
However, these distribution networks have caused difficulties, with the collapse of many societies
and hence the Bank losing part of its network.
The Bank had 1.5 million accounts in 1987, and offers the full range of services: cheque
cashing, clearing, overdrafts, mortgages, etc. The Bank is particularly strong in traditional areas
of trade unions, local authorities and member clubs and, of course, there is also the huge
corporate business of the movement. The retail societies had a turnover of £5.048 million and the
CWS of £2.4 billion in 1987. While societies provide only 10% of deposits, bank loans provide half
of the borrowing and 25-30% of the Bank's lending.
However, in the 1970s the Bank aimed at expanding both its personal and corporate
business outside the movement. Nevertheless, the Bank still maintains relationships with other
co-operative banks throughout the world, e.g. 4,600 Volksbanken and Raiffeisenbanken of West
Germany, and is a member of various international organisations, e.g. International Confederation
of Popular Credit, Association of Co-operative Savings and Credit Institutions of the EEC,
International Confederation of Agricultural Credit, and Banking Committee of the International Co-
operative AJliance.
The Bank expanded strongly in the 1970s at a time when there was the 'great unbanked'.
In 1976 only 38% of adults had a current account while by 1981 this had increased to 50% and by
1984 65%. The Bank aimed to bring these people into the banking system, although they were
also concerned to target those within the existing banking system.
Richardson (1977) identifies three main planks to the 1 970s strategy. Firstly, the Bank
aimed to provide a comprehensive package of financial services aimed particularly at a typical
family. Furthermore, the Bank regarded itself as something of a pacesetter in British banking,
being the first to publish Its commission charges so account holders would be aware of the actual
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cost of their account. In 1973 the Bank Introduced the concept of 'free banking' - commission
free banking for current account holders who keep their accounts in credit. In the area of
personal credit the Bank gave facilities on unsecured personal loans for fixed terms up to five
years and budget accounts on a revolving credit basis. The Bank was first to introduce a 'Truth in
Lending Policy' before legislation was introduced on credit terms.
Secondly, the advantages In terms of the convenience of Its distribution network were
stressed. The Bank had both the traditional branches and also some 4,000 banking points
providing basic services. The Bank was clearly not going to compete with the 'Big Four' for an
extensive branch network, the efficacy of which had, in any case, been open to increasing doubt;
indeed the Bank had some 10,000 customers per branch (1978), backed by a custom-built
Central Services Bureau at Skelmersdale, which housed a centralised computer system and
compiled statements and was responsible for distributing chequebooks, cheque cards and
standard letters, hence facilitating the concentration on customer contact by staff. By contrast,
the major banks averaged some 2,000 accounts per branch and it was believed that the heavy
Infrastructure was uneconomic. The Bank utiiised Its link with the movement to provide via the in-
store network as many locations and longer hours than the banks.
Thirdly, the Bank promoted itself as the customer-friendly or people's bank, responsive to
consumer needs (Richardson 1978).
The Bank's aim in the early years of its time as a clearing bank sought to build a loyal
customer base via its current account service and to achieve this the Bank was highly competitive
and innovative, most notably with the introduction of 'free banking'. However, the Bank's
ambition was expensive, especially the heavy investment in the infra-structure of a transmission
system - bullion centres, a London-based clearing house and a customer service centre. All this
meant that the cost of raising current account funds was more pro rate than the other banks.
The Price Commission in its report on Bank Char ges for Money Transmission Services,
published in 1978, commented on the different position of the Bank:
"during this period (the 1970sJ it has more than doubled its bank branch network
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and as 50 per cent of its branches are less than five years old, some have yet to
make a contribution to overall profitability. In the mid- 1970s it became a clearing
bank, which required the establishment of a London based clearing centre and
computer installation; the benefits of this development In terms of profitability are
medium to long term. Unfortunately the Bank undertook the major part of this
expansion during a period (1973-1977) which subsequently proved to be years of
historically high inflation, which doubled payroll costs per member of staff
employed and dramatically increased the Bank's infra-structure costs."
(Cited in Co-operative Bank Paper, 1978)
With the bulk of profits coming from the domestic banking sector, this has meant the
Bank's operations and profitability were greatly affected by the fluctuations of domestic interest
rates and did not have the diversification into finance and International operations of the major
banks, although the attractions of these declined with bad debt problems in the early 1980s. The
Price Commission reported that:
"An examination of the accounts of the Co-operative Bank shows that throughout
the period under consideration it has consistently operated on lower margins
than the major London clearers and that its return on capital, both before and
after adjustment for In flat/on, is at a lower level. It is clear that, after taking
account of inflation, the Group's level of profitability has not been adequate to
maintain its free capital during the period under review. The Bank's policy
(tariff) has been to keep the tariff as simple as possible in order to encourage
customers. It sees itself as a specialist in providing money transmission
services; It Is actively pursuing new personal accounts, and its competitive rates
are a sign of this policy. Its success may be gauged from the fact that Its share
of the personal sector market has doubled since 1975. Furthermore, the majority
of this new business has been obtained by customers transferring from
established clearing banks and not from first-time account customers, and a
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large proportion of their customers are in the higher socio-economic groups.
The Co-operative Bank also competes energetically for corporate business
customers." (Cited In Co-operative Bank Paper, 1978)
The Commission concluded that:
"Generally, the Co-operative Bank is In a position to become a real force In
alternative banking. The nature of its branch network and its opening hours
make it convenient and accessible to customers. By aggressive competition, it
has expanded its market share appreciably In the past five years. For the
reasons outlined, however, its overall profitability is low, and when allowance is
made for in flat/on its capital base appears to have been significantly eroded."
(Cited in Co-operative Bank Paper, 1978)
The Bank in the 1980s had slowed considerably in its progress (see Table 4.1).
Table 4.1: Co-operatIve Bank accounts 1975-1986
Accounts
(thousands)
1975
	
360
1976	 417
1977	 500
1978	 570
1979
	
700
1980
	
850
1981
	
1,000
1982
	
1,200
1983	 1,250
1985	 1,500
1986	 1,500
Source: Annual Reports
Market share was no more than 2% by the mid 1 980s. The 1981 Windfall Profits Tax, levied by
the Government upon the average non-interest bearing deposits of clearing banks, hit the Bank
disproportionately because of the structure of its deposit balances, the Bank paying 89% of its
profits as opposed to an average of 19% by the other clearers. Furthermore, the concentration on
building up current accounts customers (few of these being heavy borrowers) and the Bank
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having few corporate customers meant that the Bank was underlent.
Part of the strategy developed to overcome this was to increase the Bank's lending book by
Handycard, a budget shopcard introduced in 1978 to enable the consumer to make purchases on
a revolving credit basis. Another scheme, Handyloan, was designed for more expensive
purchases and had a fixed term repayment scheme. With some twenty million co-operative
shoppers, this was clearly an area to be exploited. Furthermore, many co-operative shoppers did
not have bank accounts so there was the opportunity of bringing them into the banking system.
Hence the Bank could expand without 'poaching'. Thus in 1978, of some 80,000 new customers,
60,000 had never had a bank account before, being mainly shop assistants who switched from
weekly cash to monthly bank payments.
The Bank maintained its innovative reputation; in 1982 the Bank launched the first interest
bearing cheque book account to be offered by a U.K. bank. The Bank also pioneered links
between banks and building societies. With spare capacity in the clearing house, the Bank
agreed to provide clearing facilities for the Abbey National Building Society. The Bank made
cheque books and credit cards available to the Building Society customers, while Bank customers
could cash cheques at Building Society branches and also apply for Abbey National Mortgages.
In the 1980s a major development was the establishment of the trade union bank, Unity Trust,
in 1985. The Bank took half of the voting stock and supplied the top management. Other stock
was taken up by the trade unions and by sympathetic individuals. The immediate aim of Unity
Trust was to take deposits from unions then either re-lend to other unions or invest on the money
markets. In the longer term the new bank had more ambitious plans (rather like the original Co-
operative Bank) to become a fully-fledged bank in its own right, providing personal banking
services and being involved in commercial lending (following the example of German and Israeli
trade union banks). It began with the advantage of a loyal customer base, and without the
hindrance of a large branch network, enabling it to utilise the latest technology.
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(e) Conclusion
This chapter has examined the historical development of the Bank to the present day. It
showed the long-running debate as to what role the Bank ought to play within the movement
through to the 1970s when the Bank began to take a position as a bank In Its own right, and
hence becoming much more in tune with the financial sector. However, the Bank's relationship
with the movement left It with a rich and complex heritage which had implications both for
business strategy and its industrial relations approach in the 1980s as the Bank sought to get to
grips with the changing nature of the financial sector.
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CHAPTER FIVE: BUSINESS STRATEGY IN THE BANK
(a) Introduction
This chapter discusses changing business strategy in the Bank focusing on the new
Corporate Plan and the attempt to implement this Plan. The first part of the chapter examines the
competitive pressure facing the Bank and the Corporate Plan itself. The changing structure of the
Bank is also reviewed. The second part of the chapter looks at the attempt to implement the
Corporate Plan with particular attention to the organisational change and the positioning of the
Bank. The section also examines the appointment of a new Chief Executive whose Strategic Plan
considerably revised the Corporate Plan, modifying both the process of decision making and the
substantive content of the Plan. The final section of the chapter examines the implications of the
business strategy for employee relations.
The analysis in this section adopts Morris's approach that:
"strategies are concerned both with certain broad goals and with the methods
adopted to reach them" (1986 p117)
and takes a broad approach to the management of strategic change. Most management writing
adopts a linear and rational approach, e.g.
Figure 5.1: Conventional Strategy Model
Environmental shock	 ---	 strategy change---- 	 implementation
results
Hence such models assume that an objective analysis of the environment will lead to appropriate
strategy changes and a direct relationship between strategy formulation and Implementation is
assumed. The process of strategic change is thus an unexplored black box.
This chapter, following Pettlgrew (1987), considers not only the content of business
strategy but the contexts in which it occurs. This includes both Inner context (the structure,
corporate culture and political context of the organisatlon) and outer context (the economic and
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business environment). Hence this chapter considers the 'what' of change (content) and the 'why'
(Inner and outer context factors) as well as examining the 'how' of change (process) see Figure
5.2.
Figure 5.2: Context and Content of Change
ki
Source: Pettigrew (ed) (1987)
Mintzberg (1978) has a similar model whereby he considers strategy to be the Interplay
between the dynamic environment, the stabilising organisation and the mediating role of
leadership which should maintain the latter while adapting it to the former.
Part I
(b) The Co-operative Bank in the 1980s
The changes in the macro-economic environment in which the Bank is operating have
been discussed In the literature review. We noted that few Industries have been subject to the
degree of fundamental change that the financial sector has undergone (Rybcznskl 1984). Thus,
financial deregulation has removed barriers to entry and new technology has altered the basis of
competition. The consumer has become more sophisticated and there has been a great Increase
in competition between banks and within the financial sector as a whole. The result has been a
much tighter product market than was the case in the period of the Bank's rapid expansion in the
1970s and consequently a need to sharpen up the competitive edge of the Bank.
This section looks more closely at the Bank's position in the banking sector and the
particular problems it faced in the 1980s. The Co-operative Bank is unique as a banking institution
owned by a retail organisation and is essentially a domestic retail bank. This poses particular
cause for concern in the 1980s as non-performing sovereign debt has led to a refocus on the
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domestic retail market by the clearers. For instance, In 1985 international profits were only 17% of
total pretax profits in the clearing banks (Hall 1986). As Middleton has pointed out:
"The banks are only now really starting to appreciate the potential of the retail
sector to have an impact on their pro fitability and the value of the consumer
marketing techniques required to exploit the market. Traditionally, retail branch
banking has been viewed as the ugly duckling of the banking world - high fliers
gravitated towards corporate and wholesale banking activities where the re-
wards and glamour were perceived to be more attractive than in the retail sector,
which was characterised by high operating costs and a less prestigious image
than in other areas of the banking world.
A concentration on wholesale lending during the OPEC surplus
recycling period and the subsequent horror stories surrounding sovereign loan
portfolios diverted much senior management attention away from the retail
operations which were often expected virtually to run themselves. In addition
until recently there has been little appreciation of the positive impact of retail
activities on overall profitability. Compared to wholesale markets; in retail finance
spreads are larger, annual volumes greater, competition less intense and
differentiation possible. The basis of competition in many wholesale finance
markets Is price alone - the long term leverage to be gained from marketing
including such elements as branding, segmentations and innovation is often
minimal." (1987 p13)
Furthermore, the entry of building societies into the personal lending and transmission
areas (and their ability under the 1986 Building Societies Act to become Plcs and raise capital)
together with the Interest shown by retail stores in financial services and foreign banks In
domestic retail services (not to mention the TSB flotation In 1986) all add up to what Hall (1986)
calls a "herdllke push into the retail markets". At the same time, the traditional banking market
has slowed in its expansion. The 'great unbanked' Is now a myth with 70% of the population
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having a bank account and some 88% some form of financial account (NOP 1987). Hence, the
potential in terms of new accounts is limited to school leavers and switchers.
Using the structural analysis of Porter (1980), one can examine the competitive forces
facing the Bank. The changes in the financial sector are evident In the difference between this
analysis of competitive forces and that In the literature survey which was using 1985 as a
benchmark.
(i) Threat of Entry
The traditional barriers to entry: strict government regulation, huge capital requirements
and the long experience of the industry gained by the banks are being eroded. Deregulation in the
financial sector has been the order of the day (Hall 1986), building societies have been expanding
their banking services, challenging the banks' monopoly in transmissions, the 1986 Building
Societies Act allows easier access to capital (Uewellyn 1987), technical change has facilitated the
entry of new competitors by removing the branch network as the major barrier to entry.
(ii) and (iii) The Power of Buyers and Suppliers
It remains the case that buyers (both borrowers and buyers of financial services) and
suppliers (depositors) exert minimal power over those in the industry. However, there Is evidence
of reduced loyalty and Increased 'financial promiscuity'.
(iv) The Threat of a Substitute Service
While the public sector offers an alternative service via National Savings and Girobank,
what Is becoming increasingly important is the challenge of building societies and also now retail
stores, for Instance Marks and Spencer's, and various highly centralised financial service groups
who handle money market funds.
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(v) Rivalry among Existing Competitors
Until recently competitive forces have been limited in the banking sector because of the
oligopolotic nature of the industry and government regulation and intervention to pursue its
monetary goods. Product differentiation was limited. The 1980s have, however, witnessed
intensifying competitive pressure and falling margins.
The environmental analysis of Porter, while shedding much useful light, unfortunately
does not explain the different positioning of strategic groups vis-a-vis the five forces outlined.
Thus, for instance, some banks offer longer hours (Mathur 1986 p90). A second weakness relates
to the essentially normative based theory of strategic decision making, an Issue to which we shall
return later in the thesis. Nevertheless, the importance of scanning the environment for both
threats and opportunities when establishing new strategies is a commonplace In the strategy
literature (e.g. Ansoff 1984, Johnson and Scholes 1984, Luffman et al 1987). The Corporate Plan
1986-90 drew out the implications of changes in the environment for the Bank:
"It is now commonly accepted that as customers become more demanding, they
are increasingly interested in convenience, price and the quality of seivice. In
looking harder at the terms of their financial services, they are beginning to opt
for the best 'unbundled' price. However, by way of contradiction, as the financial
needs of customers broaden and the choice of products from different
institutions widens, there is to some extent, a latent desire for one- stop financial
shopping. In this apparent conflict opportunities exist for those institutions who
can get the formula right for their target products and markets. There will be
room for a wide range of different and successful strategies and there is not one
simple answer. However, the penalty for failure in any selected market will also
be high." (Corporate Plan p10)
While such an analysis was undoubtedly true it did beg the crucial questions: what were
the target products and markets to be and what where the "wide range of different and
successful strategies"? These issues relate to the Bank's positioning of itself in the market. In the
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1970s the Bank established a reputation for itself as an innovator, and a thorn in the side of the
Big Four and the public sector banks. While 'free banking', introduced in 1973, was the main
flagship, the Bank was also responsible for innovations such as interest paying cheque accounts
and the disclosure of tariffs to personal customers. As a small bank with only 2.5% of current
account market share in 1986 (see Table 5.1) it was important to be "closer to the customer" (as
Peters and Waterman (1983) term it) than the others.
Table 5.1: Current Account Market Share 1987
Barclays	 21.3
National Westminster	 19.8
Midland	 15.9
Uoyds	 15.3
TSB	 14.0
Girobank	 5.2
Royal Bank of Scotland 	 4.0
Yorkshire Bank	 3.7
Co-operative Bank	 2.5
As with Yorkshire Bank and the TSB, the Bank had proportionally more personal accounts
than the other banks (see Table 5.2).
Table 5.2: Numbers of Customers of Major Banks 1987
Personal
	
Corporate	 Total
m
	
m
	
m
TSB	 6.5	 0.5	 7.0
National Westminster	 5.75	 1.5	 7.25
Barclays	 5.5	 1.5	 7.0
Midland	 4.5	 1.0	 5.5
Uoyds	 4.25	 1.0	 5.25
Girobank	 2.0	 0.5	 2.5
Royal Bank of Scotland
	
1.5
	
0.45	 1.95
Bank of Scotland	 1.0	 0.3	 1.3
Yorkshire	 1.0
	
0.15
	
0.15
Co-operative	 0.8	 0.05	 0.85
Clydesdale	 0.8	 0.2	 1.0
Others	 0.5	 0.05	 0.55
Source: Various sources
Free banking had created for the Bank a niche in the market and the number of accounts
held by the Bank had increased from 360,000 in 1975 to 1.5 million by 1985. However, the Bank's
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1987
(half year)
530
717
251
369
131.8
n/a
6.5
1984 1985 1986
605
671
135
468
153.8
131.3
13
840
804
351
561
169.3
166.3
12.9
895
1011
434
700
205.6
184.5
13.8
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apparently successful transformation from being the banking arm of the Co-operative movement
to being a clearing bank in its own right turned out to be illusory. Since the loss of free banking as
a source of differentiation as the Big Four took on the concept in 1984-5, the Bank had struggled
to find something to replace it. Tagging behind the Big Four could not be a viable long term
strategy.
The absence of a viable strategy was reflected In recent profit figures (see Table 5.3
below), stagnation in account numbers (see Table 5.4) and low profitability ratios (see Table 5.5).
Table 5.3: Pre-Tax Profit of Clearing Banks
Pre-tax
profit (tm)
Barclays
National Westminster
Midland
Uoyds
TSB
Royal Bank of Scotland
Co-operative
Source: Annual Reports
Table 5.4: Co-operative Bank Accounts
Accounts (thousands) 	 1983	 1984	 1985	 1986
1458	 1539
	 1507
	 1499
Source: Co-operative Bank Papers
Table 5.5: Profitability Ratios for Major Banks (mostly 1986)
Pre-tax return on
equity assets
% %
Yorkshire	 31
	 3.2
Girobank
	
28
	 1.4
Barclays	 26
	 1.3
Uoyds	 25
	 1.5
National Westminster	 22
	 1.3
TSB	 21
	 1.7
Bank of Scotland	 21
	 1.3
MkIand	 21
	 0.8
Royal Bank of Scotland
	
20
	 1.2
Co-operative	 18
	 1.0
Source: Banks concerned
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While the above figures do not of themselves indicate a 'crisis situation', defined by
Herman as a situation that:
"threatens the high-priority goals of the organisation (i.e. its survival), restricts
the amount of time available for response and surprises decision-makers by its
occurrence, thereby engendering high levels of stress."
(quoted by Slatter 1984 p61)
they do indicate a stagnant business and this may lead to a crisis situation for:
"If a stagnant business is not turned around, a crisis situation will eventually
ensue because the management of such a firm is unlikely to be taking the
necessary' steps to adapt to the changing product-market environment in which
the firm is operating." (Slatter 1984 p14)
In terms of Porter's analysis (1 980,1985) one could say that the Bank had followed a
differentiation strategy but competitors had imitated it and the result was that the Bank was "stuck
in the middle" having neither cost leadership, differentiation nor a focus strategy. As Porter points
out:
"Becoming stuck in the middle is often a manifestation of a firm's unwillingness
to make choices about how to compete. It tries for competitive advantage
through every means and achieves none, because achieving different types of
competitive advantage usually requires inconsistent actions."
Furthermore, Porter argues that:
"Industry' maturity tends to widen the performance differences between firms
with a generic strategy and those that are stuck in the middle, because it
exposes ill-conceived strategies that have been carried along by rapid growth."
(1985 p17)
Page 121
CHAPTER FIVE	 BUSINESS STRATEGY IN THE BANK
(c) The Corporate Plan
The previous section examined the environment in which the Bank was operating. This
section analyses the new Corporate Plan which was to address these challenges.
(i) Background
Quinton, commenting on the planning process in banking states that:
"the planning process has changed considerably over recent years, it is now a
vehicle for the consideration of strategic issues rather than the formulation of
annual budgets"
(1986 p28)
This was a reflection of the more dynamic environment of the banking sector. The Bank draws up
a five year rolling Corporate Plan. The object is to enable account to be taken of the years
performance and the changing environment so as to be able to alter, update or revise the Bank's
corporate strategies. The 1986-90 Plan was drawn up by the Chief Executive in May and June of
1986 (exactly a year after he had assumed the position) In consultation with the Directors of the
Bank, hence pulling together divisional objectives with the Head of Planning to ensure a fair
allocation of resources and responsibilities and a consistent coherent 'Bank' approach.
The corporate planning process is clearly much more than taking the plans of divisions
and using them as building blocks, as this would reflect the aims of second level managers and
lead to a segmented approach (Argenti 1980). Furthermore the process Is important as a means
by which each division can learn of another's position and activities.
The Board gave approval to the Plan in September and authorised the Chief Executive to
bring In the management consultants, Booz-Allen, to examine the Bank's existing structure In
relation to the new Corporate Plan and to make recommendations as to an appropriate structure
to support the strategy. Hence, this appeared to be a classic case of 'structure follows strategy',
as in the Chandler thesis where strategy is defined as:
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"the determination of long term goals and objectives together with the adoption
of courses of action and the allocation of resources for carrying out these
goals." (1962 p13)
and structure as the organisation which is devised to administer the activities which arise from the
strategies adopted.
(ii) The Plan
Pressure for change clearly came from outside: falling profits and low returns on assets
forced the Bank to re-examine its strategic position. While it is the case that interaction of the
organisation with the environment is not a simple matter of cause and effect, so organisatlons can
in fact enact their environment (Child 1972), this has little relevance to the case of the Bank with
its small size and limited resources.
Furthermore, the unique position of the Bank being owned by the Co-operative Wholesale
Society (CWS) was an important contextual factor. In the 1986 Annual Report the Chief Executive
stated that:
"Our co-operative philosophy dictates that we approach the bank market in a
fundamentally different way."
As we have examined in C3, the relationship between the Bank and the movement has
changed markedly over the years as the Bank has evolved from being the CWS Bank and
essentially banker to the movement to being a fully fledged bank in its own right with wider aims
and a broader customer base. Twenty-five years ago 90% of the Bank's deposits came from the
movement and only 10% from outside. By 1987 that ratio had been reversed. This changing
relationship has been the source of some tension: phrases such as 'separate but integral' were
used to describe the existing situation.
There are those in the movement who were suspicious of the Bank, its loss of ideology
and its ostensible philosophy of co-operatism. Some Co-operative union officials regard the
Bank's link with co-operation as simply being based on ownership. Tension has increased with
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the shrinking of the movement (12 million members in the 1950s down to less than five million by
1987) which is itself under tremendous high street pressure (see e.g. Arnott 1983, Bamfield 1987)
and which we examined in Chapter Four.
An additional point to note is that the movement's financial operations are counter-
cyclical in that it is more profitable in times of low interest rates, which is the opposite of the Bank.
The relationship is both a constraint and an opportunity. On the one hand, remaining
banker to the movement Implies that the movement has higher expectations to the Bank, for
instance it expects the Bank to meet its demands with EFTPOS. The relationship with the trade
union (BIFU) is also part of the movement's baggage which the Bank must take on board. At the
same time, there are opportunities, for instance the 1986 agreement with the Co-operative
Insurance Society (CIS) designed to Increase cross-selling opportunities. Other aspects of the
relationship present something of a mixed blessing: the image of the movement has both
advantages and disadvantages and much depends on the specific region.
It Is perhaps, therefore, somewhat surprising that in the purpose statement, the purpose
of the Bank Group is defined as being:
"to support the objectives of the co-operative movement by providing value for
money banking and related seniices to personal and business customers at a
profit."
However, the distinction between official goals (statements of intent) and operative goals (what Is
actually sought by operational policy) Is an Important one (Perrow 1970). Nevertheless, while the
movement may have little effect on the Bank's policy on a day to day basis, the immersion of
senior managers In the culture and values of the movement may have more Influence than might
at first appear to be the case In that cultural values affect the formulation of strategic options
(Grinyer and Spender 1978).
The main objective of the Bank as stated in the Plan was:
"The Plan has the primary objective of achieving a rapid growth in the Bank's
customer base, which is seen as essential to its long-term survival and the full
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and profitable exploitation of its resources and infrastructure."
(Corporate Plan p1).
The method or strategy arrived at to achieve this was to decide not to attempt to
take/embrace a single approach to all markets but to secure sustainable competitive advantage
through:
focusing on the needs of target market segments: and
providing differentiated (i.e. distinctive) approaches to these target markets.
Hence, the decision was made not to get involved in the areas of Investment banking,
international banking, private banking, factoring or corporate financial advice, where the Bank In
any case lacked expertise. It was adhering to the "stick to the knitting" advice of Peters and
Waterman (1982) and In fact made a virtue of these limited horizons by emphasising Its
attachment to its retail customer base. Even some of the Big Four Banks have not pursued
strategies of being all things to all men. Shaw and Coulbeck, writing In the early 1980s, opined
that:
"all the clearing banks appear to be determined to tackle the market on the
widest possible front and to develop a full range of financial services for all
segments." (1983 p5)
In fact by the mid 1980s, increasing diversity of corporate strategies among the clearing banks
was becoming apparent. While the National Westminster and Barclays have become huge
financial conglomerates, Lloyds have created for itself more of a niche In the market with
professional and high income accounts and has moved into estate agency and Midland has
ratlonalised its activities so as to concentrate on areas where It has a competitive edge.
Furthermore, each has taken a very different approach to Investment banking after the Big Bang
(Plender and Wallace 1985, Hamilton 1986). Hence, the implicatIons of the changes in the
financial sector we examined are for the banks to position themselves differently in the market.
For the Bank, it clearly made sense to focus its efforts rather than spreading itself thinly
(for instance, marketing budgets could be concentrated more effectively). However, the Bank's
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strategy in the 1970s had been to see itself as a U.K. clearer, challenging the Big Four on all fronts
and this identity it maintained had implications for the range of services it provided, Its portfolio
and its infrastructure. One of the major difficulties lay in heavy cost of maintaining the
infrastructure (the weaknesses of the Bank outlined in an internal paper - see Table 5.6 - show this
clearly.)
High overheads were inevitable given that all the clearing banks had to maintain simIlar
functions, a clearing centre and system and financial and prudential control. The larger banks are
clearly in a position to spread their fixed costs over a larger volume of output. This problem was
exacerbated by a Head Office that was believed to be overmanned. In the words of one Manager:
"the Bank was creating so much paper it did not need any customers". Hence, while the Bank's
income per head was not very different from that of Uoyds Bank in 1966, the retained profit was
much lower (see Table 5.7).
Table 5.6: Strengths and Weaknesses of Co-operative Bank Against
its Principal Rivals, the Major Clearing Banks
STRENGTHS
Small in size;
lacking large infrastructure
and heavy investment in High
Street branches
Method of delivery servIce in
major banks is radically out
of date
Capable of flexible approach
to business development
System less rigid and
inflexible than rivals
Problems that a radical
overhaul of method of
delivering service to
customers create tend to
freeze major banks into an
evolution approach
WEAKNESSES
Small in size;
lacking public awareness,
lacking economies of scale
from high volume
Limited number of outlets
No easy access to capital
through shareholders via
rights Issue etc
Cost of system development and
price of 'being in the Club'
favour large High Street banks
Page 126
1985
32,427
7,932
24.46%
28,885
6,604
22.86%
42,635
5,284
12.39%
33,586
8,739
26.02%
25,013
3,379
13.51%
1984
27,386
4,948
18.07%
31,008
7,903
25.49%
42,898
2,013
4.69%
31,666
7,455
23.54%
23,116
3,946
15.12%
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Major banks not liked by press
and public causing them to
spend on large building
Developing and controlling
business in the past has
created problems In
Co-operative Bank
Lack of good quality managers
in depth
To compete with major banks
marginal pricing has to be
employed with the necessary
controls which currently do
not exist In Co-operative Bank
Changes In working practice
may be frustrated by Unions
Source: Internal Bank Paper
Table 5.7: Comparison of Income and Profit per Head of Staff
1986
Barclays	 Income	 33,945
Net Profit	 8,136
"Retained after overheads" 	 23.97%
Iioyds	 Income	 25,805
Net Profit	 6,047
"Retained after overheads"	 23.43%
Midland	 Income	 41,115
Net Profit	 6,441
'Retained after overheads"
	
15.67%
Nat West	 Income	 38,925
Net Profit	 10,755
"Retained after overheads"	 27.63%
Co-operative	 Income	 27,405
Net Profit	 3,581
"Retained after overheads"
	
13.07%
Source: Internal Bank Paper
Furthermore, the lack of a more extensive branch network, while cited as an advantage,
does have a number of drawbacks as we noted In Chapter Two. While Shaw and Coulbeck posed
the question of:
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"whether developments in EFT will render large branch networks redundant. If
that proves to be the case the existing institutions with substantial networks
would be at a major cost disadvantage until they had dismantled them or utiised
them in some other more profitable way" (1983 p4)
in fact branch networks are remaining surprisingly resilient. While there has been an 8% fall in
branch numbers between 1979 and 1986, the major direction of change has been segmentation
(Howcroft and Lavis 1986). Hence, in an effort to align delivery systems with market needs, the 'all
purpose' high street branch is being replaced by a range of different branches, some of which
specialise in the servicing of corporate customers. Branches are also being regarded more as
sales outlets.
While the Bank has an extensive in-store network, the scope of the banking facilities It
provides Is limited. Thus, while the Bank has some 2.5% of the current account market It has only
1% of the deposit market. This is partly the result of the facility of withdrawal being limited to
branches as the in-store network is unable to handle the sums involved in the deposit account
market.
We have seen that the main objective of the Plan was to achieve "a rapid growth in the
Bank's customer base", yet what strategies were formulated to achieve this? Much of the
Corporate Plan was devoted to analysis of the existing markets and dealt only in very general
terms of implications for the Bank, e.g. it was recognised that the "requirements of the 'Personal'
and 'Non Personal' markets are beginning to differ and it was necessary' to develop somewhat
different strategies for each", and it was acknowledged that the Bank's commission rates when
charged were amongst the highest, but it was agreed that customer awareness and utilisatlon of
the total service meant no change in pricing policy was required.
The primary product requirement was regarded as being a money transmission account
and although between 1970 and 1984 there had been an increase in accounts of some 20% per
annum, with the loss of 'free banking' as a source of differentiation it was clear that the Bank
would have to offer other attractions, for instance convenience, access and quality of service.
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Furthermore, it was no longer the case that the Bank was operating in the banking market, the
market was broader in financial services and, since the profit on banking services was low, it
needed to be seen as a platform to sell other services, or cross-sell in the banking Jargon.
A similar type of approach characterised analysis of the corporate sector (see Appendix
Al). The Plan recognised that in the area of the Bank's major strength, namely the co-operative
movement and local authority sectors, growth opportunities were limited. Falling margins in the
large corporate sector market meant that the Bank could only offer transmission services. In the
medium sized business sector the highly competitive nature and cost precluded the Bank offering
a full range of services. Small business was the area to be targeted, building on the success of the
1985 Cheque and Interest Account. Finally, while the Bank had some 50% of worker co-operatives
as customers, to fully utilise the Bank's potential in this area it was agreed that the Bank needed to
provide risk capital to selected entrepreneurs and secondly, a management support team to be
able to evaluate and monitor projects.
Distribution strategies were also re-assessed. The Corporate Plan stressed that:
"In the broadest terms we see that banking services will increasingly need to be
provided when, where and how the customer wants them, rather than where It
suits the banks to provide them. The cost of adapting to this changed approach
will be hea.y, particularly for those banks most committed to the traditional outlet
structure and High Street branches; although we are better placed than the Big
Four Clearers in this regard - and thus have an important competitive advantage
in this area - our own systems are still based on branch processing and we must
pay due account to the existing investment in developing our more flexible and
customer-friendly distribution strategy."
(Corporate Plan p27).
The Bank was particularly concerned to develop two areas: firstly, to have greater Bank
representation at outlets to meet customer needs and, secondly, to exploit more the advantage of
ten million Co-op shoppers.
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The Plan's revised distribution network was composed of 75 Full ServIce Regional
Branches, the new high street shopping centre branches and the existing In-store banking points.
The aim was to avoid investing in the huge cost and infrastructure of an extensive branch network
while giving the Bank a fair representation across the country. The first shopping centre branch
was opened in Darlington in April 1986, and they were characterised by being small and low cost,
removing bank office functions by utilising technology to process at the 'parent' Regional Branch;
thus staff could concentrate on personal customer service and sales. The In-store banking points
were based on the traditional agency system provided by the retail societies but the Bank now
wanted to upgrade this basic counter service with a wider range of services and to be run by Bank
staff, and to this end developed the concept of Financial Service Centres, where estate agents,
insurance and travel representatives are present, and supported Handybanks where only bank
services are provided but these are offered by Bank staff. Pilots on both these were running and
the distribution network would unfold in line with their success.
(d) Changing Structure
We have examined the Bank's new strategy to face up to new and more extensive
challenges. We now examine the way bank structure was altered in line with this. In Chandler's
view a new strategy requires a new or at least refashioned structure (1962 p15). A strategy-
structure mismatch can prevent the successful Implementation of strategic change. To a arge
extent a concern with organisational form Is recognised as being a function of Industrial maturity
with a simple organisatlonal pattern reflecting a simple business environment. Hence, a more
complex environment requires both a more sophisticated form and a more effective allocation of
resources to exploit opportunities which may be less apparent (Howcroft and Lavls 1986).
Thus the organisational structure of the Bank was to be reviewed taking into account the
new business strategy. The management consultants concentrated on two key areas:
(I)	 organisatlonal structure, especially the revenue generating function, the staff support
function and the senior management committees;
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(ii) modus operandl, which examined management processes and style. The consultants
found that the planning process was in danger of losing "credibility and direction", the
operational planning was not in balance with business needs; personnel management
was not carried out effectively; project management needed to be tightened up and credit
approval needed to be related to credit strategy. A senior manager admitted that the
Bank had a "disjointed approach" and that it was "an amorphous mass relying on things
to turn up".
In relation to management style, Booz-Allen commented on the need for more group
mindedness of managers and more intense profit motivation. Furthermore, they drew attention to
the failure of senior management to use their time effectively and the need to improve top-down
communication with the Bank.
Hence the main thrust of the report lay in the lack of relationship between the strategic
priorities and the organisational structure. Thus the existing structure (see Figure 5.3) was
dominated by the Domestic Banking division which was responsible for 81% of the gross Income,
56% of the staff and 50% of the assets and 40% of the liabilities of the Bank and de-emphasised
the role of general management. Furthermore, the result was an Imbalance of power,
responsibility and workload among the Directors.
With this In mind, Booz-Allen recommended that Domestic Banking was split into
Personal Banking and Corporate Banking divisions giving the diverging requirements and the
need for separate marketing strategies; this also relates to growing market segmentation as banks
structure themselves to meet customer needs (e.g. see Crawley 1982). Hence Personal Banking
would consist of the personal side of Domestic Banking and Direct Financial Services (DFS)
which had handled mainly consumer credit. They also drew attention to the cost Implications
inherent in having overlapping product and systems (see Figure 5.3). For example, the Sales
function was the responsibility of both DFS and Domestic Banking Division.
As Large points out, banks need to be structured around the customers' financial
management needs and problems rather than around their own operational procedures (1980
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p99). The new structure was designed to align management with marketing priorities and balance
the responsibility of the management. With each area having its own separate marketing plan,
profit performance would be more measurable and this should enhance greater competition
between business units.
Nevertheless, there are dangers that organisational change can become a substitute for
real action:
"Not infrequently they are the result of work done by management consultants
who wish to demonstrate that something was achieved as a result of their work.
Of course the theoiy would say that 'structure follows strategy'. This indeed
should be the case and when observers see a re- organisation they tend to
assume that there is a clear strategy behind it. But in many cases only cursory
attention is given to a careful definition of strategy, whereas enormous amounts
of effort go into establishing the new structure during which time business
activity may well suffer" (Emerson 1985 p31)
Similarly Slatter expresses reservation:
"The appropriate organisation structure for a firm is determined at least in part
by the firm's product-marketing strategy. Until such a strategy has been
formulated major organisational change is usually premature, even though
analysis of the firm may indicate the existence of organisational problems such
as lack of co-ordination, poor communications, too wide a span of control, etc.
Organisational problems are often symptoms of strategic problems, with the
result that re-organisation has little or no effect on the firm's performance except
to cause confusion and mask the real problems facing the firm." (1984 p86).
To improve management processes the consultants recommended a committee structure
to Consist of a Policy Committee which would be responsible for major strategic decisions and a
number of subordinate committees with delegated authority: the Product and Technology
Committee, the Human Resources Committee and the Risk Management Committee, who would
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study issues in depth and make recommendations. A new function, the Group Development
DMsion would be the 'think tank', ensuring Bank Group consistency and allocation of resources.
The need to emphasise strategic perspectives In decision making rather than operational
perspectives which are defined by a company's Internal performances, has been argued by Haas
(1987). Haas suggests that the difference is between asking "how can we do it better than
before?" (operational) and focussing on "how we can use it to beat the competition" (strategic).
The debate relates to whether special attention Is required and whether this needs specialists
rather than ordinary executives. For instance Ansoff argues that:
"since strategic problems are harder to pinpoint they require special attention;
unless specific provisions are made for concern with strategy, the firm may
misplace its efforts in pursuit of operating efficiency at all times when attention to
strategic opportunities (or threats) can produce a more radical and immediate
improvement in the financial performance." (1965 p22)
Stewart asks whether the fundamental style of management thinking is:
"compatible with the concept of the manager as a planner, a concept which
suggests a need for Ion gish periods for thinking about and planning what to
do?" (1983 p15-16)
On the other side Argenti (1980) regards corporate planning as being best done by
ordinary executives and a senior bank manager has written that:
"once line executives have learnt to raise their sights from short-term problems
and solutions they are capable of doing their own planning, consequently they
are undertaking most of the processes themselves, one achieves greater
commitment to the plan and a more practical action programme."
(Uoyd In Taylor and Sparkes 1977)
The Bank had decided that a new structure would enhance long term thinking and strategic
planning and it is to these new processes that we now turn.
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Figure 5.3: Organisational Structure of the Co-operative Bank 1986
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Figure 5.4: Proposed Corporate Structure, Corporate Plan 1986-1990
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Part II
(e) Strategic change
The second part of this chapter examines the events in the Bank taking place after the
introduction of the Plan; to term this implementation is, of course, to beg the question. What It
seeks to do is examine the process of change over the two years following the Plan, Including its
modification by a new Chief Executive with his own Strategic Plan.
As we have noted, the starting point of the new Corporate Plan was, rather paradoxically,
a new organisational structure. The first part of this was a new committee structure. The main
decision making forum was the Policy Committee (formerly the Chief General Manager's
Committee) on which sat the Chief Executive, the Divisional Directors of Personal Banking,
Corporate Banking, City and International Group Services, Financial Control and the Heads of
Group Development and Information Technology. Its terms of reference were to consider all major
strategic issues. In practice, the Chief ExecutIve regarded the Policy Committee as the forum
where he gathered all his team together and could, therefore, bind In inter-divisional support for
various projects. One manager compared it to the Cabinet. As he put It:
"The Chief Executive liked the PC to be seen as the place where collective
decisions are taken; they don't all like that but that is the way he plays it."
It was partly for this reason and partly because of the need to 'bed down' the new
organisational structure that operational Issues as well as strategic were tabled. The danger with
this, of course, Is that the subordinate committee was held over again with a different set of
people, hence wasting senior management time, to the misuse of which the consultants had
drawn attention. However, the political learning process or conditioning role of the meetings may
be more important. As Knights and WilImot observe of policy meetings In an insurance company:
"could it be that the meetings were occasioned and structured for purposes of
internal control and motivation for senior management or as a vehicle for the
Chief Executive to set standards and expectations of management practice?"
(1987 p32)
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The committees operating below the Policy Committee were:
Product and Technology Committee (PTC)
ii	 Human Resources Committee (HRC)
iii	 Risk Management Committee (RMC)
iv	 Professional Practices Committee (PPC).
The new system took time to settle down and in fact did not operate in the manner
envisaged In the consultants' reports. The original system was to have the committees comprised
of directors and chaired by one of them. It became apparent early on that the directors felt they
were spending too much time on the detailed consideration of Issues and it was agreed that the
membership criteria would drop down by one level; at this level managers would have time for
discussing these issues in detail and, secondly, it would provide a good training ground for future
directors. Group Development Division, as Figure 5.5 illustrates, was to ensure Bank Group
consistency by checking that changes are in line with the overall Corporate Plan, provide support
services and maintain political balance between divisions. As noted It was designed to address
the criticism of Booz-Allen as to the lack of strategic thinking, although the extent to which the
creation of a think tank isolated strategic thinking from the reality of the business continued to be
debated.
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Figure 5.5: Schematic Representation of Committee Processes
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There were a number of 'teething problems' associated with the new structures, one of
which was the extent to which subordinate committee meetings were in effect repeated at the
Policy Committee. Far more serious was the extent to which managers carried along their
departmental baggage to meetings rather than concentrating on Bank policy. Furthermore, some
of the Executive Directors worked around rather than through the existing structures, regarding
the committee system for instance as 'interference' in their divisional responsibilities. All this
points to the power and career implications of structural change associated with new strategies.
As Child (1984) points out, organisational change is as much a political as a technical question.
Dalton (1959) has illustrated the manner in which managers pursue personal as well as
organisational goals.
These inter-organisational difficulties were also evident in the segmentation of the Bank.
The segmentation between the Corporate and Personal business was the key change between
the beginning of the Corporate Plan and the end of the Chief Executive tenure. The original
structure of the Bank was to have Corporate, Personal and Operations under the one manager.
The new structure was to have separate Personal and Corporate managers In the branch so as to
strengthen the Bank's local presence and thus be able to respond more effectively to competition
and customer requirements. For Instance, the Corporate section could now respond to the
customer without consulting the regional office but instead going directly to the central
department. The Personal section would itself be divided into pro-actIve (e.g. cross-selling
campaigns) and reactive (administration etc). As with other banks this was attempting to get to
grips with market segmentation by identifying separate target markets (Pattison and Quelch
1979).
The original Plan had envisaged a three-way split with Personal, Corporate and a local
Operations unit, but this was reconsidered. There were two key reasons for this. Firstly, both the
Corporate and Personal units would incorporate the service sectors relative to their area,
especially securities. Secondly, systems development plans were to include major enhancement
to existing screen based systems and these were to be implemented over the next 18 months,
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providing significant alteration to current branch operating procedures, thus eliminating the need
to maintain customer record cards, and there would also be screen based account opening for
personal loans and free flow accounts, including credit scoring and the generation of letters and
agreements.
However, many of the implications of segmentation was thought best dealt with at an
operational level and a pilot scheme was run so as to shed light on critical issues. Among senior
management there was a consensus that segmentation was appropriate but there was general
and continuing debate as to how this was to be achieved. For instance, many of the directors
believed that the process could be achieved most effectively if Head Office was dealt with first and
the change then rolled out. However, a danger with this approach was the perception by branch
staff that Head Office had looked after itself as usual while branches were considered a secondary
issue and this led to uncertainty. The pilot schemes were designed to examine a range of issues:
firstly, the implications of setting up a separate unit to service different customers; secondly, how
the branches were to be run functionally with separate Corporate and Personal teams; thirdly, the
changes in systems and procedures required; and fourthly, the question of obtaining new
business and servicing existing business had to be examined.
Unlike the Big Four, the Bank had a very small branch network and hence was unable to
dMde branches simply into Personal and Corporate business. While at Cardiff the existence of a
main and sub branch made a split possible, in Newcastle new premises had to be taken. Another
option was to split the floors within the branch. Other considerations were the extent to which
such a split would be divisive in terms of competition for resources within the branch and the
presence of suitable staff and management.
Such concerns meant that the pilot schemes became, In the words of one of the
managers responsible for supervising the schemes: "a concept tempered by pragmatism".
Initially four pilots were chosen, using the criteria of getting a spread of location, size and
business mix and adequate resources. The intention was to feedback the results from here (to
Personnel and Organisatlon and Methods) before rolling out the programme.
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However, the disparity between theory and practice was wide. One pilot never got going
at all because of premises problems and management difficulties. The results of the pilots took
time to feedback into Head Office and little of this was communicated to branches, which created
uncertainty and suspicion. This led to problems for Personnel in terms of moving staff, as many
were unsure of the current position. This also meant that it was difficult to latch onto the Initial
enthusiasm of staff for change. Yet, while change took place too slowly for staff, It took place too
quickly to get full feedback from the experience of the pilots. While on the surface the pilots
appeared to be a case of incremental change endorsed by Mintzberg (1978), and "a continual
testing of alternatives", in practice the roll out of the segmentation was criticised for proceeding
regardless of the experience of the pilots. It was, as one branch manager put it, "seen as a good
idea which they would go and do anyway".
Particular concern was over the financial targeting of branches. The Corporate and
Personal sections had profit targeted separately, but the difficulty lay In allocating the costs of the
branch and this caused friction between managers.
(f) Positioning of the Bank
The process of strategic change in the Bank lends support to the view that business
strategy Is a far more Incremental process than many textbooks Imply (Mlntzberg 1978, Quinn
1980). In fact, as we noted the Plan left unanswered a good many questions and this section
addresses the debate over positioning.
A fundamental issue related to the market positioning of the Bank. This has been defined
as occupying a clear, distinctive and desirable place in the market and In the minds of target
customers (Kotler 1986).
Since the loss of 'free banking' as its flagship In 1984, the Bank had no clearly defined
edge In product or Image. In Porter's terms, It was "stuck in the middle":
"Such a firm lacks the market share, capital investment and resolve to play the
low cost game, the individual differentiation necessaiy to obviate the need for a
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low cost position or the focus to create differentiation or a low cost position in a
more limited sphere." (1980 p41)
With increased pressure on the personal sector as the banks have refocussed on the
domestic market (Hall 1986) the Bank had shown an awareness in the Corporate Plan of the need
to find a niche for itself. However, as one marketing manager pointed out, by not making a choice
the danger was that "the Bank would go for a niche strategy by default". In other words, the Bank
would be reduced to merely serving segments from which It had not been forced out.
Shaw and Coulbeck have argued that:
"in the long term it is clear that in eve,',' area of retail banking competition will
become much more fierce as a result of the increased ease of access to the
market. Probably the vital factor as to what groups gain most advantage will lie
in the quality of marketing." (1983 p5)
Yet banks in general have been poor at marketing, primarily concentrating on the upper end of
the market, servicing personal, commercial and corporate business from the one branch, which
removed retail services from the ordinary person (King 1981). With an end to the 'great unbanked'
and the refocus of banks on the retail sector, banks have to overcome marketing myopia (Levitt
1960) of product rather than market orientation and the perception that banks are cloakrooms Into
which money is paid and later drawn out. Such marketing strategies that banks have had, have
been aimed more at Increasing volume rather than profit, for instance merely increasing the range
of services rather than attempting to differentiate or segment the market (Laurent 1979). By the
1980s focus strategies were seen as important especially for smaller organisatlons. Thus niche
institutions, e.g. Robert Fleming (Save and Prosper) have sought high net worth IndMduals.
With the break up of the cartel, positioning was crucial for the future of the Bank and this
had Implications for the Bank as a whole. A clear, consistent, integrated approach was required In
terms of product, distribution, advertising and branch design.
In October 1987 a marketing specialist from ICI was appointed to become Head of
Marketing and his priority was to address this issue. Almost a year after the new Corporate Plan
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had been running, he argued to the Policy Committee that:
"Whilst development in the areas of product, place (distribution) and price were
being undertaken initial research had concluded that in the absence of any clear
sustainable differentiation from our competitors these alone would be unable to
sustain real profits and customer growth."
Slatter (1984) identifies inadequate marketing as one of the main causes of a crisis
situation. The Bank had squandered the opportunity of a huge steal on the market with 'free
banking'. Partly this could be blamed on a lack of resources (and the tight rein of the CWS) but
the end result was that only a limited breakthrough was achieved and, as one manager put It:
"free banking was the best kept secret British banking ever had". Furthermore, the Bank had
failed to target or segment its customer base, so effectively was adopting what one manager
referred to as "a scattergun approach".
The new Head of Marketing, reviewing the Bank's position, pointed out that In many areas
the capital costs of being an innovator were too high for the Bank. However, this was not seen as
necessarily a point of competitive disadvantage, given that the banking sector had never been
very innovative. More Importantly the cost structure of the Bank was such that it could not
compete on price: for instance its commission rates were among the highest.
Hence image and presentation were vital. Middleton reports that:
"Recent research has indicated that the price elasticity of demand for many
consumer financial products is low and suggests that if an institution's customer
is happy with his overall relationship, a competitor who wished to poach one
element of business, (say, that customer's deposits) would have to offer at least
3 per cent more for the money."
(1987 p1 7-1 8)
Yet, according to Bank market research (see Table 5.8), the level of unprompted
awareness of the Bank amongst the total markets was 6% compared with Barclays Bank 83% and
Midland Bank 62% and there was a clear connection between level of awareness and the share of
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the market. This affected utilisation of ATM services even more than those with lower awareness
levels. For instance, small building societies had lower awareness levels but because they were
localised there was not the same effect on ATM activity rates, as awareness was high in the
trading area. The Bank clearly lacked corporate brand images; it had no sign off phrase, it was not
the 'action bank', the 'listening bank' nor the 'Black Horse bank'. The building societies had their
own slogans: 'Get the Abbey habit', 'I'm with the Woolwich', etc (Middleton 1987).
Table 5.8: Awareness of Financial Institutions
Unprompted
	
Prompted
Banks
Co-operative	 6	 67
Barclays	 83	 98
Uoyds	 68
	 95
Midland
	
62
	 94
National Westminster	 69	 92
TSB	 48	 93
Royal Bank of Scotland	 20	 68
Bank of Scotland	 24	 68
Girobank
	
7
	
78
Building Societies
Halifax	 75	 97
Abbey National	 53	 95
Nationwide	 31	 84
Leeds	 37	 85
Woolwich
	
22	 90
AngRa	 17	 74
Alliance and Leicester	 8	 52
National and Provincial 	 12	 68
Bradford and Bingley	 45	 89
Britannia	 8
	
54
Source: Co-operative Bank Market Research Unit, March 1988
The demographic profiles of the Bank's personal customers (see
Figure 5.6 below) showed that the Bank was in a similar position to the
Big Four clearers (especially close to Barclays Bank, being slightly older
and more upmarket than the norm). Apart from the Big Four, the other banks did have a distinct
position, TSB being downmarket, Yorkshire Bank young and downmarket and Royal Bank of
Scotland upmarket.
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Figure 5.6: Current Account Positions
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Hence the Bank had no distinct position and had become indistinguishable from the Big
Four, yet this placed it at a point of competitive disadvantage because of the high awareness of
the major banks who had the advantages of size, high street presence and advertising
expenditure. This related to Bank strategy in the 1970's of being a national clearer with all the cost
that it entailed.
Nevertheless, as far as the Bank did have an image it was regarded as 'clean' compared
with the Big Four, tainted by association with South Africa, Third World debt and City scandals
and huge profits. The other element related to the image associated with the name and its
ownership by the movement, which gave to some people the Image of being, in the words of a
marketing manager:
"a leftist, Greenpeace type organisation appealing to Guardian readers and
members of CND"
Hence, in choosing a strategic position and image the Bank did not start with a clean
sheet, and images are of course 'sticky'.
One possibility discussed was establishing a niche for itself as the ethical bank. This
clearly had the attraction of being a route the big banks could not follow and hence avoided the
risk which Porter observes, that:
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"imitation narrows perceived differentiation, a common occurrence as industries
mature." (1980 p46).
Yet, as Shaw and Coulbeck observed in 1983:
"in competitive terms the bank has unique opportunities because of its 'caring,
sharing' principles, its links with other parts of the co-operative movement in the
U.K. and overseas and its links with trade unions and local authorities." (p 54).
Furthermore, it would cut across the socio-economic divide and would fit In with Its historical
heritage in terms of social caring and the community. Like the movement as a whole, It needed to
define its ethos in an age of individualism. Thus,
"In a classic marketing mix the proposal means that the emphasis in
communications will move from the product or the place where available or the
price to existing and potential customer perceptions of the bank as a positive
and caring vehicle through which they can care or, equally important, be seen to
care." (Marketing Strategy Paper).
Perception and Image were crucial because they were long lasting rather than, for
instance, product innovation. While the Bank's competitors, the Big Four, became larger, more
international and impersonal, the Bank had the opportunity to stress Its closeness to the customer
and Involvement in local Initiatives, e.g. inner city reform and the community. A Community Affairs
Manager was appointed to perform the role of emphasising social responsibility and links with the
local community.
(g) Strategic Decision Making in the Financial Sector
We noted earlier In the chapter that the Bank's Corporate Plan had failed to take a
number of key strate9ic decisions and, secondly, that there had been little attention to operational
considerations. In the normal course of events a Corporate Plan for 1987-91 was expected to be
produced and presented to the Board In April/May of 1987. Nevertheless, In practice senior
management admitted that the effort required to produce the Plan was out of proportion with the
Page 146
CHAPTER FIVE	 BUSINESS STRATEGY IN THE BANK
ability to implement it within a given timescale. The 1986-90 Plan had raised as many questions as
ft answered and even where strategies had been Identified, the practical implications were not
dealt with In any detail. As many managers continually pointed out, there was the need to put the
how' into the objectives. Given the organisational restructuring taking place, it was decided by
eay 1987 to concentrate on the operational level, examining closely the implementation of plans
and getting profit in line for the year, while at the same time not pushing the Plan for 1987
because it was seen as necessary to look beyond the current year at fundamental issues. They
were very much aware that an organisation threatened by competitive pressures would be looking
at shorter term planning horizons.
One major issue which illustrates the difficulty of making strategic decisions in a rapidly
changing environment and the myth of managerial expertise is that of EFTPOS (Electronic Fund
Transfer at Point of Sale). Clearly, if the environment is wrongly diagnosed, strategic decisions will
be faulty. Yet in this case it was very difficult to get a grip on the environment, and the Bank was
also not a major actor.
It was a view commonly shared by top management that if the Bank got this Issue wrong
ft could be crippled. It was not addressed in great detail in the Corporate Plan but a working party
was established and it reported that:
"It may not be possible to clariiy the way forward on a number of Important areas
of Bank policy until the EFTPOS environment has begun to resolve itself. Yet
each player (especially the smallest, such as the Co-operative Bank) requires to
optimise its decisions as to participation in EFTPOS and the commensurate
investment required - in some cases, urgently."
The decision to join appeared to owe much to the fact that everybody else seemed to be
joining in. One Director argued that, after a number of years of poor profit performance, major
capital expenditure of this kind was a vote for the future. However, it was pointed out that no
Income would be generated, at least not in the short term. Furthermore, given the confused state
of EFTPOS in the U.K., It was almost impossible to quantify what long term benefit would accrue
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to the organisation. The operational cost sharing formula had yet to be defined and account had
to be taken of retailer and consumer reaction. Nevertheless, there was a belief that by the mid
1990s it would be at the core of the banking infrastructure and it was clear that the Big Four were
rapidly and aggressively increasing market share and trying to preempt the competition. As the
Head of Strategy Formulation put it: "The Bank was all dressed up with nowhere to go". Others
expressed concern that the major banks, especially NatWest, were spending money on new
products and development, In an attempt to "blow away the smaller banks", and that by following
them the Bank was playing into their hands.
The issue of EFTPOS was, of course, part of a wider debate over distribution, regarding
which the Group Development Manager commented that there was "a very considerable
divergence of attitudes among the Executive Directors over distribution". This broad area was the
means by which the Bank would deal with customers and provide services to them. A general
theme was to move away from being product driven to being market driven. More specifically, the
two key questions related to whether the Bank needed to increase its branches on traditional
lines, hence presupposing the need for a high street presence and, secondly, to look closely at
the network of in-store banking. The 1985 Audit Report referred to the "crumbling agency
system" which made the Bank vulnerable in certain areas. This area was of considerable strategic
importance given that the Bank had emphasised distribution as one of the key points of
differentiation.
Extended opening hours was launched but regarded as a defensive move, to retain
customers rather than attack other markets. Originally it was aimed at the personal customer but
in fact new customers proved difficult to attract, although existing ones may have found it useful
and hence the Bank may have prevented some loss of customers. The business customers did
find the change of greater use to them.
A further difficulty was the choice between the different routes to EFTPOS; there was
national EFTPOS, LINK, VISA and Co-op EFTPOS, and how the Bank would utilise the systems.
The main players had already taken up positions by 1988 and were not waiting until EFTPOS U.K.
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came on stream in mid 1989. In November 1987 the Bank had a clear choice of entering the
inaugural scheme which would roll onto EFTPOS U.K. or staying out and accepting that In the
medium term at least it would not be a main player; entry could not just be delayed by six months.
Senior managers expressed a reluctance to join EFTPOS U.K If there was any cheaper suitable
alternative.
The Bank's own scheme, Co-op EFTPOS, was 'live' in 26 stores and used to explore
customer behaviour patterns and retailer acceptance. (This was essentially a defensive strategy;
to hold on with minimum resources until it was decided what the relationship with the movement
would be.) In the long term it was Intended to integrate Co-op EFTPOS Into EFTPOS U.K.; the
former was essentially regarded as a short term solution to secure a position In the marketplace
for the Bank. Furthermore the Bank wanted to emphasise Its experience of over a hundred years
in the retailing environment. The situation was Immensely complicated. The LINK scheme
provided another option but 4/5 of its founder members were committed to EFTPOS U.K. and no
major developments were envisaged for 1988. However, If EFTPOS U.K. foundered, LINK could
provide a medium term opportunity.
Other issues revolved around the EFTPOS decision. The Head of Marketing pointed out
that the Bank had a very poor record in selling card products, e.g. with 2.5% of the current
account market share but only 1.5% of the plastics market, and this needed to be addressed.
Criticism was also levelled at the process of strategic decision making which merely followed the
competition: and to choose to join and develop a system before deciding how It was to be used.
Was it then a solution to a problem or a solution in search of a problem?
(h) Problems of Implementing Change
One senior manager complained that the Bank had an "infinite capacity to change and
remain unchanged", and this Illustrates a concern discussed earlier of changing structures rather
than attitudes. Hence It was vital to convince staff that this was not just 'another change' and this
had to be down from the top down. Strategic change was thus problematic.
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The Head of Strategy Formulation emphasised that the Directors In the Bank because of
their age and experience meant it was unlikely that they would be receptive to change. Hence
change was constrained by political and cultural factors. Schon (1969) has argued that while
organisations are conservative and do not accept change easily, to term them conservative is
misleading since they are dynamic - in other words they fight to stay as they are.
We have seen earlier that there were teething problems associated with the operation of
the new committee. Far more serious was the extent to which managers attending committee
meetings took along their own departmental baggage and hence took a departmental rather than
Bank' view. Furthermore, some of the Directors worked around the existing structure, expressing
disinterest in the committee system which they regarded as interfering with their divisional
responsibilities. Managers responsible for achieving the organisatlonal change complained that,
while Directors had agreed in principle to restructuring and other changes, In practice they would
ignore or obstruct on issues which they felt might reduce their own influence, and these 'negative'
views filtered down to other managers. The Group Development Manager said that "the effort to
get the minutest change is incredible".
Many of these problems illustrate the views of Argyis (1972) that a change In managerial
attitude Is needed to precede organisatlonal change. The case of the Bank shows that some
matters were simply dealt with outside the existing official structure. Hence, as we have noted,
managers pursue their own goals as well as those of the organisation.
Moreover, some Directors actually wished to obstruct elements of change and continued
to engage In empire building. Cyert and March (1963) write of the negotiated nature of goals
among Influential participants and the inherently unstable position, as power balances change
with changing business conditions. This is particularly true of organisatlons tending to be
segmentalist dominated rather than integrative (Kanter 1983) and thus change will disturb the
Isolated segment and may consequently be resisted.
Anthony quotes Dalton's criticism of bureaucratic theory which:
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"slights the fact that in the larger organisations, local and personal demands
take precedence in most cases" and that "the typical firm is thus a shifting set of
contained disruption, powered and guided by differentially skilled and
committed persons. Its unofficial aspects bulk large but are shrouded in a
bureaucratic cloak." (1987 p179)
A number of criticisms were levelled at the Chief Executive and his alleged inability to
manage strategic change. The previous Chief Executive had been at the helm of the Bank from
1971 to 1985 at a time when the Bank had averaged 20% per annum growth. He had been
regarded as a traditional authoritarian figure who had "got things done". The new Chief Executive
had come from Williams and Glyn's Bank and served as Assistant General Manager for a year
before he became Chief Executive. He was said to believe in an open consensus style of
management but, as one senior manager put it: "while this was a great strength, it was also a
great weakness". In particular there was an obvious difficulty in attempting to achieve major
change with top level management familiar with a different style of management. Turnarounds are
usually achieved by tough no-nonsense managers brought in from outside the company, who
break consensus to get radical change (Slatter 1984). In this case the Chief Executive seemed to
reflect the consensus and culture he was trying to change.
Many managers, not appreciating his style of management, accused him of being
indecisive, very much influenced by his solicitor's background and always seeing two sides of
view. One branch manager said that he "always asked a lot of questions but could not himself
provide any answers". Other criticisms were made of his inability to motivate managers and his
'lack of vision".
One problem lay with the perceived caretaker role of the Chief Executive. It was clear
from the beginning that this was not to be a long term tenure. It was rumoured that the tenure
might even be shorter than the existing contract. Hence some of the Directors wanted to attempt
to 'hold out' until a new Chief Executive was appointed. Two In fact were in competition for the job
which further coloured decisions about strategy and resources for the future.
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The problem partly lay with what might be termed "strategic slack"; a lack of tight, clear
objectives and plans about what was to be done and how it was to be done, which enabled senior
managers to argue that what they were doing was in fact within their remit. The focus was too
large and not crystallised into tight criteria. A Hay Group Performance Profile Report stated that
senior managers:
'do not share a common, clear, strong vision of where the Bank is going, and
what sort of organisation it wants to be. This may also imply that they are
communicating conflicting views of the Bank's objectives, plans and per-
formance to subordinate staff."
More broadly, a problem of implementing strategic change could be said to relate to the
strategic frame reference of managers (in Rumelt's terminology, 1979) whereby managers
perceive current actions in terms of past experience, which is essentially constraining.
(i) Business Strategy and Performance
The year 1987 gave reason for cautious optimism. The year had witnessed dramatic
upheaval in the financial markets with record falls in share values in October. Among the major
banks a steady Increase in domestic profit had been overshadowed by bad debt repayment. The
Bank, however, had very limited exposure to Third World lending. There had also been an
intensificatIon of domestic competition, with banks moving Into the housing loan sector and the
end to the building society cartel.
The primary objective of the Corporate Plan had been a rapid expansion in the customer
base; this had not occurred, although negative growth trends had been reversed with a net
growth of 7588 accounts in 1987. However, there were signs that some of the Initiatives,
especially cross-selling within branches from central Initiatives were beginning to make an Impact.
Nevertheless, caution was seen as vital as much of the positive Improvement may have
owed something to external factors, most notably high interest rates and the continuing consumer
boom. The Bank's share of the market had not changed markedly.
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The results in 1987 (see Table 5.9) reflected the heavy spending on Infrastructure, market
developments and the separation of personal and corporate banking. Performance fell well short
of the target of pre-tax profit of 1 8m.
Table 5.9: Profit Figures 1986 and 1987
1987	 1986
Profit before tax and debt provisions
	 15.684	 13.771
Profit before tax	 14.3	 13.771
Profitaftertax	 8.319	 8.360
Source: Bank Papers
In such circumstances the Bank saw "no alternative but to cut costs and increase the
volume of business".
The question of cost returned again to the problem of being a small bank but with an
onerous support cost structure. t was agreed that the Bank would have to operate with more
modest support services and without dMsional duplication. The concept of autonomous business
units was dismissed as impractical.
Hence many of the cost savings identified related to either 'belt-tightening' or stricter
management control. However, senior management were aware that it was considerably easier to
be specific on cost saving rather than income generation:
"consequently it is considered that cost savings can more easily provide the
bulk of the target, but that increased income generation will be a better quality
and more lasting solution." Source: Internal Bank Papers
The corporate sector, especially small and medium sized businesses, were regarded as
the key areas to be targeted, such targeting being facilitated by the new structure of the Bank and
by the time profit for the half year of 1988 was published, considerable advance had been made
with lOm being reached, compared with 6m in 1987. As part of the move to expansion, the Bank
sought extra capital so as to generate economies of scales through balance sheet expansion
based on the Bank's present Investment in infrastructure. It was the first time the Bank had sought
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long term capital from outside sources, growth being previously financed from retained earnings
and CWS contributions. The placing of the 4Dm Cumulative Redeemable Shares was seen as an
historic event since the Bank had obtained non co-operative investment capital without departing
from the principles of ownership and control within the co-operative movement.
(j) A new Chief Executive, strategic planning and a reformulated
strategy
A new Chief Executive was announced In April 1988 to succeed the existing Chief
Executive from October. He was comparatively young (aged 50), having joined the Bank from
National Westminster in 1973 and had been the first Marketing Manager of the Bank. He was
widely credited with being behind the introduction of 'free banking' and this reputation as an
innovator produced a degree of apprehension, particularly among older staff.
Within two months of the announcement being made the Chief Executive Designate took
over much of the policy making initiative. He emphasised the need for a flexible approach to the
Corporate Plan. He argued that in a dynamic and fiercely competitive environment:
"there can never be a realistic and viable total 'Corporate Plan' available for
discussion at any one moment in time which has embraced every aspect of the
Group's existing and potential business, all potential competitor strategies, line
management experience, staff attitudes and shareholder expectations. If it was
ever theoretically possible the 'plan' would be out of date before It was
circulated."
(Strategic Plan)
Thus the incoming Chief Executive embraced the concept of strategic planning. There Is,
of course, a link with corporate planning, but the two are by no means synonymous. Corporate
planning decides both corporate objectives and corporate strategy. Strategic planning Is
concerned with the latter (Argentl 1980 p7). As we have noted In our discussion of the strategy
literature the fashionable corporate planners of the 1960s and 1970s have been Increasingly
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replaced by the process of strategic management which encompasses all managers.
As the incoming Chief Executive argued:
"This change in emphasis from the theoretical end product i.e. the Corporate
Plan, to the nrocess of continually thinking strategically at all levels of
management has also resolved the question as to whether planning is, or should
be, a top-down or bottom-up exercise. It is of course with the Board and
senior executive expressing with clarity and consistency the strategic objectives
and assumptions as to resources available and timescales within which to
achieve those objectives, supplemented by experienced and successful line
management feeding upwards the commercial realities within which they are
operating on a day-to-day basis. It is in the inter-play between these two forces
that strategic options can be identified and resolved within the framework of the
ultimate objectives as determined by the Board.... This approach is the antithesis
of a culture which develops 'tablets of stone' or 'sacred cows' and recognises
that a successful business must continually evolve, adapt and amend in relation
to the economy and society within which it desires to profitably exist."
This is certainly in line with the view of Kudla (1982) that while the process of decision
making is more Important than the plan which emerges, nevertheless the plan Is Important
because of the discipline of thinking strategically.
The task of revising the previous Corporate Plan begged the famous Drucker question:
"What business are we in, what business do we need to be in and what is the
business from which we wish to depart" (1955 p55)
It was generally accepted that the Bank was in the generic area of 'financial services' but
deregulation had fundamentally altered the differences between different types of business and
competitors. The four areas which the Bank identified as areas where they would have a future
were:
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Money Transfer
Risk Management
Customer Service
Advisory and related financial services.
There was a reiteration of the statement in the Corporate Plan that the Bank had to drop
s international pretensions, While in the past it had been deemed an Important Justification that
the Bank be involved In international activity so as to give the Bank the highest status, this was no
longer relevant after the Banking Acts of 1979 and 1987.
The Strategic Plan of the incoming Chief Executive emphasised a new process of
decision making as discussed. It also reformulated the Corporate Plan with significant changes In
two areas. The Chief Executive was keen on quoting Drucker's view that middle managers will be
extinct and cited the example of Mars with 17 billion turnover and a Head Office of some 30 staff.
He was regarded as being much more action orientated than the previous Chief Executive and
continually stressed that: "managers must be managers".
A new organisational structure would facilitate this by being more market driven, with
autonomous business units. The Personal and Corporate Banking Divisions were to fall under a
new regional structure with six regions each being comprised of 8-10 branches, branch managers
reporting to Regional General Managers, who in turn reported to the Chief Executive, with
Customer Sales and Service DMsion co-ordinating. More autonomy would be given to managers.
For instance, there would be greater discretion to managers on lending rather than the much
criticised references to Head Office which undermined branch managers' credibility and morale.
Managers would be given targets, but how these were to be achieved would be left to them. The
regional structure was linked to a new regional strategy (see below).
Other organisational changes included bringing the various financial control areas, e.g.
Financial Control, Treasury, Audit, Credit Control, under a new Group Finance Division. The
decentralisatlon and emphasis on giving greater responsibility to the line had clear human
resource implications in that responsibility for managing the business would Include greater
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responsibility for managing people.
We noted earlier in the chapter the concept of managerial 'recipes' and the difficulty of
achieving radical change in the face of 'political' obstruction and commitment to old recipes. It Is
highly significant that the Executive Directors were moved into more narrowly defined roles, with
responsibility for particular issues rather than functions, so as to prevent power bases emerging.
The Head of Customer Sales and Service was not a Director, nor were any of the Regional
Managers. Furthermore, the number of Directors was to be reduced from seven to three (a
number of Directors were expected to retire in the not too distant future) and the Policy
Committee now included some senior managers who were not Directors but were obviously the
men of the future'. Thus, the sidelining of the old guard of top management with the promotion of
a younger element owing much to the Incoming Chief Executive, would clearly make the
management of change less problematic.
The second main theme in the Strategic Plan, but interlocking with the organisatlonal
change, was in terms of the philosophical approach to the market. The Chief Executive talked of
"revisiting our inheritance as part of the co-operative movement". Hence the Bank would:
"differentiate itself from other banks by developing its involvement with
organisations both at National and Regional level that in different ways see a
closer relationship between owners and workers, customers and members as
being beneficial to individuals, organisations and the community."
While traditionally this had been expressed through the Bank's involvement In the movement,
alternative ways could express the philosophy.
The policy would be national and regional. Nationally the Bank would develop services for
the wider co-operative movement, mutual organisations, local authorities and members of such
organisatlons, and organisations interested in creating employee participation in ownership
through ESOP (Employee Share Ownership Plans). Regionally, a regional focus would enable the
Bank to get closer to local organisations and the local community.
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(k) Business strategy and employee relations
This section seeks to look at the consideration given to employee relations by top
management during the production of the Corporate Plan and subsequent modifications to it. As
we have noted In the literature review, employee relations has not usually been rated very
significant in terms of strategic thinking by top management (Timperley 1980, Purcell 1986) unless
the level of unrest was such that labour was seen as a problem as, for instance, in the car Industry
(Willman and Winch 1985). Hence, it was regarded as more of an operational consideration rather
than a subject worthy of top management attention.
Nevertheless, the importance of the people input has been deemed to be of fundamental
importance to the success of business (Peters and Waterman 1982). In banking, paternalistic
notions of loyalty and security have flourished in a business environment with a stable product
market and high profitability. Clearly the competitive environment has changed with the end of the
bank oligopoly.
Kochan and Cappelli write that:
"Changes in the competitive environment can occur gradually as products
change in response to changing consumer demand (e.g. the shift to small cars)
or as low-cost competition grows. The environment can also change abruptly
because of competitive shocks such as de-regulation of the trucking or airline
industries or the introduction of new products (radial tyres) and technologies.
Regardless of the cause, a sharp increase in competitive pressures forces firms
to make a series of decisions whose effects reverberate through the
organisation and its Industrial relations system." (1983 p13-14)
Yet while this Is undoubtedly the case, the effect of such decisions was not given much
consideration at top management level. Thus in the Corporate Plan, personnel Issues fell Into the
category of the Strategic Support Section (together with computer capacity and reliability - very
operational Issues) and stated that:
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"Over the next five years the Bank will need to change its approach to Personnel
Management both for a variety of the reasons which were touched on in the
Banking Environment Section, and also as a consequence of the Divisional
Business Plans." (see Appendix A2)
However, much of the discussion of issues was of a very general nature. For instance, the
Plan stated that:
"It will be strategically important over the planning period to ensure the Bank:-
is correctly structured to meet the demands placed on staff;
can operate with maximum flexibility whilst ensuring the requisite
standards are not relaxed, or agreed structures compromised;
operates with maximum efficiency on optimum members of staff."
The Plan outlined and indicated areas in which there were likely to be changes but
without going into any detail about what this would entail. Thus reference was made to the
diverging staffing needs of the Personal and Corporate sectors; the shift of emphasis to selling
rather than technical skills and change which seemed to be a catch all for increased flexibility,
performance, orientation etc.
Much of the above lends support to Legge's observation that:
"while senior managements in the organisations involved were coming to a
realisation that 'something needed to be done' about personnel policies in their
organisatlons, especially in the medium sized and small organisations, they
lacked the ability to think through appropriate and internally consistent personnel
management strategies."
(1977 p37)
A senior manager (but not a Director) who had been given the responsibility for Personnel
matters half way Into the strategic review said that In the past staff had been treated as a cost
overhead and, particularly given the expansion In the 1970s and the emphasis on external re-
cruitment to meet staffing needs, the Bank had paid little attention to developing staff or seeing
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them as a resource. This had been true of the clearing banks In general for, as Morris (1986 p22)
points out, Involvement in funds transmission meant that the majority of clerical staff have not
been used as a means of marketing the banks' products nor directly for increasing business, but
to process existing accounts. They have accordingly been regarded as an overhead rather than a
resource to the banks. The senior manager emphasised the importance in strategic change of
managing employee attitudes. The problem with many previous plans was that "no matter how
the strategies changed, the staff continued to work in the same old way". Clearly, for strategies to
be implemented, people have to implement them and the way they implement them is crucial to
the success of a business strategy.
Furthermore, in some respects the link with business strategy is not merely a knock-on
effect of the type described by Kocnan et al (1983), or labour as an 'operational' issue to
implement strategies, but actually, explicitly linked with business strategy. As Kitching has
commented:
"it is perhaps difficult for somebody not involved in the banking scene to
differentiate one bank from another, no matter how every bank may claim its own
superiority. The product range. ..is usually the same, the hours of opening are the
same and the ser.'ice is the same; only the personality of the staff at the Branch
is different." (1982 p57)
Hence the staff are an inextricable part of the product and not merely a link to it. Staff quality is
thus part of creating sustained competitive advantage not merely a facilitating force (Miller 1987).
This was more apparent as a marketing strategy was developed positioning the Bank as a caring,
ethical bank. Such images were inevitably bound up with staff projection of such ideas.
Overall, there was very little detailed consideration of human resources in the Corporate
Plan. In so far as a criterion of Human Resource Management is that it is considered by top
management and integrated into business strategy at the level of formulation, the Bank does not
meet this. However, the Chief Executive took an increasing interest in the area and, as one senIor
manager observed:
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"It was starting to register among top management that unless the staff were got
up to scratch and on board with change, the Bank was not going to get there."
It was not, however, regarded as a topic which should be dealt with in any detail when the
Corporate Plan was being debated. This may be seen as simply a typical management approach
to human resource issues. This would not be an accurate analysis of the case because senior
managers did acknowledge the importance of human resources, a belief which would lead to the
appointment of a Human Resource Manager: they did feel they lacked time (given the continuing
debate over corporate strategy) and expertise to formulate policy at this level.
It is worth noting that in the Strategic Plan which followed two years later, there was
explicit mention of a 'human resource strategy' and the importance of this to future business
success (see Appendix A4).
(I) Summary and Conclusion
This chapter has examined the response of the Bank to the changing competitive
environment with deregulation, increasing competition and technological innovation and the
impact of this on the management of labour.
The Bank had, by the mid 1980s, lost its way. Its apparent successful transformation from
being the banking arm of the co-operative movement to being a clearing bank in its own right
turned out to be illusory. The Bank had seen Itself as an alternative force in U.K. banking and had
the reputation of an innovator, largely with the introduction of free banking. However, by the
1980s, free banking was no longer a source of differentiation as other banks adopted the concept
and with a re-focus on the domestic retail market margins were squeezed and the Bank suffered
several years of stagnant profits.
It became apparent that, despite a fourfold increase in accounts between 1975 and 1985,
the Bank had failed to make a significant breakthrough. Furthermore, cost problems resulting
from the heavy investment In Infrastructure associated with being a clearer began to bite with
'creeping overheads'. The period under review saw a new Corporate Plan designed to address
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these difficulties. The main thrust of the Plan lay In the emphasis on the need to achieve a rapid
growth In the customer base but there was little detailed consideration of how this was to be
achieved.
There were important strategic shifts. The Bank had always seen itself as a clearer with
national coverage, a growing branch network and an in-store network maintained by the retail
societies. The 1986-90 Plan raised major questions as to the future form of the distribution
network and wanted a tighter, more customer oriented approach with bank staff in the retail
sector offering a wider range of products, especially through the FInancIa Services Centre, so as
to achieve synergy. The Bank was to adopt a focus strategy' with a core personal customer and a
limited group of non personal customers. Certain areas would not be competed in, namely
international and investment banking.
However, many gaps remained in the Plan. One manager said it was more an "enormous
housekeeping project" to unravel the structure of the Bank rather than a blueprint for the future. A
senior manager who was appointed after the Plan had been introduced said it was more of a
"framework for a corporate plan" and that the Bank was "still groping around" in many areas, the
Plan having raised more questions than it had answered.
As Mathur points out:
"it is not enough simply to pinpoint the firm's intentions without specifying how
progress towards them will be measured." (1987, p77)
Furthermore, It was not clear how such intentions would be translated into practice.
While growth of the customer base was the key, the associated costs of expansion Into,
for instance, the targeted corporate sector was not examined, given the need to ensure an
adequate return. While some attempt had been made to Identify which customers the Bank
wished to aim for, the question of how the Bank would attract them was only touched upon.
Thus paradoxically while structure seemed to follow strategy (a Ia Chandler) in terms of
organisational change following the Corporate Plan, in reality the starting point of the new strategy
was the organisational change. This, ft could be argued, was the appropriate approach, given that
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an unstable environment hindered rigid formal planning and a more flexible structure would
enable the Bank to, as one manager put it: "start the race second but finish first".
The example of extended opening hours was given; this had been mooted by all the
banks but the Co-operative Bank had got its structure in place first.
Certainly insofar as structural change can be a success it needs to be reinforced by
cultural change (see e.g. Pettigrew 1985). A non-banker at the Bank argued that traditional
bankers had a rather narrow approach to the financial sector and said that this was based on the
fact that they had achieved their success by lending skills. This fits In with the concept of a
managerial recipe' developed by Grinyer and Spender whereby:
"shared patterns of managerial judgment are closely tied to the field of
experience In which they were generated and become less effective as
circumstances change." (1979 p6)
Quinn (1980) has stressed the advantage in not having concrete goals. The danger with
concrete goals is that they may prevent the generation of alternatives. Secondly, It may provide a
clear focus of opposition. Thirdly, they may be difficult to alter because of their public nature.
Finally, it may give competitors information. Hence It may be more appropriate to have a set of
general objectives to build consensus and allow flexibility. However, in the case of the Bank,
having general objectives without a clear view of how these were to be translated into practice
meant a high degree of 'strategic slack' which enabled senior managers to pursue their own goals
while arguing that they were in fact consistent with the general objectives of the Corporate Plan.
It is probably too early to assess the success of the Corporate Plan. Before the second
new Chief Executive was appointed there were signs of a turnaround, but this owed something to
short term external factors, e.g. high Interest rates and the consumer boom. The Bank's
performance was undoubtedly helped by more effective cost control (although this too is short
term) and by greater generation of Income on the corporate side. However, this was not of the
scale desired and the customer base remained stagnant. The period can be seen as one of
consolidation after some years of fluctuating performance or as a lost opportunity to create a long
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term positioning strategy. In a sense the solution was within the 'old recipe' (in terms of Spender):
the application of familiar techniques, e.g. cost cutting, rather than a new recipe.
The second new Chief Executive was more action orientated and had much clearer Ideas
on the future of the Bank, emphasising a return to traditional regional strengths and a more sales
and marketing driven culture which was to be facilitated by organisatlonal change. It was highly
significant that there were major changes at the top level. This returns us to the concept of a
managerial recipe and the difficulty of achieving major change with managers committed to the
old recipe. For instance, the old recipe embodied views on the provision of full services being an
essential component of what a clearing bank was, rather than a strategy. In a sense, old recipes
were based on financial models rather than business ones.
This chapter has illustrated several themes. Firstly, it argues that business strategy Is a
highly complex process and understanding the forces of change Is only the first stage of strategic
management, contrary to much normative writing. While external shocks may create the pressure,
and perhaps opportunity, for change, much greater attention needs to be paid to the formulation
of strategy and the effective management of strategic change, both of which are highly
problematic. Linear models, as outlined at the beginning of the chapter, are inadequate. Porter
(1980, 1985), for Instance, has little to say about organlsatlonal constraints on change and
regards the state of the environment as the main constraint. However, as Pettigrew points out:
"The rational approach describes and prescribes techniques for identifying
current strategy, analysing environments, resources and gaps, revealing and
assessing strategic alternatives and choosing and implementing carefully
analysed and well thought-through outcomes. This rational picture of business
problem-solving has as its concern the content or what of strategy - the outcome
which is sought - and has nothing to say at an explicit level of how to achieve
that outcome. In other words; it has no process theory within it of how and why
to create the strategic outcomes so perceptively and logically derived from the
analysis of competitive forces." (1985 p19)
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Secondly, the chapter has shown some inherent dangers in the incremental strategic
management approach. Quinn writes that:
"The most effective strategies of major enterprises tend to emerge step by step
from an iterative process in which the organisation probes the future,
experiments, and learns from a series of partial (incremental) commitments
rather than through global formulations of total strategies. Good managers are
aware of this process, and they consciously intervene in it. They use it to improve
the in formation available for decisions and to build the psychological
identification essential to successful strategies. The process is both logical and
incremental. Such logical incrementalism is not 'muddlingç as most people
understand that word. Properly managed, it is a conscious, purposeful,
proactive, executive practice." (1980 p58)
The problem with this type of approach is its assumption that "good managers are aware
of this process and they consciously intervene in it", and that they pursue corporate objectives.
As we have noted, broad corporate objectives without clearly defined strategic policies lead to
strategic slack and the opportunity for managers to pursue sectional goals under guise of
corporate policy. This had Implications for all aspects of policy. For instance, the Bank was
expanding its branch network yearly. While the 1986-90 Plan talked of not being a national clearer,
this was not clearly drawn out. Hence where the new branches were to be located was up for
lobbying by Directors and a series of ad hoc decisions, rather than being allocated according to a
strategic plan. The new Strategic Plan, in contrast, emphasised that the aim would be to achieve
critical mass in certain regional areas and hence the network would be expanded in line with this
strategy. Incremental change may be most effective where there is a stable environment, but in a
fast moving dynamic sector the demand is for clearcut goals with signals of a change from the
past (c.f. Johnson p429 in Hammond (ed) 1985). It is clear from the Bank that major strategic
change Is difficult to achieve with senior management committed to an old recipe. Hence a new
Chief Executive and a new top management structure, with managers committed to the old recipe
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effectively marginalised, may have been necessary to get the impetus for the change required.
In terms of the consideration of human resources, we have seen that the Corporate Plan
included an indication of the direction the Bank was to be moving In. The need to change culture
as the Bank itself became more market driven was a particular concern. However, there was little
detailed consideration at this level. The area was acknowledged by senior management to be
important but they saw their time as being taken up by more directly business related Issues while
a human resources manager would take over responsibility In this area. The formulation of
strategy In human resources and Implementation of new policies will be examined In the next two
chapters and it is there that we will examine the implications of such an approach.
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CHAPTER SIX: TOWARDS HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
(a) introduction
The previous chapter examined the changing business strategy of the Bank In the context
of rapid environmental change. This chapter examines the changing policy of the Bank towards
the management of labour. We have seen that the Bank had accorded a higher priority to human
resources, and this chapter looks at the implications and results of this new attitude. Hence the
bulk of the chapter is concerned with discussing the attempt by the Bank to introduce a more
strategic approach to its management of employees. The chapter looks at the reasons for the
new approach, the key actors Involved and the evolution of a strategy which Incorporated cost
control, a revised remuneration package, a re-shaping of the union and a new management style.
This chapter is concerned with the period between December 1987 which was when 'the Human
Resource Strategy' was formulated. We examined in the literature review the debate on Human
Resource Management and saw that much of the material was of a prescriptive and campaign-like
form and hence there Is a need, as Storey (1987) argues, to contextualise by means of case
studies. This thesis attempts to do exactly that. This chapter begins by examining why the Bank
began to take the question of human resources more seriously.
(b) Towards Human Resource Management
The Bank had a quite distinct approach to its management of staff because of two key
Influences. Firstly the co-existence of the two cultures of finance and co-operation within the
Bank, with the latter fading gradually over time. In 1922 when the Bank Offices Guild (the
forerunner of the present B.l.F.U.) demanded salaries for the clerks more In line with those In
other banks, the official line was that
"Your bank is totally different from any other joint stock bank in the country"
(Quoted by Richardson, 1938)
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Until 1971 the Bank was of course the C.W.S. Bank and the historical roots in the labour
movement finds Its clearest reflection today with the Bank's relationship with the union. Secondly,
the Bank's rapid expansion in the 1 970s (1680 staff In 1974 to 3250 in 1983) meant in practice the
Bank had little time to develop its own resources and relied heavily on recruiting from other banks
to fulfil its manpower needs. Thus, training except for new staff was a low priority and neither a
manpower plan or a formal succession plan existed. Indeed until 1969, there was neither a
specialist Personnel nor Training Department. In the early 1970s, the Personnel Department was
largely concerned with the administration of salaries and negotiations over pay, with a significant
Input from C.W.S. specialists. In the later 1970s, with the rapid expansion of staff in the Bank and
in the context of changing legislation and an era of incomes policies, there was a move to greater
speclalisatlon and professionalism, as evident across industry in general (Purcell and Slsson,
1983).
While the realities of the financial labour market ensured that the Bank followed closely
the pay settlements of the Federation of London Clearing Bank Employers (FLCBE) there was a
great deal of what was termed 'seat of the pants' management. For Instance, until the introduction
of the Hay-MSL job evaluation scheme in 1978, while a minimum managerial salary existed the
salaries were awarded at the discretion of the Chief General Manager. Pragmatism was the key
philosophy.
A more positive approach to the management of people can be seen to be Identified with
the Chief Executive assigning responsibility for human resources to a senior manager in July
1985. As the training manager put it, the low priority previously accorded to human resources
was reflected in senior managers rejecting initiatives and giving reasons "why we can't do It".
After the senior manager's appointment the attitude was to say "why can't we do It". What were
the reasons for this greater emphasis on employee relations? Firstly infra-structural problems:
growth in the Bank had taken place in the relatively soft markets of the 1970s, and had to some
extend hidden rising Costs associated with the clearing centre and Head Office which were widely
regarded as being overstaffed. Secondly the increasing competitive pressure In banking had led
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to greater attention to controlling labour costs and increasing labour productivity. Thirdly, the
nature of change had moved the emphasis towards being a market driven rather than an
administration driven organisation (or towards an organic rather than a mechanistic organisatlon,
Burns and Stalker 1966) and this had Implications for staff In terms of customer consciousness
and a sales culture. Finally as the Plan developed there became an explicit link with business
objectives in terms of the niche it was trying to establish: as a 'caring bank' whose customers
'care for the community' it was clearly necessary for the staff to care for the customers and
management to care for the staff. Employee goodwill as well as technical competence was a
necessity. Hence a clear strategic link existed.
The need to manage human resources more effectively was recognised in the Corporate
Plan of 1986 and was part of the recommendations of the consultant's report on the organisatlon.
A senior manager who had been allocated responsibility for human resources said that it had
become increasingly apparent that for the Bank to achieve any success attention would have to
be devoted to this area. In particular it was necessary to change the attitude staff had towards
customers and to encourage a greater Identification with the organisatlon. Hence the move to
develop staff accelerated.
"The staff had to see that it was the customer not the pieces of paper which the
Bank were concerned with."
However the Corporate Plan, while recognising the need for changes is the personnel
area, did not explore In any detail what such changes would be or how they were to be brought
about (see Appendix A2). Thus references were made to operating with 'maximum flexibility' and
maximum efficIency on optimum numbers of staff', but only broad Indication as to how this was
to be achieved. Thus a sales culture was required, but what did this mean In terms of personnel
policies and practices?
Rothwell writes that
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"The starting point of a company employment policy must be corporate policy:
The employment policy must stem from the business policy and be an integral
part of its implementation." (1984, p.31)
However, the links between business strategy and employment policy are by no means
clear-cut: one is not simply able to read oft from company objectives a set of appropriate
industrial relations policies. Even if one takes the labour process view that control Is the
overriding objective discretion does exist over how that control is exercised (Braverman, 1974;
Nichols and Beynon, 1977; Edwards, 1979).
The human resource manager, In writing a paper on Employee Relations Strategy, made
only a brief reference to corporate objectives:
"The Bank has set out its objectives of business and profit growth in the
Corporate Plan. Those objectives can only be achieved by: improved
performance in all areas, particularly improved sales and customer service,
effective cost control particularly head-count reduction and salary costs."
(Employee Relations Strategy Paper, October 1987.)
Hence there was a recognition of the conflicting role of the Personnel Department: to
develop staff as a resource on the one hand, and on the other to control costs. The paper
developed this duality as one which must be addressed:
"The Personnel function is developing strategies to help achieve these
objectives within the key area of human resources. Effective utiisation of these
resources will contribute significantly to the achievement of these objectives.
The Bank must train and develop employees in this area. Success can only be
achieved, however, if staff feel they are being treated correctly by the Bank and
fully understand the Bank's objectives and rationale for their achievement. It is
essential, therefore, that we develop an employee relations climate which
facilitates these attitudes without reducing management's ability to manage the
business. The key human resources objectives are the refore:-
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- a motivated and well trained staff geared to performance.
- Control and authority of staff by line managers with
Personnel support."
(Employee Relations Strategy Paper.)
What did this actually mean in practice? The Strategy Paper identified the key areas
which needed to be addressed in order to meet the overall strategic objectives (see Appendix AS).
In practice there were four central concerns. Firstly, cost control and head-count reduction.
Secondly, a remuneration policy relating pay to performance and in the longer term a new pay
bargaining strategy stressing affordability. Thirdly, it was necessary for 'good' union relationships
although the union should not be in a position to obstruct change. Fourthly, this was to be under-
pinned by cultural change, new management style and greater line management authority and
accountability for staff. These new policies will be discussed in detail later in the chapter, but we
now move on to examine the key actors involved In the process of developing Human Resources
Management.
Brewster et al (1983) identify three main categories of management involved in Industrial
relations policy. Instigators determine the espoused industrial relations policy: implementors
(usually the main body of the managerial hierarchy) reflect the operational policy "in accordance
with his own abilities and limitations in the light of his understanding of what senior executives
require of him" or the organisation's "internal value system" (p.5). Thirdly, facilitators are usually
the personnel specialists involved in advising and assisting in the implementation of policy. We
now examine the instigators and facilitators involved in the process of change in the Bank.
As a sign of the Bank's commitment to human resources there was the appointment of a
human resources manager, a newly created post In May 1987. This was filled by the former
Group Employee Relations Advisor to Watney, Mann and Truman Brewers. Although the Chief
Executive can be regarded as the initial instigator of policy his role was limited to pushing for
change, but the content of a new policy was largely left to the Human Resources Manager. Hence
his role was much more than that of a facilitator. He was to be the main instigator of policy and
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would be responsible for a wholesale review of all aspects of employee relations. It was highly
significant that the Chief Executive recognised that a specialist was required to make the
necessary changes.
There were two other key actors. The head of the Group Development Division had
overall responsibility for the function and had direct access to the Chief Executive rather than, as
the organisation charts suggested, via the Director of the Group Development Division. This was
for a number of reasons. Firstly the Director was also the head of the trade union bank Unity Trust
(half-owned by the Bank) In addition to being closely involved with the marketing side of the
division and was thus unable to devote much time to the human resource area. Secondly the
Chief Executive had taken a particular interest in this area and wanted to be involved himself.
Thirdly, given that responsibility did not lie with a Director it was felt necessary to have backing
from the very top for radical change to be pursued. As Legge observes,
"Without power and influence in organisational decision- making, a personnel
manager cannot hope to successfully implement any sophisticated personnel
strategy" (1978)
The division of responsibility between the Head of Human Resources and the Head of
Personnel was also not reflected clearly in the organisational charts which pointed to a strategic
role for the former under the Group Development Division and an operational role for the latter
under the Group Services DMsion. However, because of the two individuals involved, one new to
the organisation and the other with a close understanding of the culture of the Bank and near to
retirement, it was decided that the Head of Human Resources would combine both strategic and
operational roles, hence avoiding the danger of being one of the:
"paper strategists whose policy blueprints bear no relation to operational
reality." (Hyman, 1987, p.34)
The Head of Personnel would be given responsibility for particular tasks, notably the new
pensions scheme and the reduction and relocation of staff.
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It is certainly significant that the main process of developing a human resources policy
was handled outside the line. Nevertheless there was an attempt to involve line managers by the
establishment of a Human Resources Committee. This comprised the General Manager of the
Group Development DMsion; the Head of Information Technology; the Head of the Sales Network
(Personal Banking); the Head of Corporate Banking (Retail); the Head of Personnel
Administration; the Human Resources Manager; the Head of Treasury and the Head of
Transmissions. Hence there was representation from the human resources function, the
systems' sections and those who had significant numbers of staff in their departments.
The committee was designed to facilitate a more strategic approach to human resources,
but the lower level of representation on this committee, discussed in Chapter 5, than was
originally Intended undoubtably reduced the impact of the committee, and the committee was
where policy was explained rather than where decision making took place.
The 'gap' in the Corporate Plan relating to a human resources policy meant that the new
Head of Human Resources had a relatively free hand to devise his own paper strategy for Human
resources In so far as there were no set preconceptions or conditions as to what such a strategy
would look like. Nevertheless, such a process clearly took place within a context which placed
constraints on his plans.
We now examine a set of union agreements and practices which formed a major
constraint on the policy formulation by the new human resources manager, but reflected very
much the historical development of the Bank.
(c) Agreements with the Union
While the nature and process of corporate planning in the Bank meant few decision had
been taken at the top management level regarding employee relations beyond the approval of the
appointment of a human resources manager and hence he was the main instigator of policy (in
Brewster's et al terms), nevertheless policy making clearly took place within a context which
placed constraints on the instigators in particular, and placing direct constraints on the policy
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maker were a number of agreements signed with the union which were largely a product of the
Bank's unique relationship with the movement which we have addressed in Chapter Three. We
now examine these agreements in some detail so as to be able to understand the context In which
policy was formulated.
There were four important agreements with the union which we discuss In turn.
(I) New Technology Agreement
The Bank had been the focus of massive technical change. Large mainframe computers
had removed paper chasing and number crunching from the branches and centralised them. The
Bank was the first to introduce on line (i.e. direct transmission of data between the branch and the
mainframe processing computer) customer accounting system; all this has been to improve staff
productivity and control costs via the automation of clerical procedures. This also took place In a
climate of optimism and expansion as the Bank was one of the only banks not to be rationalising
s branch structure.
More recently, the second phase of branch automation has been oriented towards the
provision of customer Information as an aid to the development of the Personal Banker
philosophy. Hence the front office communication network and micro computers would facilitate
management decision making by improving indirect customer service and would also be an aid to
the marketing of the bank's services to the customer. In addition a strategic decision was made
to develop an ATM network. Of course the industry as a whole has been the focus of
overwhelming technical Innovation as we noted In Chapter Two. In addition to the development of
ATM network, there has been CHAPS, and EFTPOS and home banking were looming on the
horizon (Cooke 1986). Thus It Is hardly surprising that there has been concern about Job security,
careers and deskilling (BIFU, 1983; Crompton Jones, 1984).
However, the agreement had been relatively uncontentious although It Is worth noting that
while seeking technology agreements since 1989, BIFU have failed to achieve even consultative
rights or employment guarantees elsewhere (Willman, 1986) and the current policy (from the 1984
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conference) had been to oppose new technology which leads to job loss. The agreement with
the Bank (very close to the model new technology agreement of BIFU) gives full consultative
rights (see Appendix A6.2). New technology then has hardly been an issue In the Bank. This can
be attributed to several factors. Firstly, It has taken place in the context of rapid expansion in the
Bank, so job security has not been threatened. Secondly, It has been regarded as having a
beneficial impact on the content and quality of the jobs affected by change. For Instance, on line
systems were deemed to require more skill in terms of terminal operation and also to be a more
rounded task. Two other factors were said to be important: good handling of the issue by
management and finally the relatively young age of staff (average age 32) said to be less
apprehensive of change.
Thus while conflict over new technology appears endemic in old craft industries, as
illustrated by printing (Martin 1981, and is also affecting newer Industries e.g. Television
technicians and air traffic workers (Bamber and Lansbury 1988) the case of the bank and the
Industry In general supports the view at Batstone et al (1987) of a lack of trauma in relation to the
introduction of new technology. We now turn to examine the Job Security and Mobility
Agreements.
(Ii) The Mobility of Labour and Job Security Agreements
These two agreements were a product of the labour difficulties the bank faced in 1983,
but had become increasingly constraining by the late 1980s. In 1983 the Bank, facing up to the
cost of its expansion in the 1 970s at a time of high inflation and the 1981 windfall tax, had a major
re-assessment which led to an attempt to cut costs by 2.5 million. Although the Bank denied it,
the union claimed that this would mean 250 redundancies, and staff ballots In the major centres,
namely Manchester, London and Skelmersdale, produced a majority for industrial action. To
prevent the dispute going further the status quo was maintained while negotiations took place,
and the result was the two agreements above.
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The Mobility of Labour Agreement was referred to by a personnel manager as "the
biggest waste of time and cause of aggravation during my whole career with the Bank".
The agreement sought to highlight the need for mobility in order to achieve career
advancement (see Appendix A6.4). Part of the difficulty lay in the limited branch network of the
Bank; to gain experience staff had to move branches but where with the major banks this did not
necessarily mean having to move house, in the Bank this was usually the case. Staff were asked
to Indicate whether they were fully mobile, had limited mobility or were not prepared to move at
all. In practice, of course, changing circumstances would alter their willingness to move, and In
fact the agreement made provision for staff to notify the Personnel Department and alter the
scope of the mobility as long as new "employed, professional, personal or domestic
circumstances merit such change". The extent to which the agreement, although being of little
use in practical terms, had something of a symbolic importance in that It focused staff attention on
the need for greater mobility is debatable.
The second agreement signed in 1983 was the Job Security Agreement. Like the TSB
Security of Employment Agreement (see Willman, 1986, p.241) it embodied the principle of no
compulsory redundancy, stating that:
"It is the policy of the Bank to provide security of employment for event member
of its staff having due regard to the need for an increasingly efficient and
profitable business. Such security of employment is best provided by careful
planning in the adoption and development of new or revised business practices
and/or procedures. In accordance with this principle and Section 1 of this
Agreement, Parties agree that they share a common aim of maintaining the
efficiency and profitability to the Bank and in continuing to further the best
possible relationships in order to safeguard the current or future employment of
the staff of the Bank."
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The following mechanisms exist to reduce staff numbers:
1	 Reduction of temporary/agency staff
2	 Cessation of recruitment
3	 Reduction of overtime
4	 Enforced retirement
5	 Voluntary early retirement
6	 Redeployment and retraining
7	 Voluntary redundancy
(Job Security Agreement.)
A Staffing Review Committee was set up to meet and discuss and review
"the implications for employees which may arise from the adoption or
development of new or revised business practices and/or procedures and
changed trading or economic circumstances"
and
"to consider as a consequence of such a review any appropriate means
including the provisions of this Agreement for reducing to a minimum the
number of employees who became surplus to the overall needs of the Bank."
(see Appendix A6.3)
In 1987 the absence of a section in the Agreement providing for compulsory redundancy
was seen as unfortunate, not so much because the Bank would wish to utilise the clause but
because the absence of such a clause was believed to generate the view that staff had a 'job for
life'.
A paper on Employee Relations Strategy stated that
"The Job Security Agreement can be viewed as a hindrance to the Bank's
activities In that it limits the Bank's actions in redeploying or reducing staff. The
Bank should, however, be able to manage the proposed organisationa! changes
and staff reductions within Its confines, though It may have to consider
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introduction of compulsory redundancy at some stage if targets are not
achieved."
This issue clearly involved the union and it is to this subject that we now turn.
(iii) Union Membership Agreement
The Bank differed from the 'Big Four' in that it operated a union membership agreement
(effectively a closed shop) (see Appendix A6.1) and hence there was no staff association and thus
no internal union conflict as in the other banks. Morris (1986) argues that divided staff
representation is one factor responsible for banks' commercial success. The debate over the
significance of the closed shop has changed markedly over time. The traditional view that It was a
weapon of the unions (McCarthy 1964) was turned on its head In the early 1 970s by those who
argued that it was managers who favoured it (Hart 1979). In respect of the Bank it Is interesting to
note that one of the Directors claimed that It is "on balance as advantageous to the employer as
to the union".
More recent research has shown the danger of looking at the closed shop as a monolithic
institution and the need to see it in many cases as the "final piece of the Jigsaw" rather than being
of huge importance itself (Dunn and Gennard 1984). In fact management enthusiasm for the
closed shop has probably been exaggerated, and
"tended to be, if not indifferent, at least non-committal. This may well have been
indicative of a disappointment that the closed shop had not produced the
practical benefits that had been expected. Nevertheless, they tended to value it
as part of the status quo and thus were not keen to see it removed, although this
in turn may have been due to their relatively short experience of the practice and
of the fact that no opportunity had arisen for the practice to operate against
management interests."
(Dunn and Gennard, p.150)
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Internally the relationship with the union was regarded as a good one. The major
problems arose from BIFU's need to meet national policy on, for instance, working practices and
hours of work. The 'big four' did not have this difficulty: claiming the 'right to manage' on issues
such as Saturday opening they simply override the objections of the unions (clearly helped by
divided staff representation). The Bank had to ensure that BIFU in the Bank are not 'embarrassed'
in relation to national policies.
Not surprisingly the attitudes of those who had regular dealings with the union were by no
means homogeneous. The Personnel Manager (a former leading lay union official) referred
disparagingly to 'trouble makers' and 'political militants' who dominated committees. He was also
critical of the people who were appointed to the position of Control Clerk (two shop stewards
seconded by the Bank for a period of two years) whom he regarded as too junior effectively to
represent the union and whom he felt were vested with too much power.
A senior manager with responsibility for personnel had a more positive view: getting rid of
or fundamentally undermining the union was neither possible nor desirable. Hence, management
should strive to work with the union. Indeed, he was critical of the confrontational approach of the
Big Four' which he regarded as likely to store up trouble for future, particularly with regard to non
career staff in the clearing centres.
One possibility floated to reduce the role of 'militants' would be to 'build up' people with
defined career paths into the job, and Blyton, working in local government, found that
"far from showing a reluctance and a fear of compromising their status by
membership of, and activity In, unions dominated numerically by their Juniors, the
high ranking officers in the local government departments displayed a desire to
exert similar degrees of Involvement and control within the union setting to those
which they were accustomed to wielding within the work organisation."
(1980, p.135)
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However in the Bank it was made clear to managers that while being members of the
union, their role was as managers. As Arthurs (1983) illustrates in his study, there is tacit
acceptance that mangers retired from active union membership when they took on a post that re-
quired a significant role in policy making.
Hence with the union dominated by Junior staff there was a tendency to reflect these
interests, for instance in seeking flat rate increases during pay negotiations and in seeking the
extension of certain fringe benefits as for instance the availability of preferential borrowing. Never-
theless no attempt had been made to have separate representation for managers outside the
union as this was deemed to go against the culture of the movement; within the union a
manager's and appointed staff's sub committee existed but was generally regarded as toothless.
The whole union question was called into question by recent legislation an the closed shop which
we will discuss in the next section.
We have discussed these agreements and their implications in some detail because they
illustrate the concerns of those in Personnel as to the constraints they faced in formulating
policies and the potential constraints in the implementation of such policies. We now go on to
examine the policies developed.
(d) The Development of a Human Resources Strategy
We have now outlined the motivation behind the adoption of a more pro-actIve and
positive approach to managing staff, the significant appointment of a human resources manager
and some of the key constraints in developing policy. We now move on to examine the
development of a human resources strategy for the Bank. There were a number of central themes
running through the strategy: an emphasis on cost control and reduction; a new remuneration
package; a new relationship with the union and a new management style and attitude. These
were linked by a central strategic and organisational posture: to be a market driven organisatlon.
We now examine these themes in turn.
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(I) Cost Control
Rather Ironically given the trend away from regarding labour as a cost and the move to
looking at it as more of a resource, the first priority of the Bank was to reduce labour costs (which
formed some 70% of total operating expenditure). Pressure for this came as a result of two
factors. Firstly, low profits in 1985 (following on from a bad year in 1984) was likely of itself to lead
to a re-examination of the cost structure of the Bank. Secondly, and the catalyst, was the pattern
of pay settlements in the banks in 1987 after the collapse of the Federation of London Clearing
Bank Employers in July which put enormous pressure on the Bank. The Impact of the
unanticipated increase in the London Allowance was a sharp one, with as many as a quarter of its
staff eligible for this. The implications of such payments for the following year's expected profits
was clear. The estimated costs for 1988 with the Annual Salary Review (ASR) and ancillary items
(allowances etc.) would be an increase of some 10% of present pay roll costs or some 5m. This
was also taking place with the background of a remuneration review and the introduction of a
profit-sharing scheme both of which would be expensive.
Hence attention focused on the reduction of unit labour costs. Unit labour costs can be
reduced in two main ways: firstly an increase in labour productivity, secondly a reduction in total
labour costs. The first method could be achieved by measures like better recruitment and
training, a new payment system, an improved organisational structure, a different management
st1e and culture. However these are essentially long-term measures and the more obvious and
immediately effective method to reduce unit costs is simply reducing the size of the workforce.
Reducing the size of the workforce by 400 would realise a saving of 4.5m. However, the shortage
of experienced staff (especially senior clerical and appointed) to support the growth areas of the
Bank meant a gross reduction of 500 had to be achieved between May 1987 and the spring of
1988.
The methods to be employed to achIeve the necessary reduction was rather ad hoc. The
Personnel Manager who was responsible for this area said he would examine "any conceivable
way". However, the crude reduction in numbers was complicated by another consideration. The
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redistribution of existing staff away from the Head Office function, which was referred to by
managers as the 'paper empire' and regarded as overmanaged and overmanned, to the 'sharp
end' of the business. This would involve some retraining as staff were being asked to move from
administrative jobs to servicing customers. It was recognised as one of the lessons of 1983 that
any attempt to reduce numbers in the branches would be fruitless as to ensure the smooth
running of the operation they would have to be replaced.
It was appreciated that the squeeze on labour costs would lead to problems with the
union and possible detrimental effects on staff morale, and hence as far as possible the reduction
in staff numbers would be achieved in an unobtrusive manner. Natural wastage was one method,
as the Bank had a turnover of some 500 people a year. Secondly early retirement would not
prove too contentious, it was thought. However, if the targets could not be achieved by these
measures the introduction of a new disciplinary code would provide the Bank with another means
to reduce staff numbers. The fact that this was being considered was itself indicative of a new
more performance-oriented management style. The case of the Bank bears out the prediction of
Hunt that the 'management of exit' would be an Increasingly important function for the personnel
function' (1984, p17).
Relocation was clearly made more difficult by the Job Mobility Agreement: since it would
prove impossible to force people out (and also have undesirable effects on morale) the new
approach would be to make Head Office jobs less attractive: for instance It would be made clear
that the way to achieve advancement would no longer be via Head Office; benefits such as cars
and housing loan schemes would be weighted against Head Office occupants and finally the
Bank would, if necessary, down-grade Head Office jobs.
A more radical strategic alternative was mooted In relation to the location of certain Bank
operations. Nearly a quarter of Bank staff were based In London In the following functions: the
clearing centre; the handybank processing centre for retail societies; the City and Treasury
function; Corporate and International offices. With Increasing competitive pressure for staff and
high infra-structural costs the Bank questioned whether they were taking the right perspective In
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looking at ways of attracting and retaining staff and raised the Issue of whether the function
needed to be performed at that location. The clearing centre received particular attention.
Leasing costs there were regarded as prohibitive and this, together with the London Allowance
and outdated working practices (which It was felt would be too difficult to change with existing
staff and union opposition) made relocation an attractive proposition. A possibility was therefore
to relocate and recruit anew. Hence, with the highly competitive London labour market, staff
could be eased out by natural wastage and there would be the opportunity to move Into a
purpose-built unit with greenfield site advantages. Furthermore such a strategy would have
further attractions with the Bank having to pay neither redundancy or relocation costs. In addition
there would be lower leasing costs, the possibility of an employment grant, lower staff Costs and
easier recruitment.
However, it was not considered feasible for a direct switch to be made. It was far more
sensible to keep two centres operating, one as an exigency centre in case of computer failure or
industrial action. While relocation is recognised as one mechanism by which changes in working
organisatlon can be effected (Japanese companies in South Wales being an obvious example -
see Bassett 1986) there are few documented cases of the strategic considerations of plant
relocation (Whittaker 1986) and this example exhibits more the Influence of negative push factors
(I.e. cost) rather than the opportunity to develop better industrial relations.
We have seen how one of the concerns with the strategy of cutting labour costs was the
anticipated reaction of the union. We now, then, turn to examine the aims of the Human
Resources Strategy with regard to the union.
(Ii) Role of the Union
We have already examined the agreements with the union which were a significant
constraint on personnel policy. The new Human Resources Manager immediately Identified the
paradox facing the Bank in a paper to the Policy Committee on Remuneration Policy in August
1987:
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"We must amend, or cease, current agreements with BIFU which inhibit our
ability to manage the business effectively, particularly the Job Security, Mobility
of Labour and Union Membership Agreements. We must, however, maintain
strong links with the Union which is a principle of the Co-operative Movement."
Demanding early attention was the Union Membership Agreement, which we have
discussed earlier on. Dunn and Gennard argued that managerial reassessment In the 1980s
would come from three sources. Firstly that while industrial relations specialists may have
convinced their companies of pragmatic reasons for its acceptance, It Is probably highly
unpopular among directors and managers generally on philosophical grounds. Secondly, the
industrial relations specialists will be less enthusiastic since it has not delivered the expected
benefits. Thirdly, the changing legislation meant the cost of maintaining a closed shop was a high
one. In relation to the Bank it was the last force which was the catalyst. Because of the unique
historical tradition of the Bank the closed shop was accepted by senior managers as part of the
culture: indeed the Union Membership Agreement made provision that the Chief General
Manager, the Deputy Chief General Managers, General Managers, the Head of Personnel and the
Personnel Manager would have the option whether or not to belong to the union, and they all did
have membership.
The main force for re-assessment was legal. Under the 1980 and 1982 Employment Acts
the Bank (and BIFU) were vulnerable to action for unfair dismissal from an employee dismissed
for non-union membership. The choices were to have a ballot as In line with the legislation;
secondly to end the UMA but to ensure sole bargaining rights for BIFU (thus avoiding the
possibility of another union and inter-union disputes); thirdly to leave things as they were. Given
that BIFU were likely to reject the first option it was decided that the Bank would attempt to get an
agreement granting sole bargaining rights and removIng s.1O of the Contract of Employment
which made the Bank liable with BIFU in contracting staff to forgo their rights under the Acts.
Changed relationships with the union would also have to occur as the Bank moved to
performance related pay (see below). The Bank wanted to remove the top tier of management
Page 188
CHAPTER SIX	 TOWARDS HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
(about 20 people) from the collective bargaining procedure. This could be achieved by Invoking
Part I of the UMA (1976) Appendix I of the Negotiating and Consultations Procedure. Although
this itself was not seen as likely to be a major source of contention, the difficulty was convincing
the union that this was not part of a wider process of reducing union influence, and to this end
union membership was to be encouraged among those affected. A recent study suggests that
grade specific de-recognition (especially that relating to movements to performance related pay)
is an Increasing phenomenon where unions have limited support (Claydon, 1989).
However, as The Times reported (12.6.83):
"Employers generally are not anxious to create rifts with their union at a time
when there is great pressure to introduce efficient working practices that need
acquiescence."
(cited by Fogarty and Brooks 1986, p.98)
The development of the Bank and Its unique historical relationship with the movement has
thus produced a number of constraints within which those responsible for formulating the
personnel policy had to achieve union co-operation rather than Impose Bank policy. Hence no
crude union bashing would take place although the Bank would attempt to change the shape of
the relationship.
As Morris observes,
"Management strategies appear now to be moving towards a position which,
while accepting unionism as legitimate, sees the need to sustain clear limits to
Joint decision-making in order to respond to the related issues of technological
change and an increasingly competitive marketplace."
(1986, p.120)
The Bank's position was undoubtedly more complex given that its relationship with the
union largely influenced by its owners. The Employee Relations Strategy paper reiterated this:
"Bearing in mind the Co-operative Bank's philosophies, objectives and position
in the Co-operative and Labour Movement it is essential that we maintain good
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relationships with BIFU. Maintenance of this relationship does not mean,
however, that we have to meet all of BIFU's demands or requirements, or use the
Union as an excuse for ineffective management."
A number of initiatives were proposed to re-shape the Union more In line with the Bank's
view of its role. Firstly, Head Office Union power would be reduced by cutting from two to one the
number of control clerks. Secondly, It was proposed to amend the status of the Negotiating
Committee so as to ensure it dealt only with major items such as pay negotiations, while minor
items were to be dealt with by the grievance procedure, and it was agreed that much of the day to
day relationship with the union would be conducted by less senior personnel. Thirdly, and this
also reflected the new management style, responsibility for personnel Issues would be devolved
to line managers who would be encouraged to have regular local discussions with union
representatives as part of the consultative process and this would also prevent them being by-
passed as Issues went directly to Head Office. A reduced union role was also apparent In the new
remuneration policy, which we now examine.
(iii) A New Remuneration Policy
The centre-piece of the new employment relations policy was a reformulated
remuneration policy in the light of changing business conditions. While some elements of the
policy outlined below had roots going back many years, for Instance profit sharing and pensions,
and others were acknowledged to be overdue, the timing and actual content of such schemes
would form part of a coherent and integrated remuneration policy which reflected the market
driven culture.
The Bank's basic pay structure (apart from the two Important areas of profit sharing and
pensions, and some fringe benefits) was similar to the 'Big Four' and while not a member of the
FLCBE the Bank did follow their settlements. Until the collapse of the FLCBE In 1987 many
employee relations Issues were dealt with at an Industry level Including basic pay levels for clerical
staff, minimum managerial salaries and other major terms and conditions Including hours of work,
Page 190
CHAPTER SIX	 TOWARDS HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
holidays and allowances (Morris 1986). Hence banks sub-contracted out part of their industrial
relations policies. However, the Industry wide job evaluation system Introduced In the 1970s was
a flexible one: four clerical grades existed at the national level with bench mark Jobs for each
grade, but discretion existed as to how the other jobs were graded and what the rate of
progression was through the scales for each grade and promotion between grades (Morris and
Willman 1988). Furthermore the system was essentially two tier with each bank being left to
determine merit payments, and managerial grading and pay.
However in the 1980s with deregulation, increasing competition and Increasingly
dftferentiated business strategies the national system came under strain, and the beginning of the
end was in sight when Midland Bank withdrew from the national bargaining machinery In 1986.
Even before the break-up of the FLCBE the Bank had been considering the possibility of
distancing themselves from the 'Big Four' In the light of both greater competition In the banking
sector and the more aggressive approach of some of the banks In the pay bargaining arena.
An Internal paper argued that stated that
"We must ensure that remuneration is related to corporate and individual
performance. We must cease the practice of following other banks'
remuneration and base our policy on ability to pay. We are clearly in a different
pay market to the other banks based on ability to pay against performance."
(Internal paper on Remuneration Strategy, August 1987)
The collapse of the Federation would allow such a policy to be implemented. The Group
Chief Executive of NatWest, T. Frost had said that the Federation was "incompatible and at times
in conflict with our business needs". However there were fears that there would be leap-frogging
as the banks became more exposed to market and union pressures.
Hence 'disengagement' would proceed slowly. Thus while the 'Big Four' were faced with
industrial action over their attempt to impose a pay settlement of flat rate Increase to salarIes and
scales plus 5% across the board, the Bank and the union agreed In an "atmosphere of relative
goodwill" to await the outcome of the dispute and there was no ballot or industrial action, nor did
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negotiations go to conciliation, despite the exhaustion of the negotiating machines.
After the settlement by Uoyds and Yorkshire Bank, the Bank negotiated a 7% pay rise In
August backdated to April, followed by a further increase of 10 In salaries and scales on the same
date. The settlement was for 15 months, I.e. to June 1988, which would enable the Bank to get
behind the Big Four from whence it could mark out its own pay policy. It also Included the
lengthening of each of grades 3 and 4 by one incremental step as well as updating territorial
allowances (and Introducing a south-east allowance) In line with other banks.
With the proposals to break away completely from the traditional scales to a single
evaluated structure the Bank hoped to establish its pay structures so as to be In line with its own
enterprise objectives and performance and so as not to be involved in Increasingly fierce and
expensive manoeuvrings with the Big Four. As an internal paper pointed out,
"Now, however, the major Banks feel able to reflect their own operating need,
without too much regard to what is happening elsewhere and against a
background of good profits, combined with a highly competitive market place for
both business and people, have begun to digress."
(Employee Relations Update, August 1987)
There were a number of forces exerting pressure on the existing pay structure of both the
clerical grades and the Hay evaluated points system for managers and appointed staff. Technical
Innovation was one factor; the need to reflect customer service and marketing forces were
another. Furthermore the recent amendment to the 1970 Equal Pay Act - equal pay for work of
equal value was also Important. It was generally accepted that the existing structure had become
distorted: for instance the clerical structure had been based on a hierarchy ranging from
securities clerk to machinist, but new technology had changed this. Furthermore too many staff
reached the maximum ceiling and there was thus a motivation problem. In the long term
structures had to reflect a need to reward exceptional performance rather than merely long term
loyalty.
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The Bank was therefore looking to re-evaluate the Hay system, previously confined to
managerial staff, so as to achieve a single evaluated and continuous structure of perhaps some
20 grades, thus providing both flexibility and avoiding the likelihood of equal opportunity claims.
We have already observed the decision to take the top management group (from Chief
Executive to Assistant General Manager) out of the negotiating sphere with the Union with a view
to establishing performance related pay. This was recognised as being likely to be controversial.
Official BIFU policy was to oppose its introduction:
'This will make its introduction more difficult and may mean that the Bank has to
increase performance related rewards above current levels to introduce the
concept for managers. Targets must be stretched to cater for this further. It also
highlights the question of whether the Bank wishes to continue to recognise
BIFU as having bargaining rights for the key groups of senior managers which it
needs to motivate to really influence profit and improve group performance."
(Discussion Paper on Performance Management and
Remuneration Review, May 1987)
Performance related pay would firstly involve relating the salary review to performance,
hence abolishing automatic cost of living awards and incremental payments. Secondly there
would be the introductIon of annual bonuses as a percentage of basic salary. Such a system
would start with senior management but it was clear from the outset that in the long run this would
percolate down the organisation although there were recognisable difficulties in applying such a
system to clerical and technical staff.
Initially the Personnel Department was aware that there would be union opposition to
such selective payments, but was prepared to argue that the union had to recognise the risk
involved at top levels and the ability of these managers to influence company performance.
Furthermore, the new remuneration packages for Board and senior management, middle
management and managerial and appointed staff would be designed by the Personnel
Department in conjunction with management consultants while only the arrangements for clerical
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staff would involve the union. Hence at this formulation stage there seemed little doubt that in the
remuneration area the union would become increasingly marginalised.
Figure 6.1: ANNUAL PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT/REMUNERATION
Manager!
Staff
CORPORATE PLAN
DIVISIONAL/FUNCTIONAL
OBJECTIVES
INDIVIDUAL OBJECTIVES
PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL
FUTURE OBJECTIVES
INDIVIDUAL
- Progress Review
- Measure Performance
- Coaching
- Training Needs
- Career Goals
- Development Plan
- POTENTIAL
ASSESSMENT
- SALARY
REVIEW
CORPORATE
o Career
Development
o SuccessIon
Planning
CORPORATE
o Salary
Structure
oJob
Evaluation
a Salary
Bill
The mechanisms by which remuneration would reflect the corporate objectives of the
Bank are illustrated in Figure 6.1, with the Executive managing staff through their line managers
Involving them In setting objectives and accountabilities which would cascade down the
organisation.
Profit sharing had been the subject of a great deal of attention In the Bank for some years
before 1987, and indeed an arbitration award on the issue had been made by the CWS in 1978 In
favour of the Bank and against the introduction of a profit share scheme. Yet almost ten years
after the Bank had refused to Introduce such a scheme, despite union pressure, largely on the
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grounds of cost and lower profitability compared to the other banks, the Bank now sought to
introduce a scheme at a time when cost control was paramount and profitability remained poor.
What explains this change of heart? This must partly be said to be the result of the
changing economic and social context. By the late 1 980s there had been considerable Interest In
the topic of financial participation in general, and schemes have been promoted by the
Government by exhortation and favourable tax legislation. MilIward and Stevens (1986) report
that the Incidence of profit sharing schemes has grown and Is also more widespread across
industry. Such schemes are said to give employees a closer Interest In the success of the
company, performing an educative function and creating a more profit conscious atmosphere
(Wright 1986). However, others have been more sceptical In their assessment of such schemes
(e.g. Fox 1985).
There has been little analysis of the introduction of such schemes within the
organisational context and the case of the Bank suggests a complex range of factors. Thus a
whole barrage of arguments were utilised to persuade the Board of the necessity to accept the
principle of such a scheme. Firstly, there was a simple need to link reward to performance. The
issue of motivation was regarded as crucial. Secondly It reflected market trends - Indeed It was
partly because of the lack of such a scheme that the Bank had to 'buy out' such schemes In
recruiting staff from other banks through basic pay that imbalances In pay structures arose.
Thirdly It was part of the cultural change outlined in the Corporate Plan. Fourthly, It would
introduce an element of variable cost into the pay settlement, and hence provide some of the
financial flexibility advocated by Weitzman (1984). A final factor which was Important In terms of
timing was the collapse of the national negotiating body, the Federation of London Clearing Bank
Employers. 93% of Bank staff surveyed by the union in 1986 regarded the existing situation as
unfair and the implications of the end to the Federation were clearly Identified:
"In the past It was likely that staff would have taken action to achieve a higher
settlement to offset gross pay disparities, but were prevented from doing so by
the national agreement. This year, freed from the restraining influence of BIFU's
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acceptance of the Federation settlement, staff may seek to achieve a higher
corporate settlement to make up any imbalance in gross pay caused by disparity
between the Co-operative Bank's pay and benefit package and that of
competitors."
(Internal Bank Paper on Pay Strategy)
The senior manager responsible for much of the prioritising of human resources said that
he had been trying to get staff to see the importance of profit for the last three years. It was clear
to him that
"Unless we get their minds linked with profit we weren't going to get anywhere
on the Corporate Plan."
Nevertheless he admitted he had a 'terrible time' convincing first the Directors and then
the Board, the former failing to see a link between across the board profit sharing and motivation
and the latter hostile because it went against the philosophy of the Movement. As a 'sop' to the
sensitivity of the Bank, shareholders' profit sharing would be called a summer bonus.
Nevertheless the Importance of the CWS and the movement clearly shows through In this
instance. Furthermore while it was difficult to convince the Board, the changing market
environment and its impact on the Movement were crucial in facilitating these changes. Members
of societies elected to previous Boards tended to be old fashioned co-operators, sticking loyally
to tradition. The more recent Boards had more businessmen who were said to be far more
receptive to change, especially the arguments being put by a Chief Executive who had previously
worked In the major clearing banks.
The Board agreed in principle to the 'bonus', subject to three conditions. Firstly, that It
was to be part of a total remuneration package; secondly, that It was self financing; thirdly, It was
to be linked with the Bank's national roll-out of extended opening hours which was being negotl-
ated with the union.
In fact the union had been pressing (unsuccessfully) for profit sharing for a number of
years and had In 1986 again put in a claim for a scheme at a time when the senior manager
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responsible for personnel Issues was attempting to convince the Board of Its necessity. The
union claim was in fact a very modest one - an annual distribution of a sum equivalent to 5% of
the previous year's agreed pre-tax profits (which would only amount to about 1% of salary).
M. Poole, in his analysis of profit sharing schemes in the U.K., makes a number of points
which are supported by the experience of the Bank. Firstly, profit sharing Is usually linked to
overall personnel policies - in the Bank it was part of the new human resources policy. Secondly
in the overwhelming majority of cases, decisions over the scheme were taken by management
alone - this too Is clearly borne out by the case of the Bank. Furthermore as Poole suggests
"financial participation in paternalistic companies may be seen by management
as a way of encouraging employee loyalty and identification with the company."
The case of the Bank contradicts the thesis of Ramsay (1977) that profit sharing schemes
are introduced to render labour more compliant, when management's prerogative to control
labour is under threat. In the Bank it was management who wanted the scheme regardless of
union pressure, and indeed the union were in any case on the defensive. Thus, more attention
needs to be paid to specific organisational contexts In evaluating such schemes.
Finally, we will briefly examine the final piece in the remuneration jigsaw. The pension
scheme in the Bank had been the source of continual friction as the Bank gradually moved away
from Its roots and evolved from the CWS Bank to being the Co-operative Bank. The scheme
operating in the Bank was for blue collar workers, I.e. factory and shop workers, and did not
provide the 2/3 final salary scheme available in the major clearing banks. A union cialm In 1971
had led to industrial action involving strikes and an overtime ban in 1973-74 and references to the
central Arbitration Committee, with the claim eventually going to the Divisional Court and the
Court of Appeal.
As with the introduction of a profit sharing scheme there were a number of forces,
including government legislation (the Social Security Act 1986 and the Finances Act 1987), market
forces and continual union pressure. Again, as with the profit sharing scheme, negotiations took
place with the CWS: given that the Bank had a young age profile and was therefore a net
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contributor to the CWS scheme, there were financial implications; secondly as with profit sharing
there was an ideological issue to be considered. Market pressures and the changing human
resources policy proved crucial and it was finally agreed to introduce a Bank scheme more in line
with competitors. While the debate over the principle of a new scheme had gone on for many
years the actual scheme was defined to reflect current personnel priorities:
"We need to develop a package which allows us as management the flexibility to
encourage staff who quality, or nearly quaIij, for a full pension, to leave where It
is deemed to be appropriate by the Bank. We should then consider carefully the
need to replace them directly or to secure head-count savings by non-
replacement of their successors, particularly if they are from indirect staff areas."
(Bank Paper on 1988 Remuneration Policy)
In concluding this section on remuneration it may appear somewhat paradoxical that at a
time when the Bank was attempting to disengage or distance itself from the Big Four policies,
partly for cost reasons, partly so as to align such policies more closely to corporate objectives,
the two main factors which separated the Bank from the Big Four were in the process of being
eliminated. However, this can be explained in terms of a long term movement away from the
CWS towards banking; but at the same time the banks themselves have become less
homogeneous as the cartel breaks down. In other words the Bank has moved closer to the main
banking pack, but this is now in the process of disintegration.
We now move on to discuss the fourth aspect of the H.R.M. strategy, namely a new
management style and culture.
(iv) Changing Culture and Management Style
What linked the central themes explored was the attempt to develop a new culture in the
Bank; and reflecting that, a new management style. The 'Excellence' studies illustrated how
financial goals were inadequate unless backed by a broader set of values. To a large extent the
culture of the clearing banks had been very similar and reflected the business environment of a
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stable product market, a cartel and high profitability, and the smaller banks tended to Import
elements of that culture.
A senior banker described banking culture thus:
"We are rather paternalistic and resistant to major changes. Indeed over the
timescale of this decade nothing fundamental will happen to our staff numbers
or even their career developments. We shall close a few branches but we have
been doing that for years. Even the idea of diversification should not be
overètated. Yes, changes will occur but veiy slowly." (Cited by Rajan, 1984)
Hence key components of the banking culture included a job for life philosophy, highly
bureaucratic and centralised decision making processes, a pay policy based on rewarding
experience, loyalty and service, a grow your own philosophy based on an internal labour system,
a heavy paternalistic approach with a focus on processes rather than results. The Co-operative
Bank culture was even more complex, with a strong co-operative ideology which Instilled In the
staff that they were "not just working for a bank". However the emphasis since the 1970s, when
the Bank became a bank in its own right, was to stress the need for a banking culture.
However, In the 1980s this culture and the values were Increasingly being regarded as
outmoded in the present financial environment which demanded a market driven organisatlon
wfth a more customer conscious approach, the active marketing of a wide range of services and
an emphasis on performance. This change can be seen in terms of the mechanistic and organic
organisations of Bums and Stalker (1966). As the Director of the Federation of London Clearing
Bank Employers has argued,
"Banks seem to me to be typical mechanistic organisations and this type of
structure has served them ver,' well in the past. The question is whether it will
serve them well in the future in a rapidly changing economic and technological
environment. It would be wise to assume not and human resourcing managers
should be considering how their organisation becomes more organic."
(Cowan 1983, p.23)
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The need for cultural change was recognised in the Corporate Plan which noted that:
"In common with others in the industr1', the Bank has traditionally recruited and
trained for a single career structure, with a strong technical (or professional)
bias. However, in the changed circumstances not only the recruitment and
training, but the whole 'culture' of the Bank will have to change radically."
(Corporate Plan 1986-90, October 1986)
Changing culture provides the Personnel Department with a major opportunity. As Hunt
points out,
"The redesign and reconciliation of the organisation's culture, values and beliefs
provides an immense opportunity ... to influence strategy and move out from its
preoccupation with discipline and control." (Hunt 1984, p.17)
One Important component of culture is management style. This has been defined as
"a deliberate choice linked to business policy"
(Purcell 1987, p.533)
or very simply a philosophy of management towards employees. The Warwick survey of
enterprise level Industrial relations found 84% of companies claiming to have an overall policy on
the management of employees, but case studies have shown how vague and general Intentions
have not been translated to practice (Cressey et al, 1985), a clear example of the difference
between espoused and operational policy.
The Employee Relations Strategy drew attention to the need for a more open
management style and that the impetus had to come from the Bank's Executive Directors and
senior management, who would not merely exhort, but involve staff more with setting of
objectives etc. The type of Initiatives that were suggested Included 'open door' policies,
suggestions schemes and managers 'walking the job'. As the Human Resource Manager put it In
his strategy paper,
"Effective communications and cultural change can be achieved if the Bank
operates an open management style. Such an approach would In no way
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diminish the management's ability to operate. It merely reinforces
management's authority in a different manner.
These issues must be seen as part of the Bank's management culture
and encourage staff to view their Manager as the natural leader to whom they
should turn for in formation. The 'Co-operative' culture should enable the Bank to
foster such an approach, but it does require full commitment and example from
the top of the organisation to ensure its effectiveness together with constructive
action arising from staff Involvement, particularly if it aids business
development"
(Employee Relations Strategy, October 1987)
It was also important that this culture was reflected by the line manager and to facilitate
this responsibility for personnel issues would be devolved.
Hirsch (1987) has shown how the pendulum of fashion has swung In favour of
decentralisation but suggests that decentralisatlon reflects the changing structure of management
rather than being based on personnel rationale. However, Purcell (1985) has argued that the
general trend towards devolvement of personnel issues Is appropriate given that the Issues of the
1980s, productivity and performance were best handled at the operational level, In contrast to the
1970s Issues of union power and changing legislation.
The Bank stressed that
"Line managers must be given authority and accountability for employee rel-
ations issues. They should be the prime movers in any staff related action though
this must be undertaken in conjunction with Personnel Department which will
ensure the action is equitable and consistent and does not create adverse pre-
cedents for the Bank. The personnel Department should be the facilitator of all
actions relating to the Bank's human resources, particularly quality, service and
development, though this should in no way detract from the ultimate account-
ability of line managers for aspects of staff." (1988 Remuneration Policy, August)
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Hence authority was to be returned to line managers. This contrasted with a situation In
the early 1 970s when the Personnel Manager would see every recruit, decide every regrade and
handle all disciplinary problems. There was consequently a tendency for matters at the local level
to be referred to the Personnel Department or union at Head Office. This had led to long lines of
communications. Managers, in the words of the Head of Personnel, "became chief clerks". They
became lending experts and lost responsibility for motivating and managing staff. Furthermore
wTh Personnel dealing with circumstances with which they had little familiarity, there developed a
belief that they were too distant from line management. Hence, the trend In banking, and Indeed
the finance sector in general, has been to devolve greater responsibility to the line (e.g. Bailey and
Ross 1981, Handy and Hepburn 1985). Of course to get the line to accept responsibility has been
a perennial problem of British industry. Flanders commented that
"The trouble with the greater part of the best of line management in British
industry from top to bottom is that it does not want to accept the responsibility for
the human aspects of its Job, what is sometimes called, although I dislike the
term, man-management. By training and inclination it prefers the greater security
it experiences in dealing with the more calculable technical or commercial prob-
lems. Labour policy it/s quite willing, even eager, to leave to a personnel
department with the necessary expertise."
(Flanders 1975, p.62)
What Is striking about the discussion of human resource policy above is the range of new
policies adopted and secondly the contradictory feeling it would engender. In the final section of
this discussion on Bank policies we examine how the Bank planned to deal with this dichotomy.
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Conclusions
This chapter has sought to examine the development of a human resource strategy in the
Bank. We saw in Chapter Five that the changing competitive environment was crucial in changing
Bank policy towards its management of labour, with the crucial mediating force being provided by
the Chief Executive. While the Corporate Plan had little detailed consideration, this chapter has
shown how the appointment of a Human Resources Manager was to lead to wholesale re-
assessment of existing employment practices and the adoption of Human Resource
Management.
In terms of the actors central to the process of change, what is interesting is the way
many of the initiatives were formulated outside the main body of senior managers. This reflects a
number of factors: firstly that senior management did not have the time or expertise to deal with
these issues, which may of course, partially reflect the low priority allocated to personnel issues
which this new strategy was designed to overcome; secondly that if they had been Involved there
was a fear of obstruction and hence the Chief Executive threw his weight behind these initiatives;
thirdly that speed was crucial and the sooner the human resource strategy was hitched up to the
Corporate Plan the better.
What is striking concerning the developments and policy initiatives outlined in this chapter
Is the range of Initiatives and the scope of the changes involved. Some commentators have been
sceptical about the type of initiatives they have investigated, e.g.
"In the main the initiatives were piecemeal and not infrequently incoherent.
Moreover in many instances the changes, while familiar, had only a tenuous
connection with them."
(Storey 1987, p.5)
However, the case of the Bank does exhibit a more strategic approach. The question of
strategic fit' has been recognised as the crucial issues for Human Resource Management (Guest
1989, Miller 1989). The central theme which linked the business strategy to the new policy was
flexibility'. This relates to the necessity of managing in an environment of rapid change and
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uncertainty. Hence the organisation, and the staff must be able to respond in a rapid way to the
environment. This returns us to the movement towards being a more market driven environment.
As Streeck argues, flexibility requires a closer integration of industrial relations and industrial
strategy:
"Present industrial relations policies of employers can be interpreted as
attempts at dismantling institutional barriers that have served to insulate
industrial relations from concerns for, and changes in, economic performance."
(1987, p.2)
Flexibility has both quantitative and qualitative dimensions, and the latter is a particular
concern of the Bank relating to the assertion of managerial prerogative and the ability to manage
change. This of course immediately raises a question mark over the role of the union. This
chapter has brought out two key themes relating to the union: the first is the relatively little
attention which the union was given. This tends to support the view of Hickson and Mallory (1981,
p.59) observed that the scope of management choice in the making of strategic decisions
appeared to be affected more by prior "programming decisions of the decision makers
themselves by union power".
Second, this of course is not to say that the union would not be affected by the new
policies. The result of performance related pay and direct communication with the workforce for
instance would clearly entail a more limited role for the union.
Furthermore, one of the key themes to emerge from the chapter is the mix of policies
both favourable and unfavourable for employees. As Morris comments:
"There has consistently been a dichotomy in management policies stemming
from the efforts to control labour costs on the one hand and the desire to sustain
commitment and motivation on the other." (1986, p.12)
The above illustrates the problem facing the Bank as it attempts to achieve radical results
on both sides of the equation. Hence on the one side there Is redundancy, relocation, a new
disciplinary code and performance management which may lead to suspicion, uncertainty, fear
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and self-protection, with detrimental effects on morale at a time when the Bank Is attempting to
work on the other side of the equation to achieve greater commitment and identification with
corporate objectives. There is clearly a tension between the two. These types of problems have
characterised industrial relations in British industry in the early 1980s as it attempts to adjust to a
more competitive product market with a drive for greater efficiency (Batstone arid Goutlay 1986).
A senior manager argued that what the Bank was trying to achieve was both "logical and
sensible" and hence could be defended. Nevertheless it was acknowledged by the Personnel
Department that many moves would be unpopular with staff and that there was likely to be a
union reaction. Thus:
"We must be prepared for some conflict if we are to introduce the unpalatable
measures listed"
and the Bank would either have to
"achieve a satisfactory negotiated situation or be prepared to take on the union if
necessary."
(Employee Relations Strategy Paper, October 1987)
Of course the danger with forcing through change by asserting the right to manage is that
the loss of union good will may endanger the success of other initiatives.
A way out of the dichotomy is better communication and the creation of high trust
industrial relations (Fox 1966). A more open style of management could dispel the apprehensIon
many staff would have of what the change will mean for them. An industrial relations audit (never
completed) a year previously had raised questions over the Bank's communication policies and
practices. However, this was the brainchild of one manager, and when he left to take up a
position in another department the impetus was lost.
Team briefings were to be introduced to facilitate change. This is "a system of regular
meetings to pass on management information to all employees" (Industrial Society). It involves a
cascading of information down the organisatlon through a series of meetings at different levels at
which appropriate local information Is added to a core brief. Such a system would perform
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several functions: firstly it could increase commitment to and identification with the Bank by
greater understanding. Secondly it would reduce reliance on written forms; thirdly It would ensure
that all levels In the organisation were up to date. Fourthly It would reduce reliance on the grape-
vine, and finally it would reduce reliance on union channels and be a method by which
management could increase their authority. As in other sectors, an Increase in communication
and consultation has part of its purpose in being a union-by-passing (Purcell, 1985).
It is generally recognised that employee relations are essentially second order and
facilitative to business strategy. Employee relations does appear to be given more consideration
when It Is seen as an obstruction to corporate strategy, as for instance In the car Industry (Willman
and Winch, 1985). However, in a service sector where product differentiation is limited and the
organisatlon is becoming more market driven with greater focus on the customer, one might
suspect that a higher priority would be accorded to employee relations. The case of the Bank
lends support to both views. On the one hand the need for greater attention to the management
of staff was recognised and reflected in the appointment of a human resources manager. On the
other hand, the secondary nature of the strategy was also evident: there was no detailed
consideration at top management level, and while the Corporate Plan was formulated between
June arid October 1986, the human resources strategy was not developed until a year later, from
June 1987. The question which will have to be resolved in the next chapter is whether such a
relationship is sufficient for a tight degree of strategic fit. The next chapter will also be concerned
to examine how far the formal policy was Implemented.
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CHAPTER SEVEN: HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
POLICY AND PRACTICE
(a) Introduction
The previous chapter examined the origins and content of the Human Resource Strategy
adopted by the Bank. We have seen that there was wholesale change in the Bank's policies on
employment practice. This chapter takes the story forward from July 1987 when the H.R.M.
strategy was officially adopted to December 1988. We are concerned in this chapter with
examining the developments in the Bank in this period and how they relate to official policies
adopted. Thus the concerns in this period are not necessarily those for which the policy was
formulated. Hence the key policy areas we discussed in the previous chapter do not fall simply
into implementation categories In this chapter.
Indeed, since the 'strategy' was for a five year period this is not perhaps surprising.
Secondly Implementation may of course be Itself problematic, hence formulation and
Implementation do not fall Into neat bundled packages. Thirdly, if we consider strategy as a
process rather than an output, this too suggests a more cautious approach to evaluating
implementation.
This chapter takes the following form. Firstly we examine industrial relations between July
1987 and December 1988, Incorporating the changing industrial relations scene, focusing
particularly on the Bank's concern with head-count reduction, relocation and the status of
agreements with the union. Secondly, we examine pay strategy during this period, and the
balancing of strategic and opportunistic considerations, and then move on thirdly to discuss the
growing emphasis on the development of human resources. Fourthly, we examine the new
communications strategy. Fifthly, we look at the debate over the Introduction of a new style
agreement In the Bank between the Chief Executive and the Personnel Department. Sixthly we
assess the changing role of the union and the personnel function. Finally, we return to the debate
on Human Resource Management.
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(b) Industrial Relations
One of the themes emerging from our discussion of the formulation of the human
resource strategy was how this had to be developed within the framework set by the Bank's
owners, the CWS. It was noted how over time the Bank had gradually moved away from CWS's
terms and conditions and In the Remuneration Review had got agreement from the CWS to
introduce profit sharing and a new pension scheme, issues which had been on the agenda for a
number of years. However, what was not open to negotiation were the procedural agreements,
some of which dated back to 1938. This section examines the implications of this for the new
policies.
As part of the process of moving towards remuneration packages more in line with the
new market driven stance the Bank did achieve two Important successes. The Bank, after
negotiation with the union, revised part of the 1938 agreement (Appendix I of the Negotiation and
Consultation Procedure 1978) by removing the top strata of management (some 20 people) from
pay negotiations with the union. As we have noted in C5 the union was essentially concerned
wh terms and conditions of clerical workers, so this issue by itself was not contentious; however,
the union did have to be convinced that this was not part of a wider process of marginalising the
union. Thus the Bank partly re-assured the union by affirming that these managers would
nevertheless be 'encouraged' by the Bank to retain membership of the union. As part of these
negotiations agreement was also reached in principle over the introduction of performance
related pay for managers, which the national union had conceded to In 1988 after resolutions
against such practices the previous year.
A problem which had not been fully addressed in the initial policy formulation stages was
how to deal with the issue of the closed shop, where the Bank was caught between the CWS 1938
principle and recent Government legislation. The CWS negotiated with some 22 unions and this
was a sensitive issues for them, not one they wanted to be openly discussed. As the Head of
Personnel said, they "Instructed the Bank to play It low key".
Page 213
CHAPTER SEVEN	 HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT: POUCY & PRACTICE
This was of course the view strongly supported by the union. They argued that it was in
neither the interest of the Bank nor the union to be faced with the prospect of so called 'bounty
hunters' (opportunists inviting themselves to be sacked so as to claim compensation). Officially
the Bank followed this line, making it clear to prospective employees that they would be expected
to join the union in line with CWS policy. However It also became apparent that the Human
Resource Manager regarded this as highly unsatisfactory and he sought to test the resolve of the
union, by getting the Personnel Department to advise a new short term contract employee that he
would not be required to join the union. This was immediately challenged by the union as the
changing of CWS policy and the test case was dropped. Thus issue does Illustrate firstly, the
constraints which the Bank faced in attempting to develop a H.R.M. policy, where the union role is
an issue, secondly, the pushing against these boundaries and thirdly, how the union relied on
CWS support rather than that of its own membership.
However, a more important source of conflict lay in the Bank's attempt to cut costs, both
in terms of an overall long term objective to get the cost structure right and also In the short term
to get profit In line with the Corporate Plan. With labour costs comprising some 2/3 of the total
operating expenditure of the Bank, it was deemed necessary to reduce the head-count, mainly In
Head Office but also in the branch network.
The Head of Personnel was given the responsibility for achieving head-count reduction,
thus illustrating Hunt's point concerning the
"Dramatic shift In the personnel function from personnel resourcing to personnel
exitIng." (1984, p.17)
All methods short of compulsory redundancy were utilised: the contracts of temporary
staff were not renewed, staff aged 60 with 40 years service were given the opportunity to retire
and others identified who would take early retirement if a 'favourable' pension payment was
offered. Of the 500 staff originally Identified as the necessary reduction required, some 300 had
been identified as the number to be achieved with reductions in the branch network and Direct
Financial Services (DFS) by the middle of 1988 with the introduction of automated systems and
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natural wastage. However while over 100 staff had left by the end of 1987 (by non recruitment and
non replacement) it became apparent that the branches could not meet their target and
alternative methods were examined: for instance the removal of fewer higher paid people would
enable the Bank to make an equivalent saving. At the same time the Bank was assessing and
removing duplication of some specialist areas of Divisional Development and Financial Control
and would move people out of indirect functions to the branch network. Over the longer term a
model branch exercise was taking place to ensure full efficiency.
However, many of the manoeuvrings of the Bank came under fire from the union. The
major source of contention was the status and interpretation of the 1983 Job Security Agreement
discussed in Chapter 6. The dispute over the Manchester branch illustrates the problem. Against
the backdrop of head-count reduction there was organisational change, most notably the splitting
of branches into personal and corporate sectors. Organisation and Methods (0. and M.)
suggested that the branch run by 141 staff could be done by 123 because of duplication of work
etc.; there were also hints of downgrading. All this took place at a time when it was being
speculated that the Manchester complex (i.e. Head Office and the branch) would be reduced by
half from 300 to around 150 staff. There was, in the words of a local union official, a bad staff
reaction' and there were threats of Industrial action over this issue, which later died down.
Furthermore, the union regarded the issues as under the control of the Staffing Review
Committee, which had been established under the Job Security Agreement of 1983. However,
management argued that this related purely to redundancy rather than merely reorganisatlon and
redeployment, and It was not the Intention of the Bank to force people into redundancy. It
became apparent that the managers concerned, because they were not party to the agreement,
did not feel themselves bound by it; indeed one manager threatened to give notice to cancel the
agreement. The general feeling was that the agreement would be reviewed by the Bank and the
opportunity to do so could come as a result of the revised pension package, since a part of the
1983 agreement concerned pensions.
The approach to putting pressure on labour costs In this manner continued to be
Page 215
CHAPTER SEVEN	 HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT: POLICY & PRACTICE
debated. It Is apparent from many studies that this strategy may not be addressing the
fundamental problem - the Inadequate growth of the customer base. In their analysis of Austin
Rover, Williams et al (1985) argue that there was a misplaced emphasis on reforming labour
relations which distracted from more fundamental problems, notably product development and
capital utilisatlon.
In the Bank a similar argument took place. One group of managers argued that this type
of cost cutting exercise was a once and for all measure which would only hide the Bank's poor
performance for a short period of time. As in 1983 this did not represent a long term strategy.
Hence more attention should be concentrated on examining the position of the Bank, the
structure of its business and branch operations.
However, the Group Development Manager responsible for over-seeing this policy
disagreed with this analysis. The mistake In 1983 had not been the cost cutting exercise but the
manner of its implementation, with too many staff being 'lost' In the branches and a failure to
introduce tight control measures. Hence, cost cutting was crucial to the Bank's future and this
would take place with tight control measures. Furthermore, the problem of moving staff out from
Head Office to the branches would be facilitated by the Remuneration Review which was
expected to give greater emphasis to creating business. These moves had run Into intra-
organisational politics as Directors were reluctant to release their staff even when functions had
been devolved.
(c) Remuneration
In Chapter Six we saw that one of the central threads of the new H.R.M. strategy was a
wholesale revision of existing remuneration practices. In this section we examine the initiatives
which had begun, looking firstly at the Bank's pay strategy in some detail as the H.R.M. policies
began to come into force, and secondly at the broader remuneration package.
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(i) Pay Strategy
We have discussed briefly in Chapter Six the intense product and labour market
competition which led to the collapse of the national negotiating body, the Federation of London
Clearing Bank Employers (FLCBE) In July 1987. As each bank sought to attain pay policies in line
with their own enterprise objectives a new pay calendar arose.
Table 7.1: Pay Calendar 1988
January 1St
	 National Westminster Bank
February 1 St
	 Barclays Bank
April 1st	 Uoyds Bank,
Royal Bank of Scotland,
Bank of Scotland,
Yorkshire Bank
May 1st	 Trustee Savings Bank
June 1st	 Midland Bank,
Co-operative Bank
Hence this re-alignment of the pay calendar meant NatWest began the round in January
and It was not completed until June with the Midland and the Co-operative Banks. This very much
reflected the Bank's wish to be disassociated from the market leaders in terms of pay policy.
However, the development of a more enterprise-based policy was constrained by external labour
market factors. Thus claims of pessimistic commentators in the 1970s proved to be ill-founded,
and there had been an Increase in the number of people employed in the financial sector.
Secondly employment in banking was concentrated very much in the south-east where there was
becoming Increasing difficulties in recruiting staff.
The Bank, with several years poor profit behind it, wanted to operate a 'pay what we can
afford' principle. It was postulated at committee level to take a hard line: to meet the budget the
Bank could give just a 2.5% pay rise with no profit share scheme or annual salary review.
It was considered that the union would be unlikely to take significant action because of
the fear of redundancy, and would hence adopt an 'inconvenience' strategy. One senior manager
said that if the computer at the clearIng centre was stopped by industrial action the Bank would
save money! It was also regarded as vital that the Bank had Its new communications strategy in
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place before the 1988 pay round. In the lead up to the 1988 settlement a number of internal
papers stressed that the Bank had to cease following the major banks' policies. Barclays were
regarded as being 10% ahead and NatWest 20%. In 1987 the Bank had made a profit of 14.4
million after provision for sovereign debt (as compared with its budgeted profit level of 17m). At
the same time, however, it had substantially increased salaries and the London allowance.
Hence, while satisfactory progress was being made the Bank's salary bill remained out of balance
with profitability. Overhead costs in the Bank were 15.2% high while profit per head was
considerably lower - 3.5k in the Bank compared with Yorkshire Bank (17.5k) and the Big Four
(between 8 and 12k).
The Bank policy, as previously noted, was to move to a later settlement date and so have
the opportunity to review other bank's settlements and also the reaction of both the union and the
staff to the profit share offer. With regard to the former the claims in 1988 were round 12% (even
though profit share payments ranged from 5 to 12%). The actual pay settlements In the financial
sector ranged from 4.5% in the building societies to 7% in the banks (annual pay bill costs
together with improved benefit packages) showing little regard to inflation (RPI 3.5% in March).
The union claim was for an increase to salaries and scales of 350 plus 9% (equating to 12%
overall staff costs).
The Human Resources Committee agreed that it was necessary to show that the Bank
had to pay less than other clearing banks because of the difference in its profitability along with
the fact that possibly the skills in the fields in which it operated were not required to be the same
as the others. In any case higher settlements were seen as an indication of an aggressive policy
by the major banks, especially Natwest and Barclays, to recruit and retain.
There were a number of internal influences shaping the settlement. Firstly, there was
union pressure to increase the relative earnings of lower paid staff. Secondly, staff levels had
been reduced from 4304 to 4154 over the year. Thirdly, the Bank was attempting to introduce a
more performance oriented culture. Finally, there had been a change in personnel on both sides:
a new Chief Executive was taking office from October 1988 and a new union full time official from
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August. Hence while a long term pay deal (2 years as at Barclays) was considered. It was
decided that because of changed personnel and continuing changes on the remuneration front
that a normal one year settlement would be more appropriate.
The Bank In their negotiations pressed the point that the pay settlement had to be placed
In the context of an Improved pension scheme and a new profit sharing scheme (together with the
continued provision of the Christmas bonus and annual salary review) and the need to link pay
and profit; if a 'reasonable' settlement was not reached It was threatened that head-count
reductions would be necessary. The settlement was for one year from June 1st and comprised
125 plus 6% increases for clerical, data processing, assistant and appointed staff and 6% for
managers. Discussions also took place on the establishment of a separate bargaining unit for
managers and appointed staff.
We have discussed the background and process of the 1988 settlement in some detail so
as to illustrate the complex interaction of a range of factors In influencing the eventual settlement.
The Bank regarded the settlement as a clear sign of the success of their new H.R.M. policy.
Firstly, the settlement was reached speedily. Secondly, the Bank's new open pro-active
communications policy had been seen to deliver the goods. The day after the settlement a
terminal message was sent across the network and faxed to London and Skelmersdale (the big
labour centres). The Personnel newsletter was hand delivered to managers in Manchester and
staff were consequently briefed within 24 hours, and importantly before the union had been able
to give Its message. Hence management had taken the Initiative. Thirdly, there seemed to be
evidence that something of the arguments that the Bank had been trying to put across concerning
profit/head and the dangers of being priced out of the market had been taken and there was
positive feedback from the staff.
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(ii) The Remuneration Review
As discussed in Chapter Six a comprehensive review of policy and practice was being
undertaken in the remuneration area. There were a number of aims: firstly, to reflect
organisational change and remove outdated remuneration practices, as with salary differentials
because of personal job points; secondly, to safeguard the Bank from equal value claims and
grading issues; thirdly, to Integrate the Bank's salary structure into a single continuous evaluated
structure of 15 grades to ensure stability and cost control; and finally to move to performance
related remuneration to reinforce standards of performance, move away from automatic
increases, award key objectives and place a greater emphasis on line management contributions
rather than the central functions (the Hay system being criticised as putting too much emphasis
on 'know-how' rather than the responsibility for generating business).
Hence there were a number of processes taking place in the Bank. There was the Job
evaluation exercise for managers and appointed staff upon which trade unions were consulted,
and the clerical and technical scheme where the unions were involved in the design of the
scheme, up to the point where agreement was reached on the format of the grading structure.
Wh each job in every branch being highly individual, the task was a long one. The consultants
assisted the process so as to provide industrial comparisons.
The remuneration review took place separately from the pay round already discussed;
this enabled the Bank to set the scene for change and maintain the initiative. The Bank insisted
upon a separate bargaining unit for managers and then extended this to the whole management
group including assistant managers and branch administrators in order the keep the whole
management team together. By July 1988 senior managers had been removed altogether from
the negotiating sphere. The Bank also insisted on the freezing of salaries for staff whose jobs fell
above the grade boundaries, and no increases of salary for those operating below an acceptable
performance level. It was only then that the Bank would enter into negotiation on the composition
of the scheme Including salary ranges to apply to each grade.
The new structures were to come into place for January 1989, although the Bank wanted
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a 'cooling off' period for 2 months before appeals. The union's main interests, as we have noted,
were clerical workers and this explains a relatively trouble free negotiating of the structures, as it
was generally thought that clerical workers would do well out of the changes. Nevertheless it was
clear that the union was being marginalised to representation of clerical workers. There was
uncertainty over the managerial position as the new system of performance appraisal for
managers was to link the award to the Bank's performance over the year, so If there was a poor
profit year no increment would be awarded regardless of personal performance.
The background to the Introduction of a profit sharing scheme has already been
discussed in Chapter 6. Objections had been raised In ternis of principle (a clash with the
kleology of the movement) and impact - the extent to which an across-the-board scheme would
assist employee motivation. The Personnel Department persisted in their view that firstly the
market' demanded action on this and secondly that the scheme should be regarded as part of an
integrated remuneration package and not merely as another cash bonus. Eventually the Board
agreed to the principle of the scheme but there was continuing debate as to the form of a
scheme, the Board having to be convinced that the union would not accept a scheme which
exciuded the benefits of Increased capital. As the Personnel Department argued, the staff were
expected to achieve greater profitability from the increased capital (and shareholders Increased
dMdends and capital growth through higher retained profits). Furthermore, there was the matter
of keeping the Bank's side of the bargain with the union over extended opening hours, discussed
in the previous chapter.
The next stage was to assess the appropriate time to introduce the scheme. One
possibility would have been to use the scheme as a quid pro quo for a low settlement, but the
percentage settlement was regarded as too low for this. Hence the plan would be to introduce
the scheme well before the pay negotiations and aim to condition the staff to accept a
'reasonable' settlement for 1988.
The Group Development Manager responsible for much of the negotiation both with the
Board and the union said of the expected Impact of the scheme:
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"if that doesn't ctystallise their minds and make things easier for them to see
how to help customers, I don't know what will!"
Hence the contribution of profit sharing to greater motivation and commitment was
central to the whole scheme, yet not explicitly addressed but assumed. Yet there is little evidence
to suggest that the introduction of such a scheme would of Itself increase motivation and
commitment. The link has become something of a black box with alleged magic properties.
Thus, ambitious claims have been made by the Industrial Participation Association and the wider
Share Ownership Council and indeed In some prescriptive text books, e.g. Bell and Hanson
(1987). Furthermore, the example of John Lewis is often cited. However, empirical work sug-
gests a more cautious approach may be warranted. A Glasgow study (1987) reported that such
schemes have very limited impact on industrial relations and are very much more a feature of the
reward system rather than part of a programme for increased involvement.
Certainly it would seem that there is a danger in failing to address and thus activate 'the
black box' between the scheme and employee commitment. Why should staff link their
performance to an across the board payment? Information on the performance of the lndMdual,
his department and the Bank itself would appear a crucial part of this process. To some extent
team briefings and a more open management style would facilitate this. However, perhaps more
explicit attention to this could have been given. The danger is if such schemes become regarded
by staff solely as a response by the Bank to the market, and a long overdue one at that,
motivation effects will be dissipated.
Some writers, for instance Fox, have been particularly sceptical of the impact of such
schemes, believing they are inherently flawed:
"The belief persists, ... that to give employees an ownership stake in the
enterprise or a share in profits will arouse the desired spirit of involvement and
commitment. This is to offer increased participation, not In decision making, but
in the outcome of the organisational effort. There is no evidence, however, of
any lasting effect upon the employee whose job remains highly prescribed and
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subject to hierarchical control." (1985, p118)
(d) The Development of Human Resources
There was lkttle detailed consideration in the H.R.M. strategy of issues like career patterns,
recruitment, training etc. This related partly to little immediate attention being required, and
secondly, to uncertainty as to what was required. Hence It was not until after the H.R.M. strategy
had been adopted and was being implemented that attention was given to these issues.
In recent years, there had been an increasing belief that the development of human
resources is no longer a luxury to be achieved when other objectives have been met (Hayes and
Ford, 1986), but an essential part of the management of strategic change. Demographic change
has meant a diminishing number of school leavers from which to recruit; secondly, and
particularly relevant for the Bank, this relates to the service nature of the organisatlon and the shift
to become more market driven. For instance, of direct strategic importance is the Importance of
people in 'marketing' the bank. Since bank products are not significantly different, image is all
important and staff make a major contribution towards this.
As Irons points out,
"For instance, although between 80% and 100% of a service company's staff
have a direct impact on customers through contact of some kind, for the most
part they were recruited not for their customer contact skills, but for their
technical or administrative ability - for example, as a mechanic in a car-hire office
or a clerk In a travel agency. It is from these contacts that customers gain their
impression of an organisation and its offerings; marketing or sales specialists in
service industries, paradoxically, often have less direct contact with customers
than the great majority of staff.
Here, then, resides the critical consideration for service management -
marketing Is not simply the bridge to the customer which conventional
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management theory implies, but is a key part of a total staff's activity. Their
interaction with the customer is a crucial element in the 'product' or 'service
package' which the company is offering."
(1984, p.90)
Hence, the development of human resources was worthy of a higher priority. This was
reflected in the development of manpower planning. and a greater emphasis on management
development and training in a systematic and integrated manner. The Bank looked to become
more pro-active in this area rather than merely respond to problems. However, much depended
on a settled business strategy for the Bank and each division, so as to Identify staffing
requirements. Hence a manpower plan took time to develop given the state of flux in the Bank.
One area which needed examining was recruitment policy. Although officially the policy was for 4
'0' levels, in practice the Bank recruited largely 'A' level people. This caused difficulties in terms
of satisfying career aspirations and even the union agreed that there was a need to have a tiered
recruitment policy, and since it was the experienced staff who were leaving, greater pressure was
thus put onto Junior staff and the branch was in difficulty. Compounding these problems was the
policy of recruitment only for vacancies; the Bank was thus always reacting to manpower
difficulties rather than anticipating them.
The exception to the so-called 'A' level syndrome was recruitment for the clearing centre
and the Customer Services Bureau which were factory type environments where one manager
went so far as to say that 'bright people' were regarded as a 'nuisance' and 2 CSEs was the
normal requirement.
A third area to be looked at was that of the qualities and personalities of the staff
recruited. There was a move to look firstly to older, non mobile married women as 'workhorses'
and secondly to look more for customer relations skills and sales ability. For Instance It was said
by Personnel managers that the Diploma of Salesmanship was of more relevance than the l.O.B.
exams to many staff.
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These changes were reflected in the training function and management development
programmes. There was a trend in the former towards programmes stressing social skills and
customer service training and sales and marketing training, all designed to educate staff in the
new sales culture. Previously, the training emphasis had been on technical training and
supervisory skills for clerical appointed and junior management staff; the training also reflected a
trend in banking to train for greater productivity rather than preparation for future jobs (Mosson
1986). The Training Manager acknowledged that more was being done on the technical side to
satisfy managers and hence enable the training department to sell others programmes; but there
was 'grudging acceptance' of the changing world: "5 years ago personal skills programmes
would have been undreamt of. We have come a long way." There was also concern that staff
career profiles would change as the Bank's structure evolved. There would be an end to the all
purpose banker and specialisation for corporate or personal sides of the business would increase.
The aim was, however, to keep the Training Department in the role of consultants, with
responsibility for the training and development of staff resting with line managers (and indeed
indMdual members of staff for self-development). However, problems did arise in the attempt to
devolve responsibility. In the management deveiopment programme, the Training Department
came up with individually tailored plans and gave them to the line managers. It was thought more
in line with the philosophy to get the line managers themselves to come up with the plan, and also
to get ideas passed down by the line via the regional operating managers, but this was rejected
by the director concerned as not being within his responsibility. Hence the problem of getting
senior management committed in practice as well as in principle returns again.
Nevertheless, there was evidence of a more strategic approach. The Training Manager
became the Development and Resourcing manager with responsibility for recruitment,
management development and training. The previous position with a narrower role for 'training'
had led to Personnel moving staff without the knowledge of the training function.
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(e) Communications Strategy
We have seen in this chapter how the Bank was attempting to achieve goals both in
cutting labour costs and developing it as a resource. We also saw in Chapter 6 that the Bank had
realised that with so may different initiatives, and change and uncertainty being the order of the
day, something had to be done to address this need for information so as to obviate fear. We
examine the implementation of a new communications strategy to achieve this goal.
Morris, describing the Increase in competition in the banking sector, argues that:
"...there has been a more explicit effort to manage communications with staff.
This reflects a paradox in that, as the business environment becomes more
competitive the need for staff co-operation and commitment increases, yet
uncertainty is more likely as the old assumptions abo ut job security and career
progression are eroded. Communicating the need for change thus becomes
more important. It has involved new methods of direct communication and the
better co-ordination of existing mechanisms such as bank newspapers and
circulars. Management thus now give more thought to the purpose and content
of their communications mechanisms and have devoted extra resources to this."
(1986, p.59)
This was particularly relevant given the huge scale of change, both in organisatlon and in
employment practices. A paper by the Human Resources Manager emphasised that some of the
measures outlined may be 'unpalatable' (particularly head-count reduction and relocation) and
hence there needed to be a much more pro-active communications strategy. It was important
that this was in place before the 1988 pay round and before many new initiatives were undertaken.
The Human Resources Manager made this clear. If the Bank was to achieve their Human
Resource Strategy goals,
"It is essential that we communicate directly with our staff to ensure they are
made aware by the Bank of our position and Intentions, and not by any other
source. This is a major employee relations objective for achievement by the
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Bank to enable management to communicate directly the rationale for change,
thus ensuring that it is pro-active in managing the business.
We must develop mechanisms which ensure that communications are
simple, consistent and effective. The Bank must communicate to staff on a
regular basis, stating both good and bad news. Inconsistent or sporadic
communications are more harmful than no communications and must be
avoided at all costs. The Bank must not leave communications to BIFU. The
Union's role is to negotiate with the Bank on behalf of its members, not to act as
the channel for communication." (Employee Relations Strategy, October 1987)
The old system was largely based on a number of newsletters, Personnel newsline,
marketing news etc. and an Internal Bank magazine, It was largely left to the discretion of
managers, some of whom explained the contents of the newsletters, others merely leaving staff to
read it on the noticeboard. There were also managers meetings but information disseminated
here was not necessarily trickled down.
Under the new system DMsional directors would continue to hold management meetings
and publications would continue as well; in addition the Chief Executive would hold an annual
review of business performance and the future direction of the Bank for senior managers and all
branch managers.
The centre-piece of the new strategy was the introduction of teambriefing, described by
the Industrial Society as:
"A system of communication operated by line management. Its objective is to
ensure that Li employees know and understand what they and others in the
company are doing and why. It is a management information system. It is based
on the leader and his/her team getting together in a group for half an hour on a
regular basis to talk about things that are relevant to their work."
It has been used by a number of major firms, including British Airways, W.H. Smith and
Plessey. The Industrial Society stresses the advantages of increasing the sense of belonging,
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common purpose, better morale and greater understanding.
The briefing groups operated in the Bank by cascading information down the organisation
from the Chief Executive to Divisional Heads and then through the network. The Bank was
concerned to stress the necessity of a consistent message being passed across the organisatlon
so as to avoid confusion and rumour; secondly the personal face element was also important as
was the reinforcement effect on the position of line managers.
The Employee Relations Strategy paper stated that:
"Apart from the introduction of briefing groups, the Bank Is not recommending
any real change to our current structures, merely that it uses its current neM'ork
to enhance communication so that it can be seen that management is actually
communicating corporate objectives from the very top of the organisation whilst
allowing the opportunity for in put and feedback from al/levels of the
organisation."
To some extent the emphasis on communications reflected management views on
mutuality: the need to trust people and make them feel part of the organisation and to Increase
employee Involvement (In the broadest sense), all of which have significant business Implications.
The 'Excellence Studies' tell us (e.g. Goldsmith and Clutterbuck 1984) to create a more open and
visible style of management (Peters 1988).
As Glueck and Januch argue, "most people perform better if they know what is expected
of them and where the enterprise is going" (1984, p.13).
However, a key thrust of the proposals were aimed at providing an alternative to the union
to getting messages to staff. As Morris notes, one of the main reasons for emphasis on
communication is:
"the intent/on to maintain direct contact with staff rather than allow the unions to
mono polise the flow of information, as is perceived to have happened in
manufacturing Industiy and contributed to lower levels of trust."
(1986, p.70)
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One senior manager was concerned that there was no method of communicating with
staff prior to pay ballots and hence the union made the running. Team briefings were to achieve
this:
"opportunity should be taken by managers at the communication briefings to
ensure that staff had full information prior to any forthcoming ballots and try to
point them in the right direction when voting."
(Communications Strategy paper, February 1988)
However, there were a number of problems in implementation. Branch managers showed
some cynicism as to the alleged benefits of team briefing and many regarded it as yet another
flavour of the month dreamed up by Personnel. Some failed to see briefing in terms of ensuring
that the union would not be the main vehicle of communciation, or would even take the view that
he who communicates leads'. Thus the Personnel Department felt it important that the benefits
accruing to staff (including those negotiated with the union) should be announced by managers.
However, in a number of cases managers were content to let the office representative handle it,
perhaps in itself a reflection of branch managers' unitary perception of employment and/or lack of
awareness of personnel considerations. Secondly, there were practical problems relating to how
briefings were to be transmitted from head office to branches; thirdly, the mechanism for
feedback was regarded as being inadequate and hence team briefings were seen as merely
representing the 1 party line'.
Overall, the strategies adopted are consistent with the aims of those in other sectors, e.g.
manufacturing (Edwards 1987). Management are trying to increase the 'involvement' of
employees in the alms of the enterprise by persuading staff to accept the benefits of change
which are explained in terms of market logic. Hence it is endorsement of management policies
which are sought, not co-determination.
'The Personnel Department claimed that such schemes were part of the "move away from
the autocracy of Bullock style of employee involvement" to a more individual basis, but it is
difficult to see in the light of what we have discussed the scheme being a two way process, and
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indeed team briefing has been criticised for this. The clear aim of the scheme was to convince
staff of the Justification of Bank action: thus It was stressed that the early establishment of the
scheme was important:
"Thereby ensuring staff become used to the process before we undertake some
of the major human resource initiatives in mid 1988, e.g. remuneration review,
profit share, head-count reduction when all relate to the achievement of the
corporate plan."
Morris (1986) suggested that this increase in more direct communication did not lead to a
reduction in union consultation but was a parallel development. However, in the case of the Bank,
it would be true to say that while there was no reduction in issues over which the union consulted
the manner and meaning of such consultation did change over time.
In the next chapter we examine a new proposal which was not part of the original
Employee Relations Strategy but nevertheless became an issue over the summer of 1988: the
Introduction of a no strike deal, which raises questions over the role of the Chief Executive in
Human Resource Management.
(f) Human Resource Management, the Chief Executive and a no strike deal
The discussion over the Introduction of a no strike deal into the Bank (or new style
agreement in the ACAS terminology) is revealing in two areas of recent academic debate. Firstly
it sheds light on the recent debate over the significance of no strike deals. Roberts (1988) has
suggested they offer something of a way forward for industrial relations in the future. However,
Maclnnes (1987) argues that the management of industrial relations is strewn with equally
Impressive false dawns and dismisses them as a side issue. Secondly, it illustrates the role of the
CE. in the management of human resources and H.R.M. in particular.
The whole Issue of no strike deals has been the subject of great attention in the media
and in academic circles. They are generally regarded as beginning with the Toshiba agreement in
1981, and consisting of a package of six elements (Bassett 1986):
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1	 Single union agreement
2	 Single status
3	 Job flexibility
4	 Consultation, usually in the form of an Advisory Council
5	 A no-strike clause
6	 Pendulum arbitration.
Such agreements have mostly been signed on greenfield sites, typically with Japanese
companies In electronics or high tech areas, but have been spreading into other sectors, for
instance the car industry (Nissan) and the steel industry. While the number of agreements are few
and the number of workers covered remains small, there is evidence of greater significance that
this (Gregory 1986). They are of course highly controversial within the union movement,
associated with new realism and criticised as at best a gimmick and at worst a sell-out.
What is interesting about the case of the Bank is that all the interest in the agreement
stemmed not from the Personnel Department but from the incoming Chief Executive. His strong
promotion of a no strike deal originated less from a belief in its particular contribution to the
Industrial relations environment of the Bank than a concern that the Bank ought to be at the
forefront of the industry not only In innovative Ideas in banking but employee relations as well.
As one manager said, rather dryly:
"We were the first bank with free banking, now we will be the first with a no strike
deal."
It was largely as a response to Chief Executive pressure that the Personnel Department
produced a paper to clarify the issues and Identify the advantages and disadvantages of such
agreements (Table 7.2).
The main attraction was identified as being pendulum arbitration. This device by forcing
the arbitrator to choose between the last offer of the employer and the last claim of the union Is
alleged to prevent the practice of 'splitting the difference' and hence avoid unrealistic collective
bargaining positions as the parties become polarised because of their expectation of the
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Advantages
- No industrial disputes
- More moderate claims
- Single union body for
negotiations
- Job flexibility
- Better employee
relations climate
To Employer
To Trade	 - Full consultation!
Union	 involvement
- Single status terms
and conditions
- May force higher level
settlements
- Greater flexibility
improves training.
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arbitrator's behaviour - the so called "chilling effect" (Wood 1985). This either-or alternative has
been hailed as innovative, but in fact takes place in 25% of the cases handled by ACAS, especially
in rights disputes where there can be no difference splitting.
Table 7.2: Advantages and Disadvantages of New Style Agreements
Disadvantages
- Third party ultimate
decisions
- Full involvement on business
issues may not be welcome
- May be forced to higher
level settlements
- No recourse to industrial
action
- Changing traditional values
- Communications to members
(Paper on New Style Agreements, May 1988)
In many of these agreements, pendulum arbitration is linked to a no strike clause. Here
too, there are many misconceptions. Virtually all collective agreements contain peace obligations
in a sense a no strike clause, in that no constitutional industrial action can take place while the
grievance is in procedure. What distinguishes the so called no strike deal is that the procedure Is
inexhaustible, hence constitutional action cannot take place.
However, many agreements which contain pendulum arbitration clauses are not strict no
strike deals, in that reference to pendulum arbitration can take place by joint agreement only, for
instance Nissan. Secondly, the deals are by no means homogeneous, some having provision for
conciliation or mediation. Thirdly, however tight the agreement, unofficial action cannot be
prevented. Fourthly even agreements with explicit no strike clauses are not legally enforceable
unless expressly drafted.
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We now seek to put such agreements in the context of banking in general and the Bank in
particular.
It was recognised that the key factor in these agreements was for the employer, the no
strike element and for the union, the single representation clause (other factors being secondary).
However, the Personnel Department pointed out that there had been no major stoppage In the
Bank since 1973 and since the Bank operated a union membership agreement, the main
attraction to the union was absent. The national union had not made a definitive statement on the
subject although the General Secretary, Leif Mills, supported the principle of binding arbitration in
view of the significant improvement It had brought about: the 35 hour week In 1969 was achieved
as a result of a unilateral reference to binding arbitration (and against fierce clearing bank
opposition). In fact, the main clearing banks had Initially opposed unilateral reference to binding
arbitration and it was only after a strike in the TSB in 1963 and a strike in the clearing banks In
1967 that it was included In the procedural agreement.
However, the arguments in favour of this largely centred around the priority banks placed
on the avoidance of disputes (both for business reasons and to maintain a good relationship with
staff) especially in the context of widespread industrial action elsewhere in the economy. By the
1980s priorities had changed and the banks withdrew from the agreement with regard to unilateral
reference to binding arbitration In 1982, ostensibly because of 'abuse' of the system by the union.
There was a strong argument that with technical change and capital Intensification the
potential for disruptIon to the clearing banking system had Increased and that the process had
great value. However, thIs was outweighed by the bank's systematic attempt to reduce labour
costs and increase productivity. Furthermore, the union and staff associations were using the
procedure to overturn agreements reached by the banks and its rival. Thus, the risks of voluntary
settlement were consIdered worth bearing so as to regain the ability to argue over every Issue
again and hence to free matters trapped by arbitration (Morris 1985, 1986).
Nevertheless, returning to the case of the Bank, such agreements concerning unilateral
reference to arbitration were quite different from the proposed no strike deal In that In the former
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the union would retain the right of action if employers broke the procedural agreement or there
was a dispute on matters not covered by the list of negotiable items. The right for unilateral
reference to arbitration could be termed a no strike deal in the sense that disputes on negotiable
ftems could be referred to arbitration and that the result was binding.
Furthermore, the Bank's owners, the CWS, had to be considered. The CWS were
opposed to any such new style agreements. Partly this was because of protection of the 1938
Agreement, and also because the CWS had a multitude of unions to deal with who would find
such initiatives politically unacceptable. Thus, the Personnel Department told the Chief Executive
that while in principle the approach embodied in a new style agreement should lend itself to a co-
operative management style, it was far too early to think that the move to a more open style and
better consultation had achieved the type of industrial relations environment which was
appropriate for these agreements.
Moreover, given a number of current concerns of the Bank, namely restructuring, the
pressure to increase profits and the need to reduce overheads, the Personnel Department feared
that the Bank was in danger of abrogating the right to manage because such an agreement would
facilitate the union bringing in a third party which could delay or obstruct change. Given that the
Bank's terms and conditions remained behind the major clearers, despite recent improvements
there was concern at leaving what the Bank would have to use as an ability to pay argument in the
hands of a third party. In addition, Personnel were worried as to whether they could limit the remit
of pendulum arbitration to pay and conditions. For instance could they exclude organisatlonal
issues or would this, In the Department's own phrase, "be seen as demeaning to the union" and
lead to mistrust of the whole procedure.
As they saw It, the attractions were outweighed:
"The Bank would obviously gain from the no strike provision of the agreement
but is this worth 'neutering' itseff in all areas, particularly as there has been major
disruption in the Bank for so long"
(Paper on New Style Agreements, May 1988)
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For the union, two of the main attractions (apart from access to arbitration) single union
recognition and single status elements, already existed. The emphasis of the Personnel
Department was not to endanger other objectives by the introduction of such an agreement,
especially in the context of furious debate within the T.U.C. about the validity of such agreements
and given the Bank' relationship with the Trade Union Bank, Unity Trust. It might well be a bad
business decision a well as an Inappropriate employee relations initiative, it was cautioned.
We have looked at this Issues In some detail because of Its relevance to a number of
Issues. In particular it illustrates the dangers of Chief Executive over involvement with personnel
matters. While Chief Executive backing may be essential for major human resource initiatives the
question which this section raises Is how far is It appropriate for Involvement In policy areas.
Furthermore, the whole area of no strike deals is illuminated by this section, which suggests that
there can be a dangerous failure to contextualise such agreements which can perhaps too often
be seen as a quick-fix panacea.
(g) Changing Role of the Personnel Function
In Chapter 6 we noted the distinction made by Brewster et al (1981) between Instigators,
implementors and facilitators. To a large extent the Chief Executive can be regarded as the chief
instigator in so far as he identified the need for a new approach In the area of human resources.
However, he did not contribute a great deal to the content of the new policy. Formulation was
largely left In the hands of the new Human Resource Manager and also the Head of Group
Development who as we saw in the previous chapter had originally been given special
responsibility for this area early on in the tenure of the Chief Executive.
Such distinctions as those drawn by Brewster et al can be misleading. While the Head of
Human Resources and the Head of Group Development were clearly Instigators of particular
policies they would be implementors in a number of corporate personnel concerns, for Instance
profit sharing and Job evaluation, and were also facilitators in areas where line management had
been encouraged to take greater responsibility with the support of the Personnel Department. To
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a large extent these two indMduals also fit the role of "divergent innovators" (Legge 1977) In that
they were attempting to make changes which required the alteration of senior management
values. Hence the support of the Chief Executive was vital.
We saw in the previous chapter that part of the new policy was to change the personnel
role from administration and 'policing' of personnel practices to one which regarded Itself as
contributing to business performance.
Hence it was agreed that Personnel would only advise: line managers would be the prime
movers in any staff related action, although this would be
"taken in conjunction with the Personnel Department to ensure equitability and
consistency and not create adverse precedents"
(Personnel Paper, August 1988)
The attempt to devolve more responsibility to the line was surrounded by precedent,
guidelines and rules, shows a clear link with business strategy. As line managers are being given
greater responsibility (and being held accountable) the requirements are for a more rapid
response to the market as the organisatlon becomes driven by the market, rather than its own
organisational structure. The ability to control the labour resource is part and parcel of this and
the Bank supports the hypothesis of Purcell (1985) that as concern focuses on productIvity,
performance and communication attempts will be made to return personnel management to the
line (cf. Hunt 1984). In the Bank, personnel policies had been dealt with outside the line;
grievances and disciplinary matters would not be passed through the line from branch manager
all the way up to the responsible director, but would be dealt with sideways by Personnel.
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Figure 7.2
PERSONNEL
INSTIGATORS
Strategic planners	 Manpower resourcing
e.g.	 policy unit	 e.g.	 manpower costs
forward planning	 labour market analysis
linked to business issues	 union strategies
DECENTRAUSED	 CENTRAUSED
Facilitators	 Negotiators
e.g.	 internal consultancy	 e.g.	 day to day handling of Issues
counselling	 negotiations on pay/conditions
PERSONNEL
IMPLEMENTORS
The personnel role in industrial relations
Source: Brewster and Connock, 1985
Brewster and Connock (1985) argue that the personnel role is moving away from the
highly centralised Implementing function concerned with day to day considerations to a more
decentralised strategic role (see Figure 7.2). Hence there is a move from the bottom right hand
corner to the top left hand corner. This does seem to be borne out by the experience of the Bank.
However, one must be careful not to exaggerate this. Banks still remain highly centralised, and
the likelihood of pay negotiations for instance being devolved seems minimal.
There were a number of methods by which the Personnel Department attempted to
devolve responsibility. We have already noted that team briefings were thought to reinforce the
line role as the chief disseminator of information. Secondly, the new disciplinary code put
authority and accountability in the hands of the line (although initially Personnel would take a
slightly more active advisory role until the system was 'bedded In'). Thirdly, managers were given
accountability within their budget to replace staff. This was to encourage managers to develop
their own staff so as to be able to replace staff who left rather than leaving it to the Personnel
Department to provide the skilled replacements. As evidence of a more Integrated human
resource approach such policies were reinforced by a new performance appraisal system which
took greater account of human resources. Previously financial targets were paramount and in the
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words of the training manager,
Se/f they met financial targets managers weren't criticised even if the staff were
close to mutiny."
A series of programmes on human resource management were designed to reinforce this
priority.
However, many of the Initiatives met up with apathy, cynicism or obstruction. Changes In
the disciplinary code were regarded as cosmetic: as one manager said, "Personnel can't bring
itself to let hold of the reins".
On the other hand, the union expressed concern that this would be seen as a green light
to 'trigger happy' management and there was a large increase In the number of disciplinary
incidents after the Introduction of the new code.
There was also doubt as to the ability of managers to take this responsibility. It was rather
unfortunate, for Instance, that the branch administrator had responsibility as part of his job for
training when it was generally acknowledged that with branch administrator being a common post
for newly 'appointed' staff, the people holding the job were young, Inexperienced and lacking In
the personal skills required for the Job. Furthermore with the corporate/personal organlsatlonal
split and with a shortage of experienced corporate specialists, many managers were appointed on
technical grounds alone. There was also thought to be a cultural problem; the Bank was regarded
as having over the years 'carried' people. The old style co-operative manager (or 'bacon slicer' as
they were called in the Bank) were particulariy notorious for not dealing with problems that arose.
The newer banking people were regarded as more positive; hence a split personality existed
among the managers.
Finally, senior managers were something of a constraint, in that many were uninterested
in personnel matters. Many courses which the Personnel Department would have liked to start
with top management Involvement had to start with middle management. When asked If a
problem In Implementing personnel policies was the quick fix approach of top senior managers,
the resourcing managers said despairingly "If only senior management did have a quick fix
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approach!"
In so far as staff reflect the values of top management, this was a major cause for concern
(Brewster et al, 1981). One of the key complaints to come out of the courses being run was the
absence of top management. More direct difficulties also became apparent. One of the themes
in the Human Resource Management programmes was reflective of the new management style.
This was designed to discuss the relationship of staff with their managers, and in particular the
need for staff to question their boss in an informal and constructive manner. The course was aptly
entitled "How to Manage your Boss". However, it became apparent that it was unfortunate that
managers had not taken a course on how to be receptive to constructive criticism!
Storey, commenting on the difficulties in introducing Human Resource Management, is
undoubtedly right when he says that
"The ambivalence and op position of the existing line management gives some
clear indication of one source of difficulty in actually Implementing an H.R.M.
policy. In part, line managers don't believe it's for real. Others don't believe it
will last even if It currently is for real. Many don't believe it will work and some
simply don't want it to." (1987, p.17)
(h) Human Resource Management and the Union
During the process of our discussion of the Bank's Human Resource strategy in practice,
we have dealt only incidentally with the role of the union. In this section we look more broadly at
the union role in the process of change in the Bank.
We have noted both In the literature review and at the beginning of the previous chapter
the association of Human Resources Management with non unionism. This comes cleaily out of
the text by Beer et al (1983). Furthermore, Armstrong's 1988 handbook on H.R.M. does not
contain a chapter specifically on trade unions. However, the chapter entitled 'handling people
collectively' does contain a section on 'keeping unions out'. Where unions do exist the process of
H.R.M. is considered more difficult. Thus Storey (1987) has drawn attention to the dangers of
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'dualism' whereby Industrial relations practices and procedures exist side by side with H.R.M.
practices and procedures.
On one level of analysis the Bank would appear in great danger of dualism. A 'traditional'
industrial relations structure with a closed shop, several procedural agreements with the union to
provide joint regulation and a heritage rooted in the labour movement alongside a banking culture
stressing paternalism and unitarism - being moved along to a more market driven culture with
H.R.M. However, such an analysis can make too much of the cultural clashes. Thus in the Bank,
the closed shop is the product of history not strong collective feeling, and links with the heritage
have been increasingly loose, and more rhetorical than real. Hence, the obstruction to making
radical changes was more limited than one might think.
Nevertheless, while radical change could be achieved this is not to say that the union
could simply be steamrollered. Partly this related to the C.W.S. who while not being involved in
Bank personnel policy on day to day business, did exert pressure to ensure that agreements
which linked the Bank to the rest of the movement were not broken as in the case of the closed
shop. Perhaps even more Importantly, the scope and degree of change which the Bank was
attempting to achieve was deemed to require union co-operation rather than sullen acquiescence
of confrontation. In a world of second best, the attempt to reform the role of the union would sour
relationships and threaten other objectives.
However, the events described do show how the relationship was being re-shaped, albeit
in an incremental fashion. Top managers no longer had to belong to the union; other managers
had a separate bargaining unit; the process of job evaluation confined the union largely to
discussing derical workers. By devolving responsibility to the line, issues were removed from the
union head office function to the shopfloor where the unions were very weak. Team briefings
were partially designed to cut out the union monopoly on information. Furthermore, management
prerogative was being re-asserted, and on issues like job security the union Interpretation over
agreements was challenged. There was more information available, as in line with the more open
management style, and thus the union received outline copies of the Corporate Plan and
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information relating to business plans.
The Head of Personnel admitted that 3/4 of the communication was concerned with
passing information, rather than consultation, but maintained paradoxically that there was the "full
invoWement of the union". Of course the paradox could be explained by the view of the Bank on
the legitimate role of the union. The Head of Personnel said that by-passing took place on a daily
basis. It is not of course a new discovery that unions have little detailed information as to long
term strategy, and limited influence in strategic decision making. The re-shaping of the union was
also facilitated by the collapse of national bargaining which was conducive to enterprise unionism,
to which the banks are by nature of their closed culture quite susceptible.
Conclusions
This chapter has been concerned with examining the attempt by the Bank to move away
from the old personnel management style to an approach closer to H.R.M. We have looked at the
various policy initiatives and the problems involved. Furthermore, we have attempted to unravel
the practice of this new approach as opposed to the official policies examined in the previous
chapter.
Of course the definition of what H.R.M. involves is itself a matter of debate. As Guest
rightly points out it is a term "now widely used but very loosely defined" ( 1987, p.503). In the
conclusion, we suggest that H.R.M. Is best defined as an approach which embodies both
strategic integration and an emphasis on labour as a resource.
In the Bank we have seen much more than a re-titling of roles which Guest suggests
characterises much of the alleged H.R.M. adoption. We saw in Chapter 6 that many of the
policies officially embraced showed many of the characteristics of H.R.M., but were cautious In
our assessment, since the gap between policy and practice is often a large one. In this chapter
we have seen that a great deal of the new policy was in fact implemented over a relatively short
period.
Of course one interpretation could take the following line: that the Bank had such a poor
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record in personnel that much of what was being attempted was merely adopting better personnel
practices, and the disparity between the two was so large that it could appear that the move was a
much more radical H.R.M. approach. However, while It is true that some of what had taken place
did contain 'catching up' elements the scale of change, and even more importantly the qualitative
difference suggest that such a interpretation is to misunderstand the nature of the changes.
Pettigrew has said that
"PrsonneI seems to have little role in the shaping of revolutions. Rather it just
drifts with the human driftwood that appears out of revolutions."
(Reported in Financial Times 31.10.84)
This is contradicted by this case study. We have seen that the Chief Executive worked
closely with the human resources manager to achieve major change. We have also seen clear
links with business strategy in terms of creating a market driven performance oriented culture
and, for instance, in terms of the devolvement of responsibility to line managers. Of course it is
too early to evaluate the success of introducing H.R.M. Skinner (1 986) talks of needing a 7-10
year horizon for changes in the Human Resource area.
However, we can make an assessment of the problems in the short term which had to be
faced. What is striking about this chapter is the enormous amount of change taken place: some
agreements were modified with the union; managerial prerogative was re-established; there was
some success in cutting labour costs without causing disruption; a new pay strategy was
implemented; the new communications strategy was also bedded in and devolvement to line
management was also undertaken.
One of the themes of the previous chapter was the extent to which stated intent
(espoused policy) was reflected in practice (operational policy), for as Brewster et al (1981, p.6)
found,
"The espoused policies are themselves inconsistent ... may be no more than
pious aims or statements, breached with impunity and unrewarded where
followed."
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While we saw both greater attention being accorded to the management of staff and a
wholesale review of employment policies, one of the concerns was the extent to which this
retained priority over time, for long term commitment is essential to the development of human
resources, for as Rothwell pointed out,
"People cannot be acquired, shed or developed as quickly or as easily as other
assets." (1984, p.31)
Hence senior management must be responsible for driving change forward rather than
merely recognising the need for change. Official recognition and practical neglect is an all too
common experience with regard to management attitudes to human resources. We saw, for in-
stance, that senior management tended to regard developments in this area as a 'job for
personnel' and failed to relate it to their own actions. Furthermore, this partly related to a
misunderstanding of the human resource variable in Issues not explicitly personnel. As Legge
points out,
"...the personnel management considerations involved in production, marketing
and finance decisions were not so much overruled as went by default. In other
words, non- specialists, while formally recognising the importance of effectively
utilising human resources, lacking as they did the expertise to develop a
systematic view, what this entailed in terms of personnel strategies and action, j
ra ct/ce tended to underestimate the importance of the human resource
variables in decision-making on issues that were not explicitly 'personnel
management'. While in theory they recognised that the effective use of
manpower was of vital importance to their organisation, in practice the very
pervasiveness of manpower management meant that, being taken for granted, It
was neglected as a dimension to most problems under discussion and emerged
as an issue worthy of concentration only if a specifically 'manpower' crisis threat-
ened. Hence, although theoretically strategic to the organisation, personnel
management, even In its broadest sense, often was not perceived or treated as
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such."
(Legge 1977, p.37)
The union did not turn out to be a major obstacle to change. On some Issues they
proved difficult to persuade, for Instance the closed shop and Job security agreements, but neither
of these were major obstacles to the new Human Resource policies. We saw In the previous
chapter, of concern regarding the cost-resource dichotomy, the attempt to achieve major change
on both sides of the equation. In practice these difficulties did not prove Insurmountable. The
communications strategy seemed to do the trick of persuading staff of the logic and Inevitability of
management action. Furthermore there was little evidence of the fear factor which characterises
declining industries. The Bank was in an industry which had high profits, growth and relatively
good pay. Only on Issues such as job security as arose briefly with the Manchester branch, was
there strong enough feeling for the union to bring to bear on management. Undoubtedly also
there was a degree of "attitudinal structuring" (Walton and McKersie 1865) in the use of the
union.
More problematic was the attitude of line managers. The paradox of H.R.M. Is that it
raises the status of personnel but gives away responsibility (Guest 1988) and hence much
depends on the attitude of line managers:
"Although the personnel department may be responsible for the design of
various 'personnel' programmes or systems (e.g. Job evaluation, management
appraisal, wage and salary structure), their implementation must not only take
place within other management systems, but largely involve the managers of
those systems. Hence, the success or failure of a personnel programme, even
within its own terms, is often removed from the direct control of the personnel
specialists themselves." (Legge 1978, p.65)
Furthermore the link between top management and line management is a vital one. As
Brewster and RichbeIl put It,
"The real/sat/on of personnel policies demands an understanding of how
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policies are implemented within an organisation. It should not be assumed that
simply having a policy accepted at the formal level is the end of the exercise.
There is a need to see 'policy' from the point of view of the implementors -
frequently line and general managers - and to develop a deeper awareness of
the many pressures and demands that make the implementation of espoused
personnel policies difficult for them. Line managers do not decide to accept or
reject policies arbitrarily; rather, they are, most of the time, t,ying to conform With
the values and priorities of senior executives."
thus
"on an intuitive basis they establish an ordering of priorities for the various policy
demands which is based on their interpretation of top management values."
(Brewster and RichbeH 1984, p.35)
Hence it was necessary for policies to be consistently reinforced; If the Bank targeted
managers on financial objectives and performance appraisal reflects this and has nothing on
achievement of human resource objectives, managers would realise that the official policy was In
practice given far less priority. The Bank did attempt to tackle such difflcutles with revised
appraisal systems incorporating a broader range of objectives.
In the long term the key question would be the extent to which the management of human
resources retained Its priority. To a large extent human resources was seen as a problem to be
'fixed'. It Is open to question whether it would continue to receive the same attention and
resources over a longer period of time.
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CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSIONS
This Chapter seeks to discuss the findings and Implications of the thesis within the
broader context of the debate about management strategy and industrial relations, and In
particular about Human Resource Management (H.R.M.), drawing upon what Yin (1984) terms the
process of analytical generalisation.
Kochan et al. have examined the nature of 'strategic choice' and provide an example
whereby changes in the competitive environment lead to business decisions which "reverberate
through the organisation and its industrial relations system" (1983, p.13). Whilst such an
industrial relations response is clearly connected with business changes, Miller (1987) Is
undoubtedly right to question whether strategy in such circumstances Is an appropriate term. The
strategic management of human resources must be more than a mere knock-on effect: most
business decisions will have some effects on the management of labour, but such effects are not
necessarily strategic decisions. Thus Miller argues:
"if management manage their employees in ways which recognise their role in
strategy implementation it is behaving strategically." (1987, p.356).
For Miller operational linkages between the business strategy and the policy towards
employees are the key, or In his words, the "fit of H.R.M. with the strategic thrust of the
organisation". This is dearly an important point but Miller's definition of 'strategic H.R.M.' (which
for our discussion we shall term H.R.M. because we argue that H.R.M. itself embodies a strategic
approach) encompassing:
"those decisions and actions which concern the management of employees at
all levels in the business and which are directed towards creating and sustaining
competitive advantage" (p352)
while important in demanding that human resources be a corporate level concern has a
significant weakness because of Its concentration on linkages and neglect of content.
Page 249
CHAPTER EIGHT	 CONCLUSIONS
If we return to the work of Porter (1985), from which Miller borrows, we find that
competitive advantage can be achieved either through cost leadership or differentiation (the so-
called niche approach). Thus Miller's definition of H.R.M. would cover firms adopting either of
these two approaches, as long as there was a 'fit' of H.R.M. with the business policy followed. Yet
these two approaches are likely to embody very different strategies for the management of
employees, one being based on seeing employees as a commodity, a numbers approach' with
the emphasis on cost control while the other may emphasise differentiation by quality, with
employees as a resource to be developed and staff quality equated with product quality.
Thus we would argue that Miller's focus on operational linkages is an Inadequate
conceptualisatlon of H.R.M. His concern Is largely with linkages: the relationship of the
management of employees to the business strategy of the organisatlon; but this Is not sufficient
as a definition of H.R.M. A more useful approach perhaps would be to characterise H.R.M. as
entailing strategic integration (on which Miller and Guest (1987) both agree) and a 'positive'
approach to the management of employees with an emphasis on staff as a resource rather than a
cost. Thus strategic integration is a necessary but not sufficient component of H.R.M. The
emphasis on staff as a resource would be likely to embody policies designed to achieve the goals
Guest has identified as being Important, namely flexibility, quality and commitment, although
Guest himself appears to regard strategic integration as an outcome rather than a process.
However, an emphasis on staff as a resource without strategic integration is not H.R.M. either. For
instance, the many customer care programmes now running owe much to the fact that other
companies are doing them rather than relating to the business strategy of the organisation
concerned: In circumstances whereby such programmes become ends in themselves it is hard to
credit them with following H.R.M. In contrast, an accounting concept of labour may welt be
strategic in that It may be related to competitive advantage through cost leadership and as such
strategically integrated but this is not what H.R.M. is supposed to be about. Hence the latter
approach sees the importance of staff in a 'negative' sense of not hindering existing business
strategy as opposed to actively contributing towards it. Of course many companies would fit
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neither category in that the management of staff may not be considered a strategic Issue at all,
and not integrated Into the strategic planning process which Is the conclusion of recent research,
e.g. Marginson et al. (1988), nor considered as a resource.
Miller is also dismissive of companies whose decisions on labour matters are forced by
competitive pressures, arguing that this is not what H.R.M. Is about. However, It Is commonplace
in business literature that major changes In strategy are brought about by a re-assessment of the
company position as a result of external shocks, and Indeed we would argue that this is true with
the case of the Bank; what matters Is whether the policy towards employees is strategically
Integrated and the type of policies adopted. In banking in general, the end to the cartel and the
disillusionment with international lending has led to a refocus on the U.K. retail market where most
staff are employed. With fierce competition In the market, banks have shifted their emphasis away
from merely providing money transmission services to a broader focus on selling financial
services. This has required a change in organisatlonal structure to reflect market needs, and
wholesale cultural change with staff being trained to deal with customers and to increase business
rather than merely process paper, hence a cost to resource shift. Such product market changes
has led to the collapse of national bargaining which has facilitated greater enterprise control of
labour matters.
The positive/negative approach to labour matters Is an important distinction although one
of the themes we observed was a clash of priorities in the case of the Bank. However, this can be
explained In terms of a longer term shift towards H.R.M. at the same time as a clash in the short-
run with a concern with an imbalanced cost structure. In reality of course, companies will face
both cost and resource concerns but what we are concerned with Is the overall emphasis, with a
resource strategy based on commitment, training etc., differing from one emphasising cost
control.
While much of the industrial relations literature argues for strategic Integration and more
account to be taken of industrial relations varIables, the manner In which integration Is achieved is
rarely specified. For Instance Is it necessary for Board level consideration, and It so exactly how
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much attention should be paid: should the Board merely take account of such factors or actually
formulate labour strategy? The problem with much of the writing on this subject is It assumes that
business strategy, if not written on tablets of stone, is at least clear and coherent so that industrial
relations strategy can lock into this. However, if it is accepted that strategy is in fact "more
typically formed through a set of decisions being taken which might be considered more
operational in nature but which over time, in a piecemeal fashion, build up to form the strategy of
an organisation" (Johnson and Schoies 1984, p.25) the Implications for the management of staff
are by no means certain. This case study has illustrated the uncertainties about future strategic
direction within the Bank, something which the Corporate Plan did very little to settle, doing no
more than advance the notion that It should find itself a niche and not compete across all fronts;
but this general strategy was not translated at least in the early stages into specific objectives.
This Is not to say that operational linkages and strategic Integration are unnecessary, unimportant
or Impractical, but merely to call into question the exact nature of such factors and how policy on
labour matters can reasonably be expected to be made. We have noted in this case study, that in
the period under discussion the management of labour did not figure prominently In the
Corporate Plan. Yet we also noted that the C.E. had identified the area of human resources as one
which required special attention. This stemmed from an appreciation of the hitherto inadequate
personnel management In the Bank which needed to be 'got up to scratch'. There was no point
producing corporate plans unless the staff were committed, and hence there was a strategic link.
Yet despite this, It was not regarded as a topic suitable for detailed consideration during the
formulation of the Corporate Plan. Nevertheless, senior managers did agree with the C.E. and
acknowledge Its Importance, although they regarded it as the job of the yet to be appointed
human resources manager to formulate strategy in this area. Thus they did no more than point the
way forward in a number of general comments in terms of changing culture etc.
One InterpretatIon of such an approach was provided by an official of the Federation of
the London Clearing Bank Employers who said that unless there was a crisis:
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"Senior Bank management only look at staff related issues if the business is
going swimmingly and there is nothing else for them to do".
This is of course a fairly common view: personnel issues as a 'nice to do activity'. However this
does not appear to fit with our case study. It was not just a matter of avoidance or disinterest as In
the Winkler (1974) analysis. It was regarded as an important Issue and accepted that management
had to take an active approach to managing labour, and Indeed It was agreed that resources
would be put up to address these concerns, a significant sign of senior managers' commitment
given the context of cost cutting, belt-tightening and an uncertain competitive position. Such a
commitment came under strain as the cost-resource problem came to the fore but the
developments on the human resource side continued and no Initiatives were halted as a result of
such pressures.
Thus one of the themes of the thesis has been a combination of a greater priority to
labour matters, at the same time as being a downstream consideration, In so far that human
resources were not given much attention by the Board during the formulation of the Corporate
Plan and by top management, apart from the CE. who was very active In backing the Human
Resources manager. The question which arises is does it matter that human resources are treated
in this manner? A commonly expressed view Is that since businesses are in business to produce
profit, not good industrial relations, and to the extent that employee relations Is essentially
facilitative and not a 'stand alone' activity but must flow from corporate strategy, It is Inevitab'e
that they are Indeed second order. However, the discussion on much of this debate has been
rather unhelpful because of the assumption that it Is only first order strategies that are 'strategic',
and other concerns relate essentially to operational considerations and are non-strategic. This Is
misleading as It assumes strategIes are of one kind (partly stemming from the view that strategy
relates to product market issues) and matters are either strategic or non-strategic whereas in fact
It would be better to think of degrees of strategy. Overall, there is a lack of clarity in this area and a
confusion of terminology and concepts. It is clear for Instance that industrial relations Is
downstream from the overall corporate mission, be It a return on assets or profits through
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business decisions. The common argument posed above is undoubtedly correct: businesses are
not formed to create good industrial relations. However, this is rather unhelpful In examining the
relationship with labour issues. The well documented case of the car industry provides an
example of the importance of such issues in explaining commercial failure. What is being called
for Is that such matters should be considered within the overall business strategy of the
organisation rather than separate from it. In other words, industrial relations should not merely be
affected in a knock-on manner, but be located much further up In the business strategy process.
Again clarification is required here, because it is often left like that. What appears to be demanded
is integration at two levels: firstly at the level of implementation; at this level It is argued that since
much of the success of policy implementation depends on the effective management of human
resources, attention should be paid to this area. Secondly, it is argued that this is not adequate,
that human resources should actually be considered further up the planning process, so that
rather than just flowing from the business strategy, it should be a part of it, in that the human
resource dimension may constrain the type of business strategy adopted or provide
opportunities. Either or both of these approaches would be consistent with H.R.M. In other words,
the first approach suggests that the human resource strategy should be consistent with business
strategy and implementation should take account of human resource factors. The second
approach demands rather more: that human resource factors be considered not just in the
Implementation of policy but actually influence which business strategy is adopted something
which Purcell and Ahlstrand (1989) suggest is doubtful in most firms.
Our case study would appear to meet the requirements of the first rather than the second
approach. Nevertheless, there appeared to have been a number of reasons why such an
approach seems to have been a sensible one in retrospect. Given the competitive pressure and
uncertainty over the direction the Bank was to be taking, much of the debate over the Corporate
Plan and indeed after the Plan was focussed on the positioning of the Bank, a debate complicated
by a degree of 'politicking' among various senior managers. Hence, a lack of time and a lack of
expertise led to the formulation of the Human Resources Strategy being dealt with elsewhere. By
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keeping such issues to the Human Resources Manager (with the crucial backing of the C.E.) this
gave him a relatively clear run in drawing up a future strategy and kept it out of the 'arena of
conflict' at Board level thus enabling a greater coherence than might have otherwise been the
case. Moreover, while commentators are undoubtedly right to argue that when business decisions
like acquisitions, plant relocation and investment are made, there is a need to examine the human
resource dimension, in this case there were few of these sorts of issues. As Thurley & Wood point
out "many aspects of personnel policy and Industrial relations policy may be neutral In relation to
the precise business strategy followed" (1983, p.221). Thus many of the initiatives on the human
resource side related to as it were updating policies and practices to better and more efficient
methods and would be relevant whatever business strategy was adopted although this should not
be exaggerated.
Thus it should be reiterated that some of the initiatives had been on the agenda for some
time. A second dimension to the developing human resource policies had been pointed to in the
Corporate Plan: a qualitative shift to treating staff more as a resource with greater attention to
training, communication, reward structures and staff quality as a whole. A third dimension linked
to this developed as the business strategy came on-stream. As marketing strategies began to
focus on ideas of the Bank as an 'ethical bank' with 'customers who care' clearly this image had
to be projected by the staff who had contact with the customer, hence a greater focus on
customer contact skills and identification with the Bank. Moreover, if staff were expected to 'look
after' customers, management had to 'look after' staff.
One of the values of case study research is that it is able to illustrate how key actors are
crucial to change processes. The crucial role of the G.E. has been acknowledged (Guest, 1987)
and this case study bears that out, both in terms of the key actor who initiated change and also
the person who provided the necessary support to the man In charge of such changes, the
Human Resources Manager. But also highly significant was the relationship between the Human
Resources Manager and the Head of Personnel. Undoubtedly the good relationship was
facilitated by the fact the latter was due for retirement and did not therefore see the new man as a
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threat. Furthermore, the appointment of someone from outside the department was also vital In
that such a person began with credibility, being seen as an expert and In many ways performed
the role of an Internal consultant. For several reasons it was unlikely that an insider could have
performed the role. Firstly, the Personnel Department lacked strategic power partly because the
role of general managers in the Bank had inhibited specialist functions; linked to this was the fact
that 'labour' had not been seen as a problem so It had never attained a high priority; thirdly the
department, albeit partly as a result of the above two factors and partly because of perceived
inadequacies In what it did do, was a Cinderella department of little status. Hence it would be
unlikely even with C.E. backing that the department without a champion would have the clout to
make the necessary changes. So key changes in personnel were clearly Important In facilitating
change.
While emphasising the importance of key actors It should also be emphasised that
prospective changes In role of the Personnel Department were also crucial. Under the new
Human Resources Manager, the department was to become more integrated with strategic policy
and his role was to improve organisational efficiency rather than mediate between employees and
managers. This change reflected the philosophy of H.R.M. with It being very much a managerial
activity (Torrington and Hall, 1987). Clearly such an approach would appeal to senior
management especially when packaged effectively. Thus things were not just going to be done
better, but differently and H.R.M. offered more than a pumped up personnel management style
which had negative connotations.
In other words, H.R.M. could be utilised to 'sell' changed personnel policies in a way the
old function would be unlikely to be able to do. Although there has been a good deal of
scepticism about H.R.M. portrayed by academics who have been inclined to treat It as a fad, the
point should be made that management as a whole are susceptible to swallowing many 'flavour of
the months' from quality circles to 'excellence' to customer care programmes. Some fade as
quickly as they had gained prominence, others remain. We noted In the thesis how quickly the
appeal of the industrial relations audit had taken hold and then been discarded although admitted-
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Iy this was the brainchild of one manager and a Personnel manager (albeit a generalist) at that.
Nevertheless, even If H.R.M. is little more than a re-packaged personnel management it
may be used as a vehicle for personnel management to gain the corridors of power or at least the
ear of the C.E. Once Inside it at least provides personnel managers with an opportunity to make
such a transition a permanent one.
This brings us back to the nature of H.R.M. and the case of the Bank. The thesis has taken
the approach that while the theoretical debate continues, a useful way of analysing H.R.M. is by
examining companies which claim to be moving in that direction. For the Bank, embracing
concepts of H.R.M. signified a fundamental change in approach to the management of staff and
stemmed from a number of sources which we have noted. Such an approach we have argued is
In line with the approach of H.R.M. which we defined earlier In this chapter.
However, H.R.M. is said to comprise a number of themes including strategic integration, a
long term time span, a focus much broader than traditional industrial relations, an emphasis on
Individualism, a unitarist philosophy, a return to line management and a reduced role for unions
(Guest 1987, Storey 1988). We have observed something of all these themes in our case study
although the extent to which they meet the criteria is more debatable and depends on definitions.
Much change is relative to the sector and a matter of degree. Thus, while there was talk of
returning issues to line management these largely involved issues of grievance and discipline and
most issues remained centralised. There was certainly no likelihood of devolved pay bargaining,
and with Bank manuals setting out in detail, rights, responsibilities and procedures there are rela-
tively few important 'Industrial relations issues' at branch level. It is also important to note that on
their own these characteristics do not form H.R.M. For Instance, the fact that line management
take more responsibility for personnel matters may be part of a shift towards general management
and be where the personnel function becomes concerned with a broader range of Issues,
providing frameworks rather than getting involved in particular cases but It need not necessarily
do so. Moreover, this does not necessarily imply the treatment of employees as a resource. Thus,
many of these themes may be associated with H.R.M. rather than fundamental to it.
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Nevertheless, there does appear to be some reluctance to acknowledge the Impact of the
H.R.M. approach in companies in the U.K. Partly this may stem from the application of rigorous
criteria. However, it is relatively easy to point to cases where adjustments to industrial relations
strategies have taken place because of short-term financial pressures, or Initiatives appear less
than fully integrated into strategic planning but this is also true of other concerns, for Instance,
marketing which may suffer In the same way. Perhaps an examination of other business
disciplines and functions will enable researchers to locate the position of Personnel and how
distinctive Its status Is. In other words by saying that with H.R.M. "the management of people
becomes a key, if not the key element in the strategic planning of the business" (Slsson, 1989
p.31) are the standards rather too high? It is important to note that H.R.M. is used far more loosely
in the U.S.A. [see for instance Kochan et al. (1986)] and would not meet these stringent criteria.
Another problem with some of the scepticism of writers on H.R.M. is that because
traditional industrial relations research is focussed on manufacturing the analysis Is based in
terms of a transformation of that sector. Thus for instance, Storey poses the question: can
industrial relations be transformed from an adversarial, rule-based institution into a co-operative,
commitment-inducing process? (1987, p.9). Such an approach makes one more likely to dismiss
the relevance of H.R.M. However looking at a different sector, In our case banking, would not
entail such a dramatic transformation.
Moreover, H.R.M. reflects the changing concerns of management. In the 1970s, following
Donovan, management concentrated on formalisation of relations with unions and national issues
like Incomes policies which put Personnel into a position of entrenchment. In the 1980s, with the
changing balance of power, concerns had turned to efficiency and productivity which many felt
were best dealt with at line management level. With 'macho' management, the personnel function
has declined. However, H.R.M. represents an opportunity for personnel to Integrate disparate
functions and link organisatlonal needs to personnel policies. It also may offer the opportunity for
the consideration of the significance of employee relations issues not Just in the negative sense of
obstructing strategic change but for a positive contribution towards It. However, whilst It is
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generally recognised that external shock may be crucial in triggering off a reconsideration of
existing strategy this itself presents a paradox in that firms in competitive difficulty may not have
time, resources or goodwill to effect a change in relationship between management and
employees (Beer et al., 1985) yet companies with profits and the resources may not appreciate
the need to move to H.R.M. Hence one of the key concerns in the Bank in the managing of
change was the balancing of conflicting priorities of cost control and the development of
employee commitment. The attempt to cut labour costs certainly seemed to endanger the
opportunity to create high trust industrial relations with fear of redundancy and relocation,
working against the Bank's attempt to create greater employee commitment and Identification.
Yet trust is itself seen to be a pre-condition for successful change although trust is generally
accepted as being a very fragile concept (Purcell, 1981). In our case, the competitive pressure put
pressure on costs and hence clashed with the longer term H.R.M. emphasis. One school of
thought would regard crisis as a catalyst for a refashioned relationship, but it seems highly likely
that in such conditions there will be unilateral management action and although unions may co-
operate in the interests of survival, and change for instance in working practices may well be
achieved, it seems questionable whether attitudes will also change. In other words when
smoother waters are reached the relationship may return to its previous plane. It is interestIng to
note that Metcalf (1989) in discussing industrial relations in manufacturing since 1979 suggests
that the crises there, although leading to considerable improvements in productivity, was
achieved through fear and compliance rather than active co-operation.
This cost-resource Issue may be regarded as a particular problem for organisations which
are following an H.R.M. approach, but whose labour costs are a high proportion of total costs,
thus for instance banking. However, such organisations are not alone in facing these dichotomies:
labour costs may well be a low proportion of total Costs in some organisations, but in the short
term they may welt be most accessible to cost reduction, hence this balancing act is crucial.
Certainly the cost-resource issue may limit the realisation of the alleged benefits of H.R.M. in
terms of increased commitment. However, one must be careful not to exaggerate such
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tendencies in our case study. Firstly, the context of such changes was one in which management,
the union and staff enjoyed a good relationship with a high degree of trust compared with other
sectors. Secondly, although the pressures on costs were such that the Bank was prepared to
consider what they perceived were relativeI 'unpalatable' measures, matters never actually came
to that stage, and thus compulsory redundancy did not take place. One possibility in the future is
to divide the staff so as to apply a resource approach to one group of staff and a cost approach to
another group although this is likely to be more complex than previous male/female divisions.
One of the values of the Kochan et al. (1986) analysis is its explicit recognition of the
importance of management as the initiator of change as the spectre of union power fades, and
indeed the movement towards H.R.M. with its predominantly unitarist philosophy does call into
question the role of unions. Furthermore, it is general management rather than personnel
management who are regarded as the initiators of change, the latter being regarded as too
closely tied to established relationships with the unions.
In the case of the Bank we have observed the very dominant role of management and a
reflection of that is how little the union figures in this story. It is however interesting to note that it
was the new Human Resources manager who was less sympathetic to the union and wanted
changes while at senior management level, values and culture made them less willing to
countenance change. This led to the official role of the union never effectively being made clear.
Nevertheless, in practice developments clearly did have an impact despite all the agreements with
the union on union membership, new technology, job security and mobility.
While there was consultation on some of the H.R.M. initiatives, the unions had no major
say. Overall, there seemed to be the view that the Bank had to maintain flexibility and the right to
manage in the face of growing competition and uncertainty and could not therefore be enmeshed
in detailed negotiations over policy, although in terms of implementation, as in the case of Job
evaluation there was extensive union input. The union role was affected both directly and
indirectly by new management initiatives over human resources. Thus, the reduction in control
clerks and the questioning of the union membership were examples of the former while devolved
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responsibility to line management and the emphasis on performance related pay of the latter.
Nevertheless many of the initiatives were not made with the express purpose of avoiding or
controlling unions but was a by-product of a new emphasis on indMdualism, decentralisation, and
greater Identification with corporate objectives. Indeed, in many respects the changes in regard to
the role of the union were the least important element of the new strategy.
The question arises in the context of such managerial initiatives as to the union role and
rection to such developments. Clearly there appeared to have been a number of initiatives with
negative consequences for the union. However, one must be careful not to telescope change.
While the above is certainly true, the union was not aware of these policies as a coherent strategy
until they were implemented, and they were implemented in an incremental, piecemeal fashion,
with each initiative being presented in terms of commonsense, or a fact of life, so the union had to
respond to each individual initiative rather than challenge a formal strategy. Secondly some
policies were welcomed, e.g. profit sharing and in others, for instance, team briefing, the union
saw opportunities arising in terms of making staff more aware and more questioning of
management. Yet other changes were no more than official recognition of de facto limitations to
the union: for Instance on representation for senior management within the Bank. Finally, the high
membership of the union was more illusory as a reflection of union strength was more illusory
than real, and there was general apathy in relation to the union, which made any mobilisatlon of
members difficult. This was true particularly at branch level; especially when developments were
not seen as detrimental to staff as a whole and such developments appeared even more
incremental at this level. It is perhaps wise to draw a distinction between employees (or union
members) and the trade union. Furthermore, it is important to note that the union were careful not
to openly confront management, and when the union did challenge what they saw as
misinterpretation of the job security agreement, their first port of call was the Bank's owners, the
C.W.S.
However, one must be careful not to interpret developments in this sector In the light of
those in, for Instance, manufacturing and make too much of the exertion of the right to manage
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and unilateral managerial action: to a great extent banking had always been like this and what we
are seeing is a further move along a continuum rather than a fundamental change away from Joint
regulation. The future of the union in the Bank appears to be one where it is undeniably legitimate,
but limited In its role and the range of Issues it is involved In, and more concerned with indMdual
rather than collective issues.
The move towards H.R.M. has been seen as a move from control to commitment: the
attainment of active co-operation rather than mere compliance from employees; as greater
identification with corporate oblectives Is achieved. However, such a picture is far too simple and
not borne out by our case study. There Is no doubt that one of the aims of H.R.M. Is to release
employee commitment. However equally pertinent Is the extent to which:
"human resource management is genuinely concerned with creating a new
equal partnership between employer and employed, or are they really offering a
covert form of employee manipulation dressed up as mutuality" (Fowler, 1987,
p.3).
Hence it Is significant that H.R.M. was, particularly in the U.S.A., associated with non-union
companies.
Thus, the dichotomy between control and commitment is misleading since commitment
may in fact be a form of control. Management may well attempt to persuade workers of the
benefits of change and the force of market logic and encourage Identification with the company,
as we saw In the case of the Bank, but this is on management terms and is certainly no form of
co-determination. Hence more information is provided so as to facilitate acceptance of
management decisions. A more co-operative relationship may enable management to Increase its
control. Where much literature Is wrong, is in its assumption that an increase in managerial rights
must necessarily Involve an attack on union rights or workers. Management need both to control
their employees and to gain their active co-operation. The two are not alternatives. Hence what
H.R.M. seeks to do is to Introduce a system where active co-operation can be achieved for
Instance through team briefing and where Identification with the company is manifested through
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profit-sharing and other such schemes. However, all this is designed to be achieved within the
context of increased management prerogative and control. However, one must not confuse intent
and outcome and we noted for instance that the union felt briefing could raise issues about
management decisions.
What of the future? As Guest describes the H.R.M. ideal:
"there is a general proposition that if human resources can be integrated into
strategic plans, if human resources policies cohere, if line managers have
internalised the importance of human resources and this is reflected In their
behaviour and if employees identify with the company, then the company's
strategic plans are likely to be more successfully implemented. There will be a
greater willingness to accept change and fewer delays and barriers caused by
conflicting understandings and priorities" (1987, p.512).
Such is the aim but how is the Bank matching up to this? The simple answer is that It is too early
to say. In the long run one would have to examine not just the impact of business strategy on the
management of labour but the converse too and of course the evaluation of success is
problematic.
Implementation was of course mediated by a number of factors. One mentioned above
was the union, although as we have seen this did not prove to be a major obstruction. Other
factors were the scepticism of line managers as to the permanency of changes, and the belief of
many senior managers that human resources were the remit of the Personnel Department. This
explained the involvement of the C.E. to give impetus and weight to the Human Resource
Manager's policy initiatives. This is contrary to one of the themes of H.R.M. which is a general
manager's perspective, but reflects the reality of organisational life. Furthermore, the dangers of
over-involvement became apparent with the new C.E. and his embracing pendulum arbitration.
For Personnel to 'give away' the function to line management may be fraught with difficulties.
Nevertheless, In the long run senior management do hold the key. We have noted that
they did not spend time on detailed consideration of the subject but did acknowledge its
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importance and were prepared to commit resources. However, one danger may be that It will be
seen as a problem to be fixed and thus eventually downgraded. Secondly if management take a
position that such factors are Important but not for them Personnel Initiatives will be fragile. In time
it may turn to official recognition and practical neglect and this will permeate the organisation.
Thirdly, It Is necessary that the human resource factors are internalised, that every manager
becomes a personnel manager. Thus appraisal systems and policies must reflect this: It managers
are judged purely on financial criteria and staff on technical skills rather than the creation of
satisfied customers it will tend to negate official policy. There are grounds for optimism though: a
new C.E. gave an even higher priority to human resources, called for more money to be devoted
to training and took an interest in ideas of Total Quality Management which Implied a continuing
strategic role for Personnel.
In terms of future research, a number of key areas emerge which need to be developed.
Firstly, there is a need to raise and broaden the focus of traditional industrial relations beyond the
Gospel and Littler definition of Industrial relations:
"defined as covering management-union relations and the institution of
collective bargaining" (1983, p.17).
or Flanders "institutions of job regulation" (1975, p.86).
as such an approach almost totally excludes strategic issues and corporate strategy making. This
of course is not a new call but remains a relevant one. In our case study, adopting such an
approach would have led to neglecting a good proportion of the changes taking place in the
management of staff. With trends in the 1980s including falling unionisation, declining trade union
power and an emphasis on employees as individuals, this change of focus is even more crucial.
Whilst there is recognition of the importance of changing business strategy for the management
of labour, more research needs to examine what this means in practice, and In particular the
nature of strategic Integration. Key Issues arising from this study are top management attitudes to
labour and the extent to which they translate espoused policy to practice.
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Kochan et al. (1986) have called for research at both the levels above and below
collective bargaining. Moreover, it is Important to examine not just Industrial relations at different
levels but managerial behaviour more generally and the Ideas of H.R.M. may be helpful In this
regard because of its emphasis on a general managers perspective. As Timperley has argued:
"Many of the major decisions to be made in industrial relations and instanced
above, are themselves contingent on other higher levels, and context creating
decisions, which do not necessarily appear as industrial relations decisions at
all. ... Basically, there appear to be a number of major decisions areas In
organisations which are not, of themselves, concerned with industrial relations,
but which in outcome do quite clearly create a context within which industrial
relations decisions of a strategic nature are then made." (1980, p.14).
Such an approach Is likely to throw light on the labour process view of control of labour being the
central theme of strategy.
In our research we have found significant change taking place in terms of Bank strategies
concerning the management of staff yet the management-trade union structures have remained
largely Intact: the closed shop remains, the various agreements on job security, mobility and new
technology have also survived the review. But even this apparent continuity disguises the debate
conducted within the Bank on the utility of such arrangements. Furthermore, there was change
both In the form of new Institutions e.g. team briefing and profit sharing, and crucially In
outcomes. This raises the question of interpreting change through institutions. Put simply, are we
putting too much emphasis on continuity In Industrial relations because of a concentration on
institutions? As Bassett suggests on joint consultation:
"with weakened unions, and alternative methods of consulting or
communicating with their work-forces, together with a tougher managerial and
negotiating stance generally, managers clearly feel they can take consultative
committees, or leave them alone: where they are there, fine; where they are not -
that's fine too". (1987, p.285).
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Far more Important Is the context of behaviour in industrial relations and the outcome of the
processes. This may lead us to believe that some of the perceived difficulties with H.R.M., for
instance that of dualism, may be more apparent than real. As this study has Illustrated, a focus on
processes rather than institutions or techniques is far more illuminating In exploring change.
This leads us on to a second point about future research. There Is a need for H.R.M.
developments to be contextualised. Much of the H.R.M. literature Is heavily prescriptive and
assumes such an approach Is non-problematic; for instance it Is said that Personnel Issues should
be devolved to line managers. Yet we noted that some branch managers appeared unaware of
the industrial relations implications of their activities, much of the industrial relations literature is
unable to address the dynamics of change because of its basis on surveys, and there remains an
over concentration on manufacturing which limits the validity of generalisations relevant to other
sectors. Thus, many of the dichotomies posed would not be seen In the same clear-cut way In
financial services characterised by unitarist Ideas and weak unions.
The key Issues to be explored are, why are H.R.M. initiatives being undertaken, what Is
the specific context of such InitiatIves, who are the key movers and what are the problems
encountered? This also has implications for methodology. As Timperley has observed:
"traditionally, the approach within organisations has been to look at industrial
relations questions from the 'bottom up perhaps a 'top down' approach using a
Ion get time-dimension to study the process of decision-making, and following
through those decisions over time, observing both their effects, and the
feedback into subsequent decisions would be more than beneficial". (1980,
p.14)
Our case study has shed light on some of these issues but more cases are needed to aid
generalisation. Thus In the case of the Bank we saw that although managers developed the
Corporate Plan without detailed consideration of human resources this was not damaging.
However, other organlsatlons following a similar approach but with changes In strategy
concerning plant relocation or significant expansion may well suffer deleterious consequences
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because of its failure to take account of human resource variables, more research needs to
explore the conditions under which such considerations are crucial. Furthermore, although our
research has taken a longitudinal approach, there is a need for a much longer time span, so that
one can assess the impact of H.R.M. on the organisation, its perceived contribution to business
performance, the changing role of the union, how far it maintains a high priority in the
organisation, and the attitude of staff to these changes. Certainly a key issue is the extent to which
these changes, which we have argued do form a coherent H.R.M. approach, impact on the shop-
floor and line managers there, and how they perceive and react to these changes.
Thirdly, the area of financial services remains relatively unexplored, yet may have much to
offer in terms of explaining continuity and change in industrial relations and in terms of H.R.M.
developments. As an industry which historically has been relatively successful with a stable
product market, steady growth and high profits, and with employee relations dominated by a
paternalistic system which has facilitated change, and yet is now under fierce competitive
pressure It offers an opportunity to examine the process by which environmental shock is
translated into business strategy change and to changes In industrial relations. Furthermore, while
it has been argued that the management of staff was Important because it enabled change to take
place, staff were not seen as a means to increase business. However, in the 1980s as banks
become more like retailing organisations and in the jargon market-driven there is far greater
concern with regarding staff as a resource and developments may be in the direction of H.R.M.
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1.	 INTRODUCTION
1.1.0. Summary of the Plan
1.1.1. The Plan has the primaly objective of achieving a rapid growth in the Bank's
customer base, which is seen as essential to its long-term survival and the full
and profitable exploitation of its resources and infrastructure.
1.1.2. Following a detailed study by the profit divisions of their prospective markets
and competitive strengths and weaknesses, it is proposed to focus the Bank's
efforts on developing the following market sectors:-
- a "core" personal customer aged 20/45,60% female, 40% male, in middle-
range employment, in socio- economic groups B, Cl and C2, and socially
aware;
- a limited group of non-personal customers, namely the Co-operative
Movement, Local Authorities, small to medium- sized businesses, large
corporate customers (transmission business only), and new Co-opera-
tives and employee-owned, and possibly mutual, concerns.
1.1.3. Our attack on these markets will be characterised by a convenient and
customer friendly network of outlets and services, and in particular by:-
- a network of Regional Branches, (largely now in place) around which will
be clustered:-
- In-Store Banking points derived from the existing agency network, but
with a significantly enhanced bank involvement in the larger stores;
- a new network of small High Street Shopping Centre outlets;
- ATMs, VISA and other shared electronic networks, including EFTPOS
terminals, with back-office work being increasingly moved away from the
customer access points.
- point of sale credit services, with accelerated acceptance/rejection pro-
cedures, direct from the Retailer's point of sale;
- a "direct" transmission service for larger corporate customers which
by-passes the branch network.
1.1.4. On the above basis - and on the assumptions set out in the Plan - the intention
is to grow the Bank during the planning period so as to achieve the following
results. (see further in Section 5):-
1985
Actual £M
74
39
113
15*
98
85
13
1,250
66
1990
Target £M
128
86
214
22
192
155
38
2,210
120
Net Interest Income
Commission Receivable
1988
tbjective £M
100
61
Total Footings
Shareholders Funds
Overheads
Bad Debts
Net Profit
-
161
16
-
145
122
23
1,630
90
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* Includes exceptional bad debts of 3.25M.
The achievement of these results by 1990 would involve growth rates (over
1985 levels) of 192% in profits, 77% in assets and 82% in shareholders funds.
1.1.5. Attainment of these profit objectives in the envisaged competitive environ-
ment will be a major achievement, but the Bank will nonetheless continue
to remain small and potentially vulnerable in the market.
Accordingly, either accelerated growth or a substantial acquisition or merger
must be seriously considered. The criteria which any acquisition or merger
must meet and the question of size and other related issues is considered
more fully in the Appendix.
Additionally, minor acquisitions may be put forward from time to time to
strengthen perceived weaknesses in the operating management, or the
Group's ability to service its chosen focus areas.
1.1.6. The Plan assumes that the Bank will grow upon its existing resource base,
and without any injection of capital. Given however, its performance - both
in real and comparative terms - since 1982, the possible breaching of our
Bank of England guidelines on prudential ratios in later years (see Section 5
- Financial Objectives) and that the targets now set are seen as realistic and
achievable, the case for additional investment in the Bank is considered to
be strong, and is developed in the Appendix.
In this context the Bank is currently earning 19% on its existing capital base,
and a return of the order of 25% to 30% would be expected from any
substantial new investment.
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1.2.0. Key Issues
In no particular order of priority these are seen as follows:-
- the future relationship with Retail Societies;
- the need to establish effective means of cross- selling products and
services, both within the Bank and throughout the Co-operative Move-
ment.
- the general consequences of a change in the culture of the Bank towards
a sales/performance orientation, with particular reference to the likely
need to provide salary, etc, incentives and possibly profit participation
based on results, and the effects elsewhere in the Movement;
- the future performance of the units now constituting Direct Financial
Services;
- the relationship with Unity Trust;
- the ability of the Bank to adapt to and take advantage of the "plastic
revolution" now in train;
- the size of the Bank and the need for an acquisition/merger;
- the need for additional capital to support any agreed acquisition/merger,
and the maimer in which and from whom it is obtained;
- the possible need to adopt a more positive attitude towards the support
of new co-operatives and other small businesses and mutually and/or
employee owned organisations.
These issues are likely to remain important throughout the planning period,
and certain of them may well dictate changes to our present plans.
In addition of course, further changes will be necessary to reflect moves in
the market place, and the current thinking on it and the banking environ-
ment.
1.3.0. Immediate Issues
1.3.1. Work on the Plan to date has stressed the need to move quickly in terms of
the distribution network. Acceptance of the strategies, particularly the net-
work proposals, will call for additional capital expenditure of 1M and
revenue of O.5M in 1986, over and above budget. Accordingly, an expenditure
request justifying these additional requirements will be submitted following
approval in principle to the Plan. Accelerated development would of course
require additional capital expenditure at an early date, and probably extra
capital to support it.
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1.3.2. In the light of the business strategies to be followed, it will be necessary to
review the organisational structure of the Bank Group to ensure the effective
achievement of its financial and market objectives. In this respect recom-
mendations will be submitted later in the year.
2.	 THE BASIC BUSINESS STRATEGY
2.1.1. The basic business strategy of the Bank must take into account:-
- its broad purpose, as set out in the Purpose Statement in Section 3;
- the business environment in which it operates, discussed in Section 4; and
- the fact that, as a U.K. Clearing Bank it must provide a wide range of
banking services, a broadly based and relatively risk free loan portfolio
and an effective infrastructure.
It must also take into account the size of the resources available to it, both
in absolute terms and vis-a-vis its competitors.
The Bank's strategies assume the ongoing and enthusiastic support of the
Movement; if there should be any significant change in this regard, it has
major implications for the future.
2.1.2 A number of alternative strategies were considered and it was decided that,
given the required spread of markets and customers and the need for
flexibility in our approach to them, it would not be appropriate to adopt a
single approach to all markets and all sections of the business. Accordingly,
we have decided to adopt a strategy which will enable the Bank to secure a
sustainable competitive advantage through:-
- focusing on the needs of a number of target market segments; and
- providing differentiated (i.e. distinctive) approaches to these target mar-
kets.
The distinctive characteristic of our approach to the target markets is seen
principally in the means of distribution, rather than in the products offered,
although these will of course be updated and refined from time to time.
The reason for this is that the Bank's existing means of distribution are
already distinctive and well advanced technically, whilst new products for the
financial market can and are being copied with increasing ease and fre-
quency.
2.1.3. It does of course follow from this strategy that substantial sectors of the
market will be ignored, and indeed this is essential for success in the chosen
sectors; on this basis we have decided not to become deeply involved in a
number of important areas such as:-
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- investment banking, including significant participation in the securities
market;
- international banking, other than to the extent required to support and
encourage domestic and corporate customers or to secure the Bank's
funding base;
- those aspects of personal banking (sometimes called "private banking")
that cover asset management and the provision of personalised services
to individual customers;
- factoring;
- the provision of corporate financial advice.
For the time being we have avoided becoming directly involved in estate
agency, legal conveyancing or travel, although these are certainly areas of
possible diversification.
These excluded activities will however be reviewed from time to time.
3.	 The Purpose Statement
The purpose of the Bank Group is:-
To support the objectives of the Co-operative Movement by providing
value-for-money banking and related services to personal and business
customers at a profit.
To fulfil this purpose the Group needs to:-
- make sufficient profits to maintain an effective infrastructure provide for
growth and pay an adequate return on capital;
- project a distinct and appealing identity to existing and potential custo-
mers and provide a high standard of customer service;
- be receptive in its approach to technology and maintain efficient opera-
ting systems;
- act as a caring and understanding employer, and ensure an active dialogue
between staff at all levels;
- operate within all relevant legislative and regulatory requirements;
- adopt responsible and socially conscious attitudes which are fully consist-
ent with those of the Co-operative Movements as a whole.
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11.	 Strategic Support Issues
11.1.0. Introduction
The operational implications of the Business Plans of the Profit Divisions
have been identified and included in the overhead costs. It is not appropriate
to detail, in the Corporate Plan, tactical issues and the short and medium-
term operational plans necessary to ensure that Business Plan objectives are
achieved. It is, however, necessary to outline the major, long- term changes
emerging in the two main support areas namely:-
- Personnel;
- Management Services.
11.2.0. Personnel
Over the next five years the Bank will need to change its approach to
Personnel Management both for a variety of the reasons which were touched
on in the Banking Environment Section, and also as a consequence of the
Divisional Business Plans.
It will be strategically important over the planning period to ensure the
Bank:-
- is correctly structured to meet the demands placed on staff;
- can operate with maximum flexibility whilst ensuring the requisite stand-
ards are not relaxed, or agreed structures compromised;
- operates with maximum efficiency on optimum members of staff.
This will involve the following:-
11.2.1. Changing Culture
As indicated earlier, the needs of the personal and non-personal customer
markets are beginning to diverge from each other, and also from the require-
ments of the technical and operational support areas. As a consequence, the
staffing needs of each section of the business will also come to differ, with
increasing emphasis being placed on performance and - in some areas but
not others - selling rather than technical skills.
In corrmion with others in the industry, the Bank has traditionally recruited
and trained for a single career structure, with a strong technical (or profes-
sional) bias. However, in the changed circumstances not only the recruitment
and training, but the whole "culture" of the Bank will have to change radically.
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In this context it should be clearly appreciated that equality of servic& is
judged largely by the efficient performance of their respective tasks by thejff of the Bank and accordingly we must ensure that the staff are properly
trained and that their jobs are seen by them as worthwhile and thus worth
doing.
The changes will take years to complete, but will be initiated in 1986 by
important moves in the following areas:-
- longer opening hours in branches;
- increasing use of part-time staff and roster systems;
- improved staff communication (upward and downward);
- revised training techniques and management development;
- revised pension provision.
Thereafter, we can expect significant changes in payment patterns (incentive
bonuses, profit participation), working conditions and career expectations.
11.2.2. Technology and Working Practices
The Bank's continued investment in technology and the requirement for
weekend working and extended opening hours, will also have a major impact
on working practices. Although staff have adapted successfully to the consid-
erable changes in working practices over the past five years, the next five
years are likely to see an accelerated level of change, and management and
staff flexibility will be a key requirement.
At present, changes in reward practice, technology, staff levels, and working
practices, are governed by a variety of Union Agreements, the most signifi-
cant of which are the:-
i) Negotiating Agreement;
ii) Job Security Agreement;
iii) Mobility Agreement;
iv) New Technology Agreement.
The above give the Union total involvement in all areas affecting staff, and
the Bank is required to discuss shortly after the concept stage, its future
strategic and operational plans. The current Agreements are onerous, but
they seek nothing a responsible employer would not wish to discuss with the
staff concerned, and thereby obtain the necessary commitment.
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11.2.3. Manpower Planning and Recruitment
In the seventies and early eighties the Bank grew at a rapid rate and this
placed considerable strain on staff resources, and the available number of
trained Personnel at first appointed level. For example from 1972 to 1976 an
increase in staff of 736 was seen and from 1977 to 1981 a rise of 938 was
required.
The Divisions have estimated that in order to staff the proposed new outlets
and provide the necessary support, coupled with generally over the next five
years, we will need to increase the present 3,718 Full-Time Equivalent staff
(F.T.E.'s) to 4,740 by 1988, with a projection of 5,050 by 1990. However,
planned further automation and improvements to working practices are
estimated to provide staff savings of 460 over the period to 1990.
Obviously, we will seek to achieve productivity improvements etc., to obtain
higher savings, but the present figures are the best currently available for
plarming purposes, and on this basis we shall require an average of 4,300
F.T.E. staff by 1988 and 4,600 F.T.E.s in 1990, increases as against 1985
F.T.E.s of 16% and 25% respectively.
The greatest challenge however, will not be the increase in staff numbers,
which will have to be justified by increased profits from the new outlets and
investment, but to manage the shift in emphasis to a sales and service culture,
with tiered recruitment and career development, and a much heavier invest-
ment in training.
11.2.4. Reward/Performance Structure
This will need to alter, and although Hay/MSL is ideal for the mixed staffing
and performance skills we need, the current system has not changed substan-
tially for 10 years. Accordingly the system is under review in conjunction with
Hay/MSL and the results will be known late this year.
11.3.0. Management Services
11.3.1 During the planning period, financial institutions (those existing and new
ones e.g. retailers) will:-
- gather more information about customers and offer a greater variety of
products and services to existing and potential customers;
- market more heavily by means of direct mail, make available the infor-
mation which they hold to the support staff in the company for customer
service and sales;
- make directly available services and information, at times and places
convenient to the customer.
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11.4.0. The overall impact of the above on Management Services may be considered
under the following headings:-
11.4.1. Access to Systems
The trend of the last few years to on-line systems will continue, and the
services and information thereby provided will be required by customers and
staff, with easy, secure access. The peak demands made on the systems will
profile the working patterns of staff, and the service demands of customers.
The volumes of data being processed will utilise the off-peak capacity.
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1.	 Introduction: The Planning Process
1.1. The revision of the original Corporate Plan and related research underlined
the fact that the Banking Group is, and will continue to operate in a dynamic
and fiercely competitive environment. In these circumstances there can
never be a realistic and viable total 'Corporate Plan' available for discussion
at any one moment in time which has embraced every aspect of the Group's
existing and potential business, all potential competitor strategies, line man-
agement experience, staff attitudes and shareholder expectations. If it was
ever theoretically possible the "plan" would be out of date before it was
circulated.
1.2. This view of the planning process is now generally accepted in the more
dynamic, entrepreneurial companies and by the academic business world
with the result that the fashionable corporate planners of the 60's and 70's
have given way to the process of 'strategic management' which embraces all
management. This change in emphasis from the theoretical end product i.e.
the Corporate Plan, to the process of continually thinking strategically at all
levels of management has also resolved the question as to whether planning
is, or should be, a top-down or bottom-up exercise. It is of course both, with
the Board and senior executive expressing with clarity and consistency the
strategic objectives and assumptions as to resources available and timescales
within which to achieve those objectives, supplemented by experienced and
successful line management feeding upwards the commercial realities within
which they are operating on a day-to-day basis. It is in the inter-play between
these two forces that strategic options can be identified and resolved within
the framework of the ultimate objective as determined by the Board.
1.3. This paper "Strategic Planning 1989/9 1" is only therefore the first of many
such papers, albeit crucial to the future since it sets out the process by which
the Board will be invited at frequent intervals to study in depth one or other
part of the business of the banking group. This process will allow for a deeper
and wider consideration of each strategic issue and provide a monitoring
process to ensure that strategic decisions once made are visited at frequent
intervals to reconsider whether the original decision and the assumptions
upon which it was made remain appropriate and generate a satisfactory
return. This approach is the antithesis of a culture which develops 'tablets of
stone' or 'sacred cows' and recognises that a successful business must con-
tinually evolve, adapt and amend in relation to the economy and society
within which it desires to continue to profitably exist.
By the same token a series of papers which tease out the strategic issues
related to one or other part of the business provides an opportunity for lay
directors to participate, to become pro-active rather than simply re-active to
conclusions tabled by the executive. The world of banking from the Central
Bank down to the smallest Bank has evolved and continues to evolve a
sophisticated supervisory regime. In addition to centrally inspired controls
and ratios we also now have Audit Committees and compliance officers. This
understandable and appropriate concern with control and supervision, how-
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ever, runs the risk of overlooking that this is only one half of the function of,
in particular the lay directors, and ignores the function related to actively
participating in strategic decisions related to generating profitable growth
and the capture of market share.
With the finance sector at last coming to terms with the fact that they too are
retailers and need to address themselves to retailing issues the Co-operative
Bank is particularly well placed with lay directors who are predominantly
retailers, provided of course the Board is used as a forum where these skills
can be deployed and used to advantage.
1.4.	 The remainder of this paper starts the process of strategic management.
2.	 Background Information
2.1. A brief summary of the probable environmental, economic and competitive
conditions over the planning period 1989/91 is attached (Appendices 1,11 and
III).
2.2	 Extracts from a N.O.P. research project as to the Co- operative Bank's image
in the marketplace is also covered in Appendix I.
2.3. What is undoubtedly clear is that the Bank's image varies considerable by
region and by type of business activity. A strong regional retail co-operative
presence is obviously supportive to the development of the Bank with the
contrary being equally true in areas like the South East.
2.4. In addition the Bank has clearly become indistinguishable from the major
and ubiquitous high Street banks in terms of its market position whilst placed
at a competitive disadvantage because of the high awareness those banks
enjoy through their very size, weight of advertising expenditure and high
Street presence.
2.5. Finally, the financial services sector is experiencing the most dynamic com-
petitive environment ever experienced in the U.K. However, it is equally
clear that the intensity of competition will not only increase but become all
embracing due to :-
(a) new competitors entering the market e.g. building societies and retai-
lers
(b) stronger competitor arising from merger, acquisition and privatisation
e.g. sale of Clydesdale, privatisation of National Giro and the antici-
pated consequences of the 1992 de- regulation within the E.E.C.
(c) increased competition throughout the marketing mix; new financial
service products, different pricing strategies and distribution systems,
distinct market positioning and supporting promotion and finally,
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(d) different and more effective delivery systems direct to customers avoid-
ing traditional infrastructure costs.
2.6. As a consequence whereas the Banking Group enjoyed significant increases
in market penetration in the 70's and early 80's, with the sole exception of
the small business sector, there has been no increase and some decline in the
Bank's share of the different markets over the past two years, particularly in
the personal sector.
2.7. It is obvious that this position must be reversed. However, it is equally evident
that to do so will require a fundamental re-appraisal of the Bank's strategy.
its position in the marketplace and in particular the human resources re-
quired to effect this change.
3.	 Executive Conclusions from the Internal and External
Research Programme
3.1. Appendices I, II and III oniy highlight some of the major issues that face the
Co-operative Bank Group. Extensive extracts from the internal and external
research were circulated to all the executive directors. A series of interviews
with individual executive directors were organised in the first quarter of 1988.
Notes were taken at each meeting and every director provided with the
opportunity to confirm that their individual observations had been faithfully
recorded.
Thirteen different conclusions were drawn from this exercise and a report
with those conclusions was discussed at a two-day meeting in April 1988 by
the executive team plus support from specialist representatives from Group
Development, Human Resources, Marketing, Information Technology and
Finance.
It was concluded that these were the issues which most concerned the
combined team in terms of developing a group strategy which would prove
viable and attainable.
3.2.	 These conclusions were as follows:-
i) We urgently require a Management Information System (MIS) im-
plementation programme. The size and complexity of which, together
with the urgency clearly indicates we need external assistance.
ii) In addition to the quantitative requirements of the business we need a
qualitative aspiration which will allow the Bank to project a relevant.
attractive and sustainable image.
The current research programme related to both the roots of co-operation
and the type of people who traditionally have used our services needs to be
pursued to a definite conclusion.
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iii) We need to develop regional strategies to build on existing strengths
and avoid spreading resources too thinly.
iv) There appears to be significant opportunities in the Corporate banking
sector that need to be clearly identified and pursued.
v) We need to identify and agree the segments within each sector that we
wish to pursue and thereby also identify those segments we will j
pursue or indeed to withdraw from as soon as practical.
vi) We need to agree the most appropriate distribution system for each
segment of our customer base and develop and appropriate premises
strategy
 which will also embrace the cost efficiencies of deployment by
region and bring locations up to the best retailing standards.
vii) Similarly, we need to agree the most appropriate money transmission
strategy
 for each sector of our activity.
viii) To complement these various strategies we need a comprehensive
human resources strategy
 from recruitment through training to deploy-
ment. As a matter of urgency we need to tackle the issues surrounding
the quality of customer service.
ix) We need to evolve the Bank's structure to best support the strategic
business decisions. In particular the need to separate out business
development, servicing existing customers and control of the business.
x) Given the broad brush of our strategic decisions we need to develop n
I.T. strategy which provides the most elegant, cost-effective and appro-
priate design which is most likely to satisfy customer needs at a profit.
xi) It appears appropriate to develop a top down financial strategy based
on agreed assumptions particularly regarding capital, shareholders
expectations, the Bank of England and the marketplace. Divisional
revenue and capital plans developed from the bottom up must fit into
this top down approach.
xii) This approach to Strategic Management has left for separate consider-
ations issues like acquisition. flotation, merger and further injections
of capital beyond that assumed.
xiii) Finally, we need to discuss and agree reasonable shareholder expecta-
tions which should be formally signed off by the Board to ensure there
is no crisis as to expectations. These expectations will in the main be
quantitative but should also be qualitative regarding our role within the
Co-operative Movement and both need to be related to reasonable
timescales.
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7.3.	 A Human Resources Strategy
It is clear that a radical change in culture is required throughout the Banking
Group to move the orientation towards performance and the needs of the
customer. To an outside observer the Banking Group generally, and particu-
larly concentrations of people like the Manchester complex, display an
ingrained civil service and unionised approach to their daily activities. This
prevailing attitude, equally prevalent in management at all levels, will not
change without a completely new approach to compensation, promotion,
training, re- deployment and recruitment within the Banking Group. A start
has been made to recapture management and communications from the
union but a more radical approach and continued programme is required to
produce the desired results.
A separate paper will be prepared for the Chairman to consider and discuss
with his lay director colleagues later in the year.
The orientation must move towards 'performance management' with appro-
priate rewards for performance and equitable penalties for those who fail or
refuse to perform at the required level. Many will willingly accept the
challenge and feel relief from being restricted in their progress and compen-
sation by the process whereby everyone is equally rewarded irrespective of
performance. But there will be others at all levels who will resist this change
in culture. The Board should be both equitable and determined in its support
for this policy since it is useless to wish the ends and not support the means.
7.4.	 Image and Regional Strategies
The regional differences of the image the Banking Group experiences has
already been mentioned. The N.O.P. survey is perhaps the most damning
since if the Group is perceived as only a smaller version of the larger banks,
then there is no differentiation and probably no long-term survival. The need
to continually recruit from other banks partly due to the past inadequate
investment in training, has contributed to this malaise since many employees
would wish to see themselves as clones of the bigger banks or in their terms,
real bankers. The qualitative objectives described earlier and related to the
need to re-visit our inheritance as part of the Co-operative Movement will
help, since image is partly how the Group behaves and partly how it is
therefore perceived.
For the past nearly twenty years the Banking Group has tried to portray itself
as a national bank without considering its relevant strengths and weaknesses
by region. A return to the traditional regional strengths, a range of qualitative
objectives supportive of the image we wish to foster, supported by anew
promotional strategy and adequate resources are essential ingredients to the
objective of creating an attractive, appropriate and sustainable image.
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This, coupled with continued research into the probable customer reaction
to becoming members, providing capital and enjoying a dividend generated
by activity will all contribute to making the statement 'The Co-operative
Bank" a meaningful and competitive differentiation.
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EMPLOYEE RELATIONS STRATEGY
SUMMARY
Improved quality and service requires positive employee attitudes
- relates to employee relations environment
- relates to understanding of business and contribution
Review of organisation and headcount reduction
- improve direct to indirect staff ratio
- work within, or amend, agreements to facilitate change
Good trade union relationships to be maintained
- in line with "Co-operative principles"
- reinforcing local management/representative relationships
- review relevance and legality of agreements
Salary bargaining to be related to performance and affordability
- not solely follow the market
- bargaining plans to be prepared and actioned by line and personnel
management as part of an overall remuneration policy
- review working practices as quid pro quos in bargaining
Effective communication is essential
- part of an overall communications policy
- message "cascading" from the top of the organisation
- simple, consistent and effective with actions from staff feedback
An open management style is necessary to support the above
- authority and accountability to be held by "line" managers
- staff functions to provide support
- revise agreements and practices to reinforce "line" management role
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- effective communication is essential to explain the Bank's plans to all
staff
Prepare contingencies for industrial action arising from changes
Adopt a "positive ethnic and equal opportunities policy
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CO-OPERATIVE BANK EMPLOYEE RELATIONS STRATEGY
SUMMARY
1. INTRODUCTION
2. ORGANISATION AND HEADCOUNT
3. MANAGEMENT AUTHORITY/ACCOUNTABILITY
4. TRADE UNION RELATIONSHIPS
5. TRADE UNION AGREEMENTS
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1.	 INTRODUCTION
The Bank has set out its objectives of business and profit growth in the
Corporate Plan. These objectives can only be achieved by:-
- improved performance in all areas, particularly improved sales and cus-
tomer service,
- effective cost control particularly headcount and salary costs.
The Personnel function is developing strategies to help achieve these objec-
tives within the key area of human resources. Effective utilisation of these
resources will contribute significantly to the achievement of these objectives.
The Bank must train and develop employees in this area. Success can only
be achieved, however, if staff feel they are being treated correctly by the Bank
and fully understand the Bank's objectives and rationale for their achieve-
ment. It is essential, therefore, that we develop an employee relations climate
which facilitates these attitudes without reducing management's ability to
manage the business. The key human resources objectives are therefore:-
- a motivated and well trained staff geared to performance,
- control and authority of staff by line managers with Personnel support.
This paper outlines a strategy to achieve this end with particular reference to:
- Organisation and cost controls
- Effective communication structures
- Line management authority and accountability for staff including effec-
tive use of:-
- Trade Union agreements
- Grievance Procedure
- Disciplinary Code of Practice
- Specialist Agreements
- Headcount and staff cost controls to meet business needs
- Good union relationships, particularly at local level
- An effective remuneration policy which relates total pay to performance
- Realistic pay bargaining based on affordability
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2.	 ORGANISATION AND HEADCOUNT
The Bank is reviewing its organisation structure to improve performance
with greater emphasis on direct sales and services as opposed to indirect
administrative operations. It is proposing headcount reductions in the branch
network and DSF utilising benefit from improved technology. Further re-
ductions must be achieved in Head Office and service functions. This was the
subject of an earlier paper which has been agreed by Policy Committee.
The Bank must question the "raison d'etre" for jobs and even whole functions,
e.g. CSB, back office functions. It should identify and probably adopt a policy
of retaining "core" operations whilst curtailing or contracting out service or
ancillary functions. This process has already been initiated and must be
achieved if we are to meet corporate profit objectives. Reductions in staff
must be balanced, however, against the need to recruit key staff in profit
generating and other areas - if and where contribution to overall objectives
is clearly identifiable.
The reductions must be achieved to ensure achievement of profitability next
year in line with the Corporate Plan. The Bank must achieve the savings
through natural wastage and non-replacement of staff wherever possible and
must fully utilise existing agreements, e.g. job security, mobility of labour, to
meet these requirements. If this fails we shall, by force of circumstance, need
to amend these agreements.
In actioning these changes it is essential that we have an effective communi-
cations system in operation to ensure that the Bank's rationale for the change
is effectively communicated by management, n by BIFU or "the grapevine"!
3.	 MANAGEM ENT AUTHORITY/ACCOUNTABILITY
Management authority and accountability for staff must be held by line
divisions. Staff functions such as Personnel and Inspection must be seen as
advisory functions to line management, albeit very powerful functions, with
effective sanction if necessary.
The role of personnel will be as a facilitator for line management providing
them with effective and consistent advice but not undertaking their role, as
is the current situation in many areas, e.g. discipline. There are areas where
the recommended practice is already undertaken, either in whole or part,
e.g. Information Technology and, more recently, City. This should be encour-
aged and extended to other areas.
Whilst line management should be given authority to ensure the effective
resourcing and utilisation of staff, they must also be held accountable for
their performance, thus rewards and sanctions must reflect this culture
accordingly.
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The first mechanism by which this change can be initiated throughout the
Bank is the introduction of the revised Disciplinary Code, which clearly
places the authority and responsibility for undertaking disciplinary action
with line management, who will have strong staff support from Inspection
and Personnel Departments as appropriate. Their role will be to ensure that
the Bank's interests are protected and there is consistent and equitable use
of the procedure by both the Bank and BIFU.
The Disciplinary Code has been approved by the Policy Committee and
discussions on its introduction have commenced with BIFU. The Grievance
Procedure has been redrafted to complement the Disciplinary Code and is
currently the subject of discussion with BIFU.
Major negotiations, particularly on pay, are currently undertaken by the
Personnel function with no active line management involvement. Senior line
managers must be involved in the preparation of the Bank's negotiating
stance and in setting the guidelines for Pay negotiations with BIFU, thus
reinforcing accountability for their staff salary budget.
The "ownership" of the negotiating policy will pass, therefore, immediately
to the Human Resources Conmiittee which will present its recommendation
to the Policy Committee, thus ensuring "line" and "staff' commitment to it as
a key part of the Bank's overall human resources strategy. The Bank will be
acting, therefore, as one body on this matter and not seen as divisionalised.
Negotiations in line with the policy will be undertaken by Personnel acting
as agents of line management.
Non-negotiable items will be actioned through the Staff Review Committee
which will continue the current practice of informing BIFU of developments
through line management.
4.	 TRADE UNION RELATIONS
Bearing in mind the Co-operative Bank's philosophies, objectives and posi-
tion in the Co-operative and Labour Movement, it is essential that we
maintain good relationships with BIFU. Maintenance of this relationship
does not mean, however, that we have to meet all of BIFU's demands or
requirements, or use the Union as an excuse for ineffective management.
The proposals outlined earlier in this paper, if implemented, would give line
management direct involvement with their union representatives, e.g. disci-
plinary and grievance procedures. They must build up sound local relation-
ships and not allow employee relations issues to be solely the province of
Personnel Department. To facilitate this, we must:-
- reduce the number of full-time "control clerks" to one. This has now been
agreed with BIFU and will take effect from June 1988 following a training
period for the incoming representative during the busy first half of 1988,
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- encourage regular local discussions between managers and repre-
sentatives as part of the consultative process,
- amend the status of the Negotiating Committee so that it only deals with
major items such as pay negotiations. Minor matters should be actioned
through the Grievance Procedure,
- ensure that other matters are dealt with quickly and effectively by line
management (with employee relations support) within the grievance
procedure, or through consultative machineiy.
- ensure that line managers are involved in all employee relations issues
affecting their department and are not by- passed by representatives
involving Control Clerks and the Personnel Department without their
knowledge or authority. Essentially this means a disciplined approach to
these matters in Personnel to ensure adherence to procedures.
5.	 TRADE UNION AGREEMENTS
The Bank's agreements with BIFU must be questioned due to their age,
relevance to the current business and employee relations environment and
as they make the Bank and BIFU vulnerable at industrial tribunal, particu-
larly in the case of unfair dismissal (this could also be said of the C.W.S. in
general). To this end we should review the agreements as follows:
5.1 The 1938 Conciliation Board Agreement - we should query this agreement
in view of the relevance and status of the Bank as a Public Limited Company.
Furthermore clauses 1 and 6 make the Bank vulnerable if it is taken to an
industrial tribunal. The total agreement is useful in that it gives the Bank an
avenue for arbitration which has proved successful in the past. It is considered
that cancellation of the agreement is not possible, but a practical view of it
and its operation can be achieved with BIFU, particularly as regards the
above clauses.
5.2 The Bank should review the grievance and disciplinary procedures to give
line management more authority for employee relations issues. A revised
Disciplinary Code and Grievance Procedure has been agreed and presented
to BIFU for comment.
5.3 The Job Security Agreement can be viewed as a hindrance to the Bank's
activities in that it limits the Bank's actions in redeploying or reducing staff.
The Bank should, however, be able to manage the proposed organisational
changes and staff reductions within its confines, though it may have to
consider introduction of compulsory redundancy at some stage if targets are
not achieved. This move would be resisted by BIFU, though quid pro quos
for its introduction could be:-
- increased profit sharing
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- flexibility of labour, thus broadening jobs
- improved redundancy terms (funded from headcount savings or possibly
as an extraordinary item in next year's accounts).
The redundancy/early retirement terms will need to be reviewed in any event
due to the new Pension Scheme (they are currently based on 65 retirement
for men) and this may provide an opportunity to review the agreement.
5.4	 The Union Membership Agreement should be reviewed as:-
- the Bank and BIFU are vulnerable under the Employment Acts 1980 and
1982 to an action for unfair dismissal from an employee dismissed for
non-union membership,
- we wish to take out the top segment of management from the pay-bar-
gaining procedure to introduce a new contract for performance related
remuneration.
The Bank can remove the above-mentioned management group from the
agreement by invoking para. 3 of Part 1 of the Union Membership Agree-
ment 1976 (Appendix 1) of the Negotiating and Consultations Procedure.
This is not likely to be a major issue with BIFU particularly if the Bank is
moving to a performance orientated culture. Further erosion of the bargain-
ing group would probably cause response if it is seen by BIFU as an attack
on its membership, particularly at NEC level - accordingly continued Union
membership of all staff should be actively encouraged, even where the Union
does not have pay bargaining rights.
Thus the Bank should give notice of removal of this senior management
group from the pay-bargaining sphere as part of the current remuneration
review exercise, but continued BIFU membership should be encouraged.
The legality of the U.M.A poses a more complex question. The choices
available are:-
- to undertake a ballot of staff in line with legislation,
- cancel the U.M.A and agree sole bargaining rights for BIFU, thus avoid-
ing poaching and inter-union disputes (e.g. ASTMS membership),
- do nothing and hope that no member of staff resigns, thus forcing the
issue at tribunal.
We recommend discussing the matter with BIFU and proposing a ballot of
members. BIFU would probably refuse, in which event we would press for
an agreement granting sole bargaining rights only, and for the removal of
Section 10 from the Contract of Employment as this makes the Bank liable
with BIFU in contracting staff to forgo their rights under the aforementioned
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Acts. Raising the issue could also be used as mitigation, however, in any
tribunal hearing.
5.5 The Bank will use the New Technology and Mobility of Labour Agreements
in implementing changes to the organisation. It must ensure that they do not
inhibit our business performance, e.g. employees refusing to move, non-
reduction of staff where technology is introduced. Where this is found to be
the case they should be amended through negotiation with BIFU.
6.	 SALARY BARGAINING
The Bank has agreed a total remuneration review relating pay to perfor-
mance which was the subject of an earlier paper. The Bank must review its
procedure for salary bargaining within the context of an overall Remunera-
tion Policy. This policy must be developed for approval in early 1988. In
future remuneration must be related to:
- affordability
- performance
- national trends
- market rate.
The Bank must not merely follow other banks' settlements. The breaking up
of the Federation of Clearing Banks provides us with the opportunity to do
this. Furthermore, movement of the review date to June enables the Bank
to review salaries against the above criteria. An annual bargaining strategy
must be prepared and agreed not later than March 1988, which takes into
account all the above factors and includes contingencies in case of action by
staff in support of uneconomic claims.
Line management must be active in support of the negotiating team, as stated
in Section 3, thus reinforcing their budget accountability. Communication of
the bargaining proceedings must be from the Bank against the background
of the above and not by BIFU.
7.	 WORKING PRACTICES
Line managers must review working practices and organisation now, and
prepare a "shopping list" which can be presented as quid pro quos in nego-
tiations on implementation of the remuneration review. This exercise should
be undertaken over the next four months by line managers in conjunction
with Employee Relations Department and 0 & M, and a package prepared
for negotiation with the Union. It should be initiated and controlled by the
Human Resources Committee.
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This process should be repeated at each salary review so that funding is
available to offset increases wherever possible.
8.	 EMPLOYMENT LEGISLATION
As a caring institution the Bank must ensure that it is in advance of legislative
requirements in respect of sex and racial discrimination and disabled wor-
kers. It should monitor its recruitment policies, particularly in areas of high
levels of ethnic population, to ensure that it is not out with legislation and,
even worse, losing business opportunities by its perceived attitudes. Where
this practice is discovered we should take positive actions to redress the
balance of employment.
This is a vital part of our marketing and personnel policy and a positive view
of our cultural change. Particular reference must be paid to positive actions
such as:-
- relationships with local ethnic communities,
- representation on local groups,
- community care programmes,
- recruiting female managers at senior positions.
Work is ongoing in various areas of the Bank on this subject and this policy
should be developed in conjunction with these developments.
The Bank must also continue to generate high standards of health and safety
in line with the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974, involving all parties in
ensuring that all locations exceed required standards under the Act.
9.	 EFFECTIVE COMMUNICATIONS
Many of the developments outlined in this paper will be unpalatable to
elements of the staff and BIFU, but if we are to achieve them it is essential
that we communicate directly and effectively with our staff to ensure they are
made aware by the Bank of our position and intentions, and not by any other
source. This is a major employee relations objective for achievement by the
Bank to enable management to communicate directly the rationale for
change, thus ensuring that it is pro-active in managing the business.
We must develop mechanisms which ensure that communications are
simple, consistent and effective. The Bank must communicate to staff on a
regular basis, stating both good and bad news. Inconsistent or sporadic
communications are more harmful than no communications, and must be
avoided at all costs. The Bank must not leave communications to BIFU. The
Union's role is to negotiate with the Bank on behalf of its members, not to
act as the channel for communication.
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The pivoted change will be to set up a simple mechanism of Briefing Groups
whereby communications "cascad&' down the organ-isation from the Chief
Executive on a regular period basis. The branch network provides an ideal
vehicle for communication to their staff, whilst similar forums should be set
up in Head Office and Service Departments.
Managers must communicate to all staff to disseminate the corporate mess-
age, together with any divisional or local messages which may be required.
Similar forums must be held in Head Office and Service Departments.
By this method staff will receive a consistent message from their line man-
ager. The duty should not be delegated to more junior staff but always be
undertaken by the branch/departmental manager, thus reinforcing his auth-
ority whilst allowing constructive feedback from staff. It is essential, however,
that any feedback is actioned, particularly if it leads to improved customer
service.
The Bank should introduce this mechanism immediately, training managers
in communication skills and briefing groups. Training can be undertaken by
Personnel Department. It can be done at various regional centres throughout
the country thus avoiding major conflict with business requirements. We
must begin training immediately and have our mechanisms in place in early
1988, thereby ensuring staff become used to the process before we undertake
some of the major human resource initiatives we are to undertake in mid-
1988, e.g. the remuneration review, profit sharing, headcount reduction,
which all relate to achievement of the Corporate Plan.
Briefing Groups should form an integral part of the Bank's overall communi-
cations structure and be utilised in conjunction with existing methods such
as Newsline, newspapers, etc. An overall communications policy will be
developed to include these procedures.
A more sophisticated approach to employee involvement could be adopted
in the future, e.g. quality circles. This is a long way off however, at this time
it is more important that we develop a basic mechanism before moving to
this more sophisticated level of involvement.
10. MANAGEMENT STYLE
Effective communications and cultural change can be achieved if the Bank
operates an open management style. Such an approach would in no way
diminish management's ability to operate. It merely reinforces manage-
ment's authority in a different manner.
The impetus must come from the Bank's Executive Directors and senior
management who must involve their managers in setting realistic objectives
and agreeing their accountabilities. This system can be built into the organi-
sation with divisional and individual objectives being defined within the
context of the Corporate Plan. Performance can be jointly measured. Staff
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can thus be involved in the process and given meaningful information on
business and individual performance including their own contribution to the
Bank. Examples of methods which can be utilised are:-
- Management Conferences and projects contributing to determination of
Corporate policy and plan,
- Senior management involvement in and support of training and development,
- "Open Door" policies to encourage staff participation,
- Effective Suggestion Schemes
- Managers "walking the job",
- Briefing and feedback,
- Open learning systems.
These issues must be seen as part of the Bank's management culture and
encourage staff to view their Manager as the natural leader to whom they
should turn for information. The "Co-operative" culture should enable the
Bank to foster such an approach, but it does require full commitment and
example from the top of the organisation to ensure its effectiveness together
with constructive action arising from staff involvement, particularly if it aids
business development.
11. POSITIVE ACTIONS AND CONTINGENCIES
A proposed timetable for action on these issues is attached (Appendix 2).
They are all necessary to improve profit performance or the employee
relations climate. A number of issues which improve the former may affect
the latter and lead to action by BIFU and staff. The Bank must decide,
therefore, on key issues which it must implement and prepare contingencies,
e.g. alternative sources of data preparation or clearing, in the case of indus-
trial action on these issues. These key issues are likely to be:-
- salary settlement based on the elements stated in Section 8 above. The
Bank must not merely follow the settlements of other institutions and
must resist action to do so from staff and BIFU,
- headcount reduction to reduce costs, including possible enforced redun-
dancies,
- changes to working practices leading to greater flexibility, particularly in
areas of high labour intensity,
- removal of managers, apart from the senior group, from BIFU member-
ship.
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It is essential that we ensure that all practices undertaken contribute to the
Bank's objectives and that we do not pay beyond our means to achieve these
objectives. We must identify bargaining strategies for each of these issues
which include our absolute faliback position and contingencies for continued
operation in the case of industrial action in the branch network or, as may be
more likely, in the large centres of operation, e.g. an alternative source for
Information Technology transactions. These strategies must be clearly ident-
ified and have the full support of the Policy Committee.
As the Bank cannot withstand major disruption for a significant period it
must ensure that staff do not undertake such action, by initiating the actions
described in this paper, such as effective communications, open management
management style, to ensure staff are aware of the reasons for the change or
decision and are not pressed into action due to ignorance of the facts. The
Bank must be pro-active in its employee relations policy and not re-active to
BIFU's requirements.
12. CONCLUSION
If the Bank is to achieve requisite profit levels, it will have to improve
performance, grow its business and curtail costs, particularly staff costs.
These savings have been identified and, though painful, must be achieved. It
is essential, therefore, that we develop a positive employee relations climate
in the manner described above to facilitate a realistic approach to cost
control. Staff must be fully aware of the rationale for the exercise, i.e. survival
and development in the face of fierce external competition. This can only be
achieved through:-
- giving line managers authority and accountability for their actions,
- effective and consistent communication of issues to staff from line man-
agers,
- a positive relationship with BIFU in which the Bank plans its actions and
executes them in line with those plans.
We must develop these points immediately as outlined in this paper if we are
to achieve our business objectives in 1988 and beyond. It is also important
that C.W.S senior management are aware of and support our actions, par-
ticularly where they may affect the Society, e.g. the 1938 Agreement.
Other major long-term strategic issues will have to be addressed in the future
if the Bank is to continue its development into the 1990s. These can only be
achieved in a positive employee relations environment where staff are aware
of the reasons and values of the Bank's actions for the future prosperity of
the business.
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AGREEMENTS WITH UNION
APPENDIX 6.1
NEGOTiATION AND CONSULTATIVE
PROCEDURE
Signed
AGREEMENT
Made	 i7(
Between the Co-operative Bank Limited arid the National Union of Bank Employees
Relating to
NEGOTIATING AND CONSULTATIVE PROCEDURE
Arranqement of Sect loris
I Definitions and Statements
II Employee Representation
III Collective Bargaining
IV Claims and Disputes Procedure
Appendix	 I Union Membership Agreement, 2 August 1976
Appendix II National Conciliation Board for C.W.S.
Appendix III Disciplinary and Grievance Procedure
Signed	
.4k.
for cO-OPERATIE BANK LIMID
I r NATIONAL UNION OF BANK EMPLOYEES
SECTION I -
Definitons and Statements
1. THE PARTIES
This agreement is entered into by the Co-operative Bank (referred
to as the "Bank" throughout this document) and by the National
Union of Bank Employees (referred to throughout as the IIUnionl).
2. PREVIOUS AGREEMENTS
No clause or clauses of this agreement shall revoke, alter or amend
any previous agreement or undertaking made between the parties
unless specifically stated in this agreement.
3. PURPOSE AND INTENT
The purpose of this agreement is to promote and maintain the best
possible collective relations between the Bank and its staff and to
provide an agreed means of regulating the conduct of relationship
between the Bank and the Union.
4. RECOGNITION
The Bank accords to the Union sole rights of representation and
negotiation in respect of staff of the Bank who are, pursuant to
the Union Memberhip Agreement 2nd August 1976, members of
the Union (see Apendix 1). In addition, the Union may represent
and negotiate in ièspect of all other staff of the Bank, who, by
virtue of the terms of the Union Membership Agreement, are or may
be excluded from the requirement to be members of the Union.
5. ENTITLEMENTS AND DUTIES
(a) The Bank, within the terms of agreements in force at any one
time, is enttled to remunerate individuals in a manner
commensurate with the duties, responsibilites and performance
of its staff.
(b) The Bank is entitled to plan, organise and manage its banking
activities to maintain optimum efficiency.
(c) Bank Employees have a duty to carry out the reasonable
instructons of the Bank and, in turn, while these instructions
are carried out, the Bank will not impose any change in
Contract of Employment, Conditions of Employment, etc.
directly affecting staff, without prior consultation.
(d) The Union is entitled to raise, on behalf of individual members
of staff, questions as to Bank practice with regard to Terms
and Conditions of Employment, etc.
(e) The Bank undertakes to advise new entrants of its collective
bargaining policy and to advise the Union of all new entrants.
6. EXISTING DISPUTES PROCEDURE
The , existing Disputes Procedure (included as the third part of
Section P1 1B1O of the Personnel Manual - April 1977) shall, as
a consequence of this agreement, cease to apply.
SECTION II
EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION
1. NUBE OFFICE REPRESENTATION
A Union Office Representative is an elected/nominated full time
member of staff. He/she is responsible for providing:
(a) immediate representation for Union members at the first
levels of the procedures for dealing with individual
grievances, job evaluation appeals and the disciplinary
procedure.
(b) an additional means of discussing the nature of change in
the organisation.
(c) a means of involvement in the affairs of the Bank by the
staff on a collective basis.
(d) an effective and continuing feedback of staff views and
opinions.
An Office Representative shall be nominated and elected by the
office staff within each Branch/Department of the Bank and shall
undertake such duties and responsibilities as outlined above in
addition to his/her normal Bank duties and responsibilities.
The Office Representative shall be permitted reasonable time off
during normal working hours without loss of pay or other benefits
in order to represent or advise employees, provided that he/she
first obtains permission from his/her Branch Manager/Head of
Department.
2. TRADE UNION MEETINGS
The Bank will give all reasonable assistance to the Trade Union
in releasing personnel and providing accommodation for Union
meetings. Where agreement has been reached between the Union
and the Bank, Branch Committee meetings may be held during
working hours, provided that the number of such meetings does
not exceed 8 during any 12 month period and providing each meeting
does not exceed more than 2 hours within normal working time.
SECTION III
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
There shall be Collective Bargaining machinery within Which the
Bank, on all occasions, will give full facilities for negotiations
to the Union on all matters affecting employees of the Bank or any
particular class of such employees.
ISECTION IV
CLAIMS AND DISPUTES PROCEDURE
This section relates to the settlement of claims affecting more than
one employee. With respect to matters affecting an individual
employee, reference shall be made under the procedure established
for Disciplinary and Grievance matters - Appendix Ill.
2. Registration of Claims
The Union will notify the Bank, or the Bank the Union, in writing
or register the substance of the claim at an agreed meeting, when
it will be embodied in the Minutes of that Meeting. This requirement
does not preclude consultation and discussion between the parties
prior .to the matter being raised as a formal item of negotiation. An
Agenda for each Negotiating Meeting will be circulated by the Bank
ten working days before the meeting. Late items will be included
as Any Other Business.
3. If at any meeting the Bank and the Union are unable to reach agree-
ment upon any negotiable matter, a first failure to agree shall be
recorded and the matter will be held over for consideration at a
further meeting which will be convened by the Bank and held on such
a date not later than twenty working days from the date of the last
meeting at such a time and place as may be mutually agreed by both
parties.
4. If at the further meeting the Bank and the Union are unable to reach
agreement upon the outstanding matter, a second failure to agree
shall be recorded and at the request of either side the matter will be
referred for consideration at a further meeting between a Joint
General Manager and an Assistant Secretary of the Union. This
meeting will be convened within fifteen working days of the second
failure to agree at such a time and place as may be mutually agreed
by both parties.
5. If at the meeting between a Joint General Manager and an Assistant
Secretary of the Union a satisfactory agreement is not reached, a
third failure to agree shall be recorded. Thereafter the dispute
will be referred to be dealt with by the National Conciliation Board
for C.W.S. employment under the rules of that body.
Alternatively, if both sides agree, the assistance of the Advisory,
Conciliation and Arbitration Service may be sought. If the assistance
of ACAS does not resolve the dispute by means of a conciliated
settlement then providing both parties agree, an arbitrator selected
by the Service shall make an award which shall be conclusive and
binding on both sides.
6. Full details of the constitution and procedure of the National
Conciliation Board for the C.W.S. are included as Appendix II.
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..L T)"'TT)T 1
The Co-operative Bank LirniLed and the National Union of Bank
Employees ajree to operate this Union Memberhip Agreement made
in accordance with the proviioris of the Traüe Union and Labour
ReleLtiolw Act, 1974.
	 . . . .
	 :.
PART I
1. This Agreement applies to all current arid new employees
of the Co-operative Bank Limited, who are enagea in -
occupations a hereinafter defined coming within.the scope
of this Agreement..	 .. .	 ...	 .•.•	 :
2. Subject to Part 1, pararaph 3 of this Agreement it shall
be a conuition of employment of all employces covered by
this Agreeracrt Lhat they become and remain paid up members
of the National Union of Bank Employees. 	 :• ..........:
3. Personnel with the following designations shall have the
option whether or not they become members of the National
Union o Bank Emloyee. 	 .	 . ..
Chief Generdi I'a Lger
Joint General Nariger Administration
Joint General Manager Domestic Banking
	 ;. ..
J oint Genc rai i'iaaer ir:ar.cja1 Control
	
0
	• Joint General ianer City and InLernational
	 •0
Personnel Manager
4. Any employee co:.in; within the sco pe of this Agreement,
who is already in the employment of the Co-operative Bank
• Limited on the date of operation of this Agreement and
is not a member of the 1ation1 Union of Bank Employees
shall be required to comply with the provisions of Clause
	 —
2 above within three months of the date of oeration of
•	 this Agreement.	 0	
•••	 • 	
0	
-.	 ••	
0	
••	 0
5. Any eloyee ccmin within the sco pe of this Agrecment who
ente	 the cmployçcnt of the Co-oerative Bank Lirnited after
the date of operation uf this Arecment shall be requirec
to comply with the provisioho of Clause 2 above within
one month of the uate of cornnccnt of employment.
6. :/hro an eiployee on the expiry of three months under
Ciauiu 4 above or one month under Clause 5 above fails or
refuoc;s to comply with the proviciorw of Clause 2 above,
such e:rIp1oye(	 hali in accor1autcc with the :Jro'.'isiorw of
5c.ul 1. Part 11, Section G, Clause 5, of the Trade
Union and Labour	 L:i1.ion A.ct, 1T!4, be uUjoct to imi;ial
by t}1r: Co-o;1cr. Li .'. L:i.tic L .tii LcI . 	 Th	 ia Lionil Union of
Ençloyet	 ia Li. tJL&Ve Lhc ri :h L to 'urin	 Lh cases
tO tile IrQ.Ce or L'u	 (—rnr!r:t:iV f	 Rnn	 1•,4 1.1	 -+4
- -
7	 -	 r	 •	 ....	 .•..	 .4,	 r
.	 v. .	 o.k.	
-	
L	
. 	 i . / 0 L	 U_.0 i	 the
Traue Union and Labour Rclutionu Act, 1976, the Statement
of Terus and Conuitiorui 01' all employees covered by
this Areeicn t 1ia1l include a term s tatin that if they
are diszniced in accordance with the provisions of this
Agrec:ttcnt they will noL brinç a claim before an
Industrial Tribunal under parai,raph (. of Schedule I to
the Trade Union and Labour Relations Act, 1974, alleging
unfair diszaiisal on such grounth.
	 -
PART	 ii.:.:
: A1Y dispute under this Agreement shall be resolved under the
agreed Disputes, Grievance and Disciplinary 	 ocures.
PART III
This Agreement may be terminated •by either party submitting
three months' notice of termination in writing to the other
party. •. .	 :	 .•	 ..........
PATIV	 ...	 :...	 ..
This Agreement shall be operative on and from July 12th 1976.
PART V
"EMPLOYEE" means a worker currently employed, and all new
emDlcyees of the Co-operative Bank Limited who are normally
epoyed	 3ix;cc	 r iore psr week.
"OCCUP4TICi Co::::;G iITi T-E SCO?" means any occupation
coming within the scope of the following designations
Non-Clerical Staff
	
Clerical Staff	 .
Appointed Staff
ManaeL'ial Staff
Si-ned on behalf of the:-
	 -
CO-OP.LTI TE BANK LIMITED . . . . . . . . 	 . . . . . . . .•. . . . . . . . . . . . .
iTIOi•LA.L UiiIO
	 OF	 AiK E;j.i LOYi' .
	
.	 • . • • • • • • • • . . a
DaLe . . . . . :/. .(!?2 . . . . . . . . . . .
	 .	 . , ---	 .
APPENDIX I
I	 NATIONAL
CONCILIATION
BOARD FOR C'W'S
EMPLOYMENT
;; j L'f Lilt L itt
between the Co-operative
Wholesale Society Limited
and Trade Unions havinz
Members in the Employ of
the Society
1938
itmcranôntn af	 Qrrrinrnt
made this 29th day oJ April, 1938, beitteen
the Co-operative Wholesale Society Limited
(hereinafter called " tile Society ") of the one
part and the signatory Trade Unions listed in
the Second Schedule appended hereto and any
other signatory Trade Unions which may be
listed subsequently (hereinafter called " the
Trade Unions ") of the oilier part.
PREAMBLE
The principle is accepted that the relation-
ship between the Trade Unions and the
Society differs fundamentally from the
relationship between the Trade Unions and
•	 private enterprise. Therefore it is undcr-
stood and herein provided:—
CLAUSE I
That the Society shall and will employ in
its service only members of Trade Unions
affiliated to or approved by the Trades
Union Congress.
CLAUSE 2
4 That the Trade Unions will give the
Society immunity from stoppages of work
arising from inter-Union disputes respecting
the Trade Union membership of its
-
employees. For this purpose the Trade
Unions undertake that before any inter-
Union disputes rcspecting membership
reach the stage of labour withdrawal, every
effort will bc made by the Unions directly
concerned themselves to reach a settlement
in urgent cases, and otherwise the cases shall
be submiued to the Disputes Committee
of the Trades Union Congress. The
Society undertakes to facilitate cases being
dealt with along these lines and, along with
the Trade Unions, to accept the resulting
decisions.
CLAUSE 3
That the Society will, as employer, on all
occasions give full facilities for negotiations
to the representatives of any of the Trade
Union on all matters affecting any member
or members thereof.
CLAUSE 4
That in the event of no settlement being
reached by negotiations, the matters at issue
between the Society and any of the Trade
Unions in disputes limited solely to the
Society's establishment (as distinct from
genera! trade disputes—local or other) shall
be referred to be dealt with by the Concilia-
tion Board, the constitution and procedure.
of which are set out in the First Schedule
appended hereto. Unless and until the said
reference has been made to and dealt with
by the Conciliation Board no strike or
lockout shall take place.
CLAUSE 5	 -
(a) That where the Society indirectly
employs labour under a form of cntract
with outside employers it shall stipulate in
the contract for the employment of labour
on recognised Trade Union rates and
conditions. The contrctors shall not
assign or underlet their contracts nor any
part thereof, nor sub-contract, except under
the same conditions as the Society stipulated
in the original contract.
(b) That as far as may seem practicable
the Society will co-operate with the Trade
Unions to secure employment of Trade
Union labour by contractors undertaking
work for the Society.
CLAUSE 6
That it shall be the definite policy of the
Trade Unions to assist the Society against
unfair trade competition by doing everything
possible to raise the wages and conditions of
employment in respect of those firms
competing with the Society who are paying
less wages for the same type of labour, and
giving worse conditions of employment
than those of the Society.
CLAUSE 7
That it is agreed that nothing herein
contained shall supersede or prejudice the
parties concerned from utilising the recog-
nised machinery and methods of negotia-
tions (other than Trade Board machinery
and proceedings) which may exist in any
trade or industry in which the Society is
engaged, for the settlement of wa ges, hours,
and/or conditions of employment, or inter-
fere with the right of the Society to give
effect to agreements mutually entered into
through such machinery, or prevent the
Society, in trades where it has been the
Society's practice to do so, from following
variations in wa ges, hours, and/or conditions
of employment which take place as a result
of negotiations between the employers and
Trade Unions.
In the event of this clause being found by
the Trade Unions, in actual practice, to
operate to their detriment, then the Society
'vii! be prepared to consider with the Trade
Union representatives a revision of the
terms of the clause.
CONCLUDING CLAUSE
This agreement shall remain in force
until it shall be mutually agreed that the
same be determined or until the Society
shall give to the Unions three months'
notice, in writing, to terminate the A g ree-
ment, or until the Unions give to the Society
similar notice of termination. It shall be
competent, hov,ever, for any Union to
withdraw from the Agreement by giving
similar notice.
4	 -
5
SL
FIRST SCHEDULE
Constitution of the National conciliation
Board for the C'o-operative Wholesale
Society's Service and Procedure for the
Settlement of Disputes.
CLAUSE!
The Conciliation Board shall consist of
13 representatives, narely, six persons
representing the Society, appointed by the
Society, six persons representing the Trade
Union or • Unions concerned, appointed by
the said Trade Union or Unions, and an
independent chairman.
At least two of [lie persons so appointed by
the Society, and at least two of the persons
so appointed by the Trade Union or Unions,
shall not be directly concerned in the matter
which has been referred to the Conciliation
Board.
The independent chairman shall be
selected jointly by the Society and the
Trade Union or Unions concerned in the
reference to the Board, from a panel framed
by mutual arrangement between the Society
and all the Trade Union parties to the
Agreement under which the Conciliation
Board is established.
An independent chairman once appointed
to the Board to deal with any specific case
or cases referred shall preside over the
Board until such time as the particular case
be disposed of.
CLAUSE 2
Subject to the provisions of the Agree-
ment under which the Conciliation Board is
established, the Board shall meet to deal
with any matter referred to it within 21
days from the date of the reference, unless
both parties agree to the meeting being held
at a later date.
CLAUSE 3
The independent chairman shall be
responsible for seeing that the rules of
procedure in connection with the hearing
of any case by the Conciliation Board,
which are hereinafter contained, are
observed, and may, if he so wishes, otTer
suggestions or advice to the other members
of the Conciliation Board, but shall not
vote on any question which may arise
except in the circumstances specified in
Clause 4 (c) hereof, when he shall act as
arbitrator.
CLAUSE 4
In dealing with any question referred to
r.
the Conciliation Board the Board shall
endeavour to secure a settlement on one or
other of the following lines:—
(a) By the unanimous vote of all the
members of the Board, other than the
independent chairman. If a decision
is so reached, such decision shall be
final and binding on both parties to
the reference.
(b) If a unanimous vote as aforesaid
cannot he obtained, but both a
majority of the Society's representa-
tives on the Board and a majority of
the Trade Union's or Unions' repre-
sentatives on the Board are in favour
of terms of settlement, the parties to the
reference shall be asked if they will
agree to accept a majority decision.
If each party replies in the aftirmatie
(but not otherwise ) such majority
decision shall be given and shall be
final and binding on both parties
(c) If a settlement cannot be secured by
the means specified in paragraph (a)
or (b) of this clause, the parties to the
reference shall be asked if they will
agree to allow the independent chair-
man to act as arbitrator. If each party
replies in the affirmative (but not
otherwise) the independent chairman
shall act as arbitrator and give his
award, which shall be conclusive and
binding on both parties.
CLAUSE 5
There shall be two secretaries to the
Conciliation Board, one to be appointed by
the Society and the other to be appointed by
the Trade Unions collectively. The secre-
taries shall be entitled to take part in the
discussions, but shall not be allowed to vote.
CLAUSE 6
Each party to any case referred to the
Conciliation Board shall pay the expenses
of its representatives on the Board and of its
secretary and of any witnesses whom it may
call on its behalf before the Board.
The expenses of the independent chair-
man and of convening and holding meetings
of the Board shall be borne in equal propor-
tions by the Society and the Trade Union
or Unions parties to the matter referred to
the Board.
National Union of Tailors and Garment
Workers.
National Union of Boot and Shoe
Operatives.
Amalgamated Society of Leather
Workers and Kindred Trades.
National Union of Leather Workers
and Allied Trades.
Tobacco Workers' Union.
National Union of Co-operative
Officials.
Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied
Workers.
National Union of Agricultural and
Allied Workers.
Clerical and Administrative Workers'
Union.
rn
General and Municipal \Vorkers' Union.
I-
	National Union of Bank Employees.
National Union of Furniture Trade
Operatives.
SECOND SCHEDULE
•	 List of Signatory Trade Unions
Transport and General Workers' Union.
United Road Transport Union.
Electrical, Electronic and
Telecommunication Union/Plumbing
Trades Union.
Amalgamated Union of Engineering
Workers.
National Union of Vehicle Builders.
Amalgamated Society of Woodcutting
Machinists.
Amalgamated Society of Woodworkers.
Society of Lithographic Artists, Designers,
Engravers and Process Workers.
Society of Graphical and Allied Trades.
National Graphical Association.
Amalgamated Weavers' Association.
National Union of Dyers, Bleachers
and Textile Workers.
Association of Patternmakers and Allied
Craftsmen.
National Union of Hosiery and
Knitwear Workers.
APPENDIX In
Disciplinary and Grievance Procedure
Disciplinary Procedure
1.	 Failure by a member of staff to achieve or maintain the
required standards of performance and conduct or to
observe the terms of the service agreement will result
in disciplinary action being taken by the Bank.
2.	 The normal action in the first instance of a failure to
meet the required standards is an informal warning.
This will usually be given by the Manager but may be
given by a Head Office official.
3.	 A repetition or a similar failure to meet the standards
or a failure of a more serious nature will justify a formal
warning. This will be given by either a Head Office
official or the Manager on the authority of Head Office.
The member of staff may state his/her case at the
interview when the formal warning is given. The nature
of the incident and the action to which the member of
staff will be liable for any subsequent failure will be
recorded and advised in writing to the person concerned.
4.	 A member of staff may appeal against disciplinary action.
The appeal will be heard by a senior Head Office official.
A member of staff wishing to appeal should notify the
'Personnel Manager, Head Office, within ten clear working
days of being informed of the disciplinary action.
5.	 A member of staff appealing against disciplinary action
may be accompanied, if he/she so elects, by another
staff member of his/her choosing or an official of the
National Union of Bank Employees.
6.	 Generally, dismissal will be preceded by at least three
warnings, confirmed in writing, within a period of twelve
months or less, so that the individual has the chance of
improving in the specific aspects which are unsatisfactory.
However, whilst this procedure will be appropriate for
the majority of the Bank's employees, the period of
twelve months may be extended for more senior employees
at the Bank's discretion.
7.	 A member of staff may be dismissed from the Bank without
notice only for gross misconduct. In such cases, the Bank
has no liability to pay him/her beyond the day of his/her
dismissal.
8.	 All warnings, including informal warnings, given under
this procedure must be clearly marked as being a warning
under the Disciplinary Procedure.
Grievance Procedure
1 •	 Should any member of the staff have a complaint, it
should be first made to his/her Manager either informally
or at a formal interview. If he/she so wishes, another
staff member or an official of the Union may be present
at a formal interview.
2. If the Manager fails to resolve the issue within five
clear working days after the formal interview, he will
refer the matter by memorandum to the Personnel
Manager. The employee will countersign the memorandum
to acknowledge that he/she has read it.
3. The Personnel Manager will arrange a meeting between
the employee and, if desired, his/her representative and
appropriate members of management. If a satisfactory
solution has not been reached within a reasonable period,
e.g. ten clear working days of the arrival in Personnel
Department of the memorandum, the member of staff may
proceed as in Clause 4.
4. If the issue is not resolved at this level, a meeting may
be arranged between the national representative of the
employee and Bank management who will make a further
attempt to resolve the issue.
APPENDIX 6.2
NEW TECHNOLOGY
Agreement Between the
Co-operative Bank p.l.c. and BIFO
on the Introduction of
New Technology
Co-operative Bank p.l.c. Copy
November 1982
Agreement between the Co-operative Bank p.l.c.
and the Banking, Insurance and Finance Union
on the Introduction of New Technology
preamble
1. This agreement is entered into by the Co-operative
Bank p.l.c. (referred to as the "Bank" throughout
this document) and by the Banking, Insurance and
Finance Union (referred to throughout as the
"Union")
2. The parties to this agreement recognise the mutual
benefit to be derived from an increasingly efficient
and profitable business. The Union confirms and the
Bank acknowledges the Union's continued co-operation
with the improvement of organisation, methods, systems
and equipment. This agreement is based upon, and in
no way is intended to subvert, existing and prior
agreements as they relate to the Bank's entitlement
to manage its banking activities to maintain optimum
efficiency and the Union's entitlement to facilities
for negotiations on all matters affecting employees
of the Bank or any particular class of such employees.
It is recognised that, within the Banking Industry,
it is the Union's aim to obtain a shorter working week,
longer holidays and early retirement as methods of
maintaining overall employment levels in the frame-
work of a prosperous and efficient industry.
3. "New Technology" is defined in this context as computer
based organisation, methods, systems and equipment,
including visual display units, micro processors, word
processors, micro computers, electronic mail, remote
terminals and associated electronic systems using
integrated circuits.
4. In accordance with the existing collective bargaining
machinery there will be full involvement of employees
and their trade union representatives in the intro-
duction of new technology and its techniques. In
addition, the Bank will on all occasions give full
facilities to the Union for negotiation regarding the
proposed introduction of new technology insofar as
the introduction of such new technology may be regarded
as affecting staff, with a view to reaching agreement
on the planned implementation of such measures.
Application of Agreement
1. This agreement applies to all current and new
employees of the Bank who come within the scope
of the Union Nembership A9reement.
2. The Bank and the Union. agree that working conditions
may reflect the general trend in respect of matters
such as working.hours, holiday entitlement, etc.,
but that such ternis and conditions will remain subject
to specific negotiations from time to time in accordance
with established agreements.
3. No deskilling or downgrading of jobs resulting in
loss of status for, or otherwise affecting, existing
employees will take place as a result of the intro-
duction of new technology without agreement, and
any geographical relocation of staff will be on a
voluntary basis. Reviews of pay structures and
gradings as required consequent upon the introduction
of new technology may take place within the Joint
Committee on Staff Information, subject to existing
machinery and procedures at the request of either
party to those procedures and any changes resulting
from such review shall not be delayed beyond the
effective date of the introduction of relevant new
technology.
4. All personnel expected to use the new technological
systems or equipment will be given full training in
its use. Employees and trade union representatives
who are indirectly associated with the new equipment
will be given an appreciation of the New Technology.
5. New jobs arising out of the introduction of new
systems or equipment shall wherever practicable be
offered to existing employees.
6. There will be no extension, introduction or removal
outside of existing agreed parameters of shift working
or non standard hours without agreement. Payment in
respect of shift working and non standard hours shall
be undertaken within the existing agreement in respect
of shift premia and non standard hours.
7. Subject to the precepts contained in the prearn.ble as
contained above and to facilitate effective consul-
tation and negotiation on the introduction of New
Technology, the Bank agrees to provide employees and
their representatives with information in an under-
standable form as listed below:-
7.1 Specific proposals by the Bank for the intro-
duction o new technology
7.2 Aspects of change in job contentJjob desi9n,
labour force dimensions (including the employ-
ent of agency staff or sub-contracting stafl)
as may be inherent within the introduction of
new technology
7.3 Aspects of change in Bank operations or organ-
isation which might be reasonably expected to
result in the introduction of New Technology
and which may be cogently, authoritatively
and in an understandable form relayed to the
Union.
The Bank and the Union will consult on matters
relevant to the introduction of new technology by
way of the Joint Committee on Staff Information
and will negotiate as relevant on the introduction
of new technology by way of the Joint Negotiating
Council or other machinery constituted for the
resolution of disputes and matters arising between
the Bank and the Union, in accordance with any
practice that may exist from time to time. Records
shall be made of such consultation and negotiation
in accordance with existing arrangements.
8. The parties recognise their obligations under the
Health and Safety at Work Act 1974. Technical
information relating to the aspects of Health and
Safety will be taken into account before the intro-
duction of such equipment. Codes of Practice as
may be appropriate from time to time for the use
of New Technology will be agreed and when agreed
will be regarded as appendices to this agreement.
9. The signatories to this agreement are committed
to take all possible steps to avoid an enforced
reduction in the workforce as a direct result of
the introduction of New Technology. Any super-
nuinerary situation will be dealt with in a variety
of ways including redeployment, retraining, the
non-replacement of labour leaving through natural
wastage, etc., insofar as these are applicable.
These are not .given in any particular order of
preference, nor is this an exhaustive list of
alternatives. It is recognised that the ability
of the Bank to maintain this policy has been and
will be due, in no small part, to the readiness
of staff to co-operate fully in the introduction
of new technology and readily to accept redeploy-
ment. The Bank will seek to continue this policy
although this document does not constitute a
permanent agreement to do so if, for example,
Sbusiness circumstances change. The Union under-
takes accordingly to encourage its meitibers to
maintain full co-operation with reasonable techno-
logical change and to accept reasonable voluntary
redeployment and retraining where appropriate.
The Bank and the Union agree that full co-operation
and proper observance of the terms of this agree-
ment will not be withdrawn in pursuance of any
claim or dispute involving or affecting the Bank
and/or the Union which does not arise directly
from the introduction and application of New
Technology within this Bank.
Termination of Agreement
1.	 This agreement may be terminated by either party
submitting three months' notice of termination in
writing to the other party. Amendments to the
agreement may be made at any time by mutual consent.
Signed on behalf of the:-
S
Co-operativeBankp.l.c.
Banking, Insurance & Finance Union 	 •1'.
Date . .'? ?'. .' 'P-(
APPENDIX 6.3
JOB SECURITY
An Agreement for Security of Employment
Between the Co-operative Bank plc
and the
Banking, Insurance and Finance Union
SECTION 1
Definitions and Statements
1.	 The Parties
This Agreement is entered into by the Co-operative
Bank plc (referred to hereinafter as the "Bank")
and the Banking, Insurance and Finance Union
(referred to hereinafter as the "Union").
2.	 Previous Agreements
This Agreement is not intended to subvert existing
and prior agreements made between the parties as
they relate to the Banks entitlement to manage its
banking activities to maintain optimum efficiency
and the Union's entitlement to facilities for
negotiations on all matters affecting employees
of the Bank or any particular class of such employees
unless specifically stated in this agreement.
3.	 General Principles
3.1	 it is the policy of the Bank to provide security
of employment for every member of its staff
having due regard to the need for an increasingly
efficient and profitable business. 	 Such security
of employment is best provided by careful planning
in the adoption and development of new or revised
business practices and/or procedures. In accord-
ance with this principle and Section 1 of this
Agreement, the Parties agree that they share a
common aim of maintaining the efficiency and
prQf i. t a b U lty f the Bank and in cQnti.nung
to further the. et pQible. relationftips in
order' tQ afegurd the current or future
employment of the s t aff of the Banks
3.2	 tn accordance with sub.clause 3,1 above, the
Bank and the Union shall therefore strtve to
cope wi'th future fluctuations in staffing
requirements by the provision of sufficient
time and effort to finding alternattve employ-
ment for surplus staff.
3.3 However, from time to time the conduct of business
in organisations is adversely affected by economic
and social factors both of an internal and external
nature and it is therefore recognised that it is
not possible for the Bank to guarantee security of
employment in perpetuity.
	 To maintain financial
stability and the longer term security of the
majority of staff, it may be necessary as a last
resort to reduce the numbers employed.	 In such
circumstances the Bank and the Union accept that
Section 2 of this Agreement shall apply.
4.	 Purpose and Scope
4.1	 The purpose of this Agreement is to set out the
procedural arrangements prior to and during any
operation as described under sub-clause 3,3
above.
4.2	 Details of substantjye matters, including severance
terms and th.e process Qf consultation with the
Unjon	 are determined by' th.js Agreement1
4.3 This Agreement applies to all staff employed
by the Bank.
4.4 The Bank recognises the Union as being entitled
to represent the interests of their members who
are within the scope of this Agreement and its
provisions.
5.	 Definitions
In this Agreement;-
5.1	 "Employees" means staff of the Bank who are
within the scope of this Agreement under sub-
clause 4.3 above.
5.2	 "Suitable Alternative EmploymentH means employ-
ment at least at the same grade and salary.
The factors to be taken into account are set
out at Sub-Clause 10.2.
5.3 "Other Alternative Employment" means employment
at a higher or lower grade than existing grade
with or without significant retraining.	 The
factors to be taken in account are set out at
Sub-Clause 10.4.
5.4 "Procedural Agreement" means the Agreement dated
22nd June, 1978, between the Bank and BIFU and
relating to "Negotiating and Consultative
Procedure"
5.5	 "Redundancy" means dismissal attributable to
the circumstances defined in Section 81(2) and
(3) of the Employment Protection (Consolidation)
Act 1978 or any amendment thereof, namely:
"81	 (2)	 For the purposes of this Act an
employee who is dismissed shall be taken
to be dismissed by reason of redundancy
if the dismissal is attributable wholly
or mainly to -
a) the fact that his employer has ceased,
or intends to cease, to carry on the
business for the purposes of which the
employee was employed by him, or has
ceased, or intends to cease, to carry
on that business in the place where
the employee was so employed,
or
b) the fact that the requirements of that
business for employees to carry out
work of a particular kind, or for
employees to carry out work of a
particular kind in the place where he
was so employed, have ceased or
diminished or are expected to cease
or diminish.
For the purposes of this subsection, the
business of the employer together with the
business or businesses of his associated
emp lo yer s shall be treated as one unless
either of the conditions specified in
thi 5 subsection would be satisfied without
so treating those businesses.
(3)	 In subsection (2),	 cease	 means cease
e i the r permanently or temporarily and from
whatsoever cause, and	 diminish	 has a
corresponding meaning.
S6.	 Objectives
The objectives of this Agreement are:-
6.1	 To set up arrangements and to formulate the
joint review of staffing requirements and
the consideration of any surplus of employees
which may arise.
6.2 To introduce procedures for reducing to a
minimum the number of employees who might
become surplus to the needs of the Bank.
6.3 To protect those who do become surplus to
requirements by the introduction of measures
designed to maintain continuity of employment.
6.4 To provide a scale of severance payments and
early retirement terms in the event that current
or future employment of employees cannot be
maintained.
7.	 Staffing Review Committee
The parties agree that regular consultation shall
take place between the Bank and the Union on the
implications for employees which may arise from the
adoption or development of new or revised business
practices and/or procedures and changed trading or
economic circumstances.	 In order to provide an
appropriate forum for consultation and discussion
of these matters the Parties agree to the estab-
lishment of a Staffing Review Committee (SRC).
7.1	 The functions of the SRC shall be:-
7.1.1	 To review regularly the staffing impli-
cations referred to in Clause 7 above.
7.1.2 To consider as a consequence of such a
review any appropriate means including the
provisions of this Agreement for reducing
to a minimum the number of employees who
become surplus to the overall needs of the
Bank.
7.2 The representatives on the Committee shall be
senior officials of the Bank and the Union.
The number of representatives shall be decided
by agreement between the Parties and by prior
agreement between the Parties individuals who
are in a position to provide specialist advice
or assistance may also be invited to meetings
of the Committee.
7.2.1	 The SRC shall meet at least four times
a year or at such other frequency as
may be agreed between the Parties.
7.2.2 When appropriate the SRC may establish
• Sub-Committees to consider particular
problems.
7.3 Through the SRC the Bank agrees to inform the
Union and to provide them with appropriate
information at concept stage or as soon as
reasonably practicable thereafter on planned
reorgansations including, for example, the
determination of manpower structures and
requirements together with the effect, if
any, of proposed changes in career progression
and the impact of natural wastage. 	 The SRC
shall hereinafter encompass the operation of
the Joint Committee on Staff Information as
constituted by agreement and minuted within
the Joint Negotiating Committee of 7th May,
1980, together with the facilities and
procedures for negotiation afforded to the
Union under the terms of the New Technology
Agreement, dated 12th November, 1982.
7.4 Within the SRC, the Parties agree to conduct
djscjns and use their best endeavours to
resolve any question of safeguarding the current
or future employment of employees.
7.4.1	 The Bank seeks by this Agreement to
operate job security arrangements which
ensure that staffing reductions which
are required are achieved by the successive
stages of the job security procedure, as
detailed in Section 2 of the Agreement.
7.4.2	 Both parties agree to endeavour to ensure
that the resolution of matters relating
to job security is achieved within the
Staffing Review Committee constituted for
that purpose.
7.4.3	 Each of the Parties agree that while any
difference or dispute is being considered
under this Agreement or under any separate
procedures agreed between the Parties, the
status quo shall be maintained until such
procedures have been exhausted.
7.4.4 Any difference or dispute concerning
individual interests as described under
Sub-Clause 3.3 regarding measures to
reduce the numbers of staff employed or
individual appeals resulting from such
measures as outlined in Section 2, shall
be referred for resolution to a panel
under the Individual Appeal Procedure -
see Appendix 4.
7.4.5 Nothing contained within this Agreement
shall restrict the Banks right to plan,
organise and manage its activities with
a view to achieving optimum efficiency
and a satisfactory level of profitability
or the Union's entitlement to discharge
its policy of safeguarding absolutely the
interests of its members, in terms of job
security and/or benefits and to lodge
claims on matters from time to time in
accordance with the Procedural Agreement.
7.4.6	 However, should a matter concerning general
pay and conditions of service or any other
matter, fail to be negotiated between the
Parties or a difference or dispute exists
in the SRC as to whether selective redun-
dancy is unavoidable, then reference may
be made by either party for resolution
under the Procedural Agreement, notwith-
standing that Appendix I and Appendix 3
as contained within this Agreement, shall
apply.
SECTION 2
8.	 Staffi'ng Surpluses
8.1	 By the use of the means i:n Section 1 of this
Agreement the Parties hope to avoid surpluses
of employees but should these measures fail
then tn accordance with subclause 33 above
the Parties agree that as a last resort the
following shall apply:-
8.1.1	 A procedure for dealing with such
circumstances as outlined under Clauses
8.3 to 11.7.
8.1.2 Arrangements for severance payments in
respect of male and female employees -
Appendix 1.
8.2	 Clauses 8.3 to 11.7 and Appendix 1 shall apply
to all full time employees and part-time
employees on a pro-rata basis.
8.3 The Bank will advise the Union of a redundancy
situation in accordance with the provisions of
the Staffing Review Committee, subject to the
provisions of Section 99 of the Employment
Protection Act 1975,	 The Bank shall advise
the Union in writing at the earliest possible
opportunity Qf any branch, department, etc.,
where a redundancy situation has emerged and of
other informatin as js required by legislation.
8.4	 In situation	 under suh'-clause 8l a b ove, the
Bank shall, undertake the following stages of
action.	 The order of listing should not be
taken to imply chronological order or mutual
inclusion or exclusion of stages.
	 The decision
to apply each stage being determined as relevant
and required by the Parties. The stages defined
do not preclude an over staffing situation being
permitted to continue for a limited period of
time as agreed by the SRC to allow natural wastage
to bring staffing numbers down to the correct
level
Stage 1 - Reductton of Temporary and Agency Staff
The employment of temporary contract
and agency contract staff shall be
reviewed and subject only to over-
riding exigencies, and having regard
to such contractual obligations as
may exist, such staff shall be released.
Stage 2 - Cessation of Recruitment
To allow natural wastage to have
maximum effect external recruitment
will be discontinued except for those
posts which cannot be filled from
existing staff.
Stage 3 - Reduction of Overtime
Subject to overriding requirements of
operational exigency, overtime shall
be eliminated in those occupations or
areas of work affected.
Stage 4 - Over Retirement Age Employees
Subject to overriding requirements of
operational exigency and contractual
obligations as may exist, staff who
have been permitted at the Bank's
discretion to continue to be employed
after their normal retirement age
shall have their contract of employment
termtna ted.
Stage 5 - Voluntary Early Retirement
See Clause 9 below.
Stage 6 - Redeployment and Retraining
See Clause 10 below.
Stage 7 - Voluntary Redundancy
See Clause 11 below.
9.	 Voluntary Early Rettrement
9.1	 rn circumstances of redundancy or otherwise,
the Bank shall invite applications for Voluntary
Early Retirement, as agreed by the SRC.
	 rn
considering applications due regard shall be
paid to the criteria in Appendix 3 of the
Agreement.	 Employees may appeal against their
non-selection under the Individual Appeal
Procedure - Appendix 4.
9.2 The terms of Voluntary Early Retirement whether
in circumstances of redundancy or otherwise,
shall be those under Appendix 1 of the Agreement.
10.	 Redeploymenrand Retraining
The Bank shall utilise as far as practicable the
deployment and retraining of staff to/from the areas
affected in order to minimise the overall and ultimate
staffing surpluses that may occur.
	 It is recognised
that a professional career within the Co-operative
Bank re.qui. re	 inifjcant degr ee Qf	 and geog
raphical rnQbi,lit,y.
	 Therefcre, in th,e cQntext of any'
s t a ffng surp1us emp1oe.e must recontse that their
career prospects 'll be di:nijnihed if they are unable
to accept offers of redeployment requiring a move of
residence. Offers' of redeployment made under this
provision wtll have full regard to the geographical
mobility of employ'ees as' determined by' the Mobility
of Labour Agreement dated 22nd November, 1983.
10.1 All offers of redeployment under this Agreement,
including any training when appropriately
required, shall be made by the Bank in writing
and acceptances by employees shall be in writing.
10.2 The Bank shall make all reasonable efforts to
redeploy employees to Suitable Alternative
Employment.	 This shall be with due consideration
to performance in existing jobs, possession of
particular knowledge or skill useful to the
performance of another job, length of service
and such other factors including personal circum-
stances.	 The short and longer term career
development interests of the employee concerned
and the need of the Bank to provide for future
skill and management requirements will also be
taken into account.
	 Specific consideration shall
be given to the potential for any further training
or other training as required for such Suitable
Alternative Employment.	 To this end, counselling
shall be given by p ersonnel Department and be
available to emplyee	 in connection with their
jobs or careers1
10.3 E mp l o yees who decline an jnyjtaton of Suitable
Alternative Employment, wth or without a move
of residence, shall be considered for further
redeployment to Suitable Plternative Employ-
ment elsewhere again having regard to the
criteria speci'fied in Clauses 10 and 10.1.
10.4 When the Bank cannot offer Suitable Alternative
Employment under Sub-Claue 10,2, employees may
be asked to consider Other Alternative Employment.
This may consist of e m pl o ym ent at the same or
higher grade but which requires significant
retraining or may consist of a job at a lower
grade, with or without significant retraining.
Such offers of redeployment shall be made by
the Bank in writing and acceptances by employees
shall be in writing.
10.5 When such an offer of employment is made, in
accordance with Sub-Clause 10.4, in writing and
accepted in writing by an employee, the
arrangements for salary and other conditions
of service in Appendix 2 shall apply.
10.6 Counselling shall be given by Personnel Depart-
ment and be available to employees in connection
with their jobs or careers.
10.7 When an employee accepts redeployment under
Sub-Clauses 10.4 and 10.5 there shall be a trial
period during which either the Bank or the
employee may terminate the revised contract of
employment.	 The trial period shall be for a
minimum of three months and not more than twelve
months and following discussions between the
Parties such period shall be agreed with the
employee and confirmed in writing before the
trial period commences. Such a trial period
shall be undertaken without prejudice to all
entitlements and obligations subsisting by
reason of the. cQntrct of	 niplo'iiirit	 nd
provided for by' tfti A9reeJ1int
10.8 tthen employees consider th,t they' have been
offered ui. table A1 t erntive Employment or
Other Al ternative Employinent unreasonably or
have been unreaonably dented offers or
Suttable Alternative Employment or Other
Alternati've Employment under Sub-C1auses 10.4
and 10.5, they may appeal under the rndivdual
Appeal Procedure.
11.	 Voluntary Redundancy
11.1 In circumstances of redundancy or otherwise
the Bank shall invite applications for redundancy.
tn such circumstances employees shall retain
their entitlement to terms under Appendix 1
when a date for termination of employment is
mutually agreed between the Bank and the
employee in writing.
Selection of employees in response to an invitation
to apply for redundancy shall be made as under
Appendix 3.	 Employees may appeal against their
non-selection under the Individual Appeals
Procedure - Appendix 4.
11.2 The minimum period of notice required in cases
of redundancy wjll be in accordance with the
contract of employment or such longer period as
is required by leislation	 Notice due to expire
by the date of termination of employment will
normally' be worked1	 When this j s not possible
payment tn li:eu of notjce, subject to SubClause
11.3, shall be made.
11.3 Employees may apply to leave before thetr period
of notice expires and hence waive part or all of
their notice.	 Agreement to do so shall not be
unreasonably withheld but shall be judged in the
light of the individual employees circumstances
and the Bank's operational and financtal require-
ments.	 Where such agreement has been given in
writing, entitlement to the terms in Appendix 1
shall not be withheld except that there shall be
no payment in lieu of notice beyond the revised
date of termfnati'on of employment. However,
employees who leave before their period of notice
expires, without the agreement of the Bank in
writing, may forfeit their entitlement to the
terms in Appendix 1.	 Employees may appeal against
a decision not to agree to early release under
the Individual Appeal Procedure - Appendix 4.
11.4 Time off to seek new employment or make arrange-
ments for training for future employment shall
be subject to the approval of the Bank, such
approval not to be unreasonably withheld, and
in cases where approval is given it will be time
off with pay.
11.5 The Bank will give all reasonable assistance to
employees in the securing of relevant state
benefits, for example unemployment pay, supple-
mentary benefit, etc., as may be reasonably
requested by employees and the Bank will make
any such representations as may be relevant or
required on behalf of employees whose employment
ceases by reason of redundancy to such relevant
ministries and other statutory bodies as may be
app r op r i ate.
11.6 The Bank will supply suck ref e rences as may be
requested by' prospective alternative employers
in a ti'nieous fashion with a viewS
 to furthering
the best interests of employ'ees in securing
.alternattve employment insofar as this does not
require the Bank to do other than present full
and factual answers in respect of enquiries received
from prospective employers.
11.7 The Bank shall make financial counselling
available to all employees whose employment
ceases by way of redundancy in accordance
with this Agreement.	 Such financial counsel-
ling shall comprise of an interview with a
representative of Holyoake rnsurance Brokers
Limited.	 Any verbal advice given at these
interviews shall be free of charge and shall
be given without liability on the part of the
Company or its employees.
12.	 Amendment
This Agreement may be amended by either Party giving
at least 28 days notice of a proposal to do so. A
proposal to amend the Agreement shall be dealt with
under the Procedural Agreement.
13.	 Termination of Aqreernent
This Agreement may be terminated by either the Bank
or the Union by not less than six months notice
in writing.
Signed for and Qfl heh1f g f th.e ank;
Signed for and on behalf of the Union:
Dated:
Appendix i
Payment Provisions in Respect of Employees
Leaving the Bank
	 eryce
1.	 Staff Aged 50 and Over with 5 or More Years
Pensionable Service
1.1	 The Bank will make provision for a penston
payable immediately based on penstonable servIce
and pensionable earnings to date of retirement.
1.2 A reduction in the final pension payable, of
4% per annum for each year of early retIrement,
will be made except In the case of employees
aged 60 and over with 25 or more years pensionable
service who retire at the request of the Bank
when the Bank will make provision for no
reduction to be made.
1.3 Employees may elect to commute up to 	 of
pension entitlement for a tax-free cash sum
subject to the proviso that the maximum tax
free cash sum that may be taken is limited to
the maximum amount permitted by the Commissioners
of the Inland Revenue from time to time.
1.4	 In addition to the above employees will be
entitled to cash payments as described under
Appendix 1, Clause 4.
2.	 Staff Aged 50 and Over with Less Than 5 Years
Pensionable Service
2.1	 No pension is payable; employees will be
entitled to a refund of their contributions
with interest thereon, less tax at 10%
or such other rate	 may be determined by
the Commissioners of the rnland Reyenue
from time to time.
2.2 Employees will be entitled to cash payments
as described under Appendix 1, Clause 4.
3.	 Staff Aged Under 50
3.1	 No immediate pensions are payable but pensions
of staff aged between 26 and 49 inclusive, with
five years service or more, shall be deferred
and paid at normal retirement age. 	 Deferred
pensions shall be improved by a rate deter-
mined by the trustees from time to time but
not exceeding 5% per annum compound. An
employee entitled to a deferred pension may
elect to receive an early retirement pension
in lieu thereof at any time from age 50 subject
to a reduction of 4% per annum for each year
of early retirement. 	 For employees with less
than five years pensionable service, Sub-Clause
2.1 will apply.
3.2	 Employees will be entitled to cash payments
as described under Appendix 1, Clause 4.
4.	 Calculation of Severance Payments
4.1	 If employees volunteer to accept Voluntary Redun-
dancy under Clause ll	 a severance payment will
be made, calculated in accordance with the
provisions of this Appendix.
I4.2 The amount of entitlement will be a bastc
award of 8 weeks pay plus the further entit-
lements as determined by the following scale,
with the provtso that no employee who has
completed one years continuous service shall
receive less than 12 weeks pay.
4.3 For each complete year of service, up to a
maximum of 20, an employee is entitled to
receive:
4.3.1 For each year of employment from age
18 and over but under 22 - half a weeks
pay.
4.3.2 For each year of employment from age
22 and over but under 41 - one weeks
pay.
4.3.3 For each year of employment from age 41
and over but under 65 (men), 60 (women) -
one and a half weeks pay.
And, in addition:
4.4 Further entitlements to Sub-Clause 4.3 above as
follows:
4.4.1	 For those employees aged 54 or below
Service (yearsj
At least 2 but less than	 5
At least 5 but less than 10
At least 10 but less than 20
At least 20 but less than 25
Over 25 years
Additional
Enti tl ement
2 weeks
4 weeks
6 weeks
9 weeks
13 weeks
4.4.2 For th.os. e employees a9ed 55 .. 59 (mej
55-5 Cwomnj
Service	 years),
At least 2 but less than 5
At least 5 but less than 10
At least 10 but less than 20
At least 20 but less than 25
At least 25 but less than 30
At least 30 but less than 33
At least 33 but less than 35
At least 35 but less than 40
Over 40 years
Additional
Entttlement
2 weeks
4 weeks
6 weeks
9 weeks
13 weeks
18 weeks
21 weeks
26 weeks
30 weeks
4.4.3 For those employees aged 60-64 (men)
57-59 (women)
Additional
Age	 (in years)
	
EntItl ement
Males	 Females
60	 57
	
140%
61	 57
	
110%
62	 58
	
80%
63	 58
	
60%
64	 59
	
50%
4.5 No employee is to receive more as a severance
payment than he/she would have earned had he!
she worked until normal retirement age (65 male
and 60 female),
4.6 The definition of a weeks pay will be the same
as descrjbed in the Employment Protection
(Consolidation) Act 1978 excepting that the
maximum earnings limit will be disregarded.
4.7 Severance payments will be made in a lump
sum on the termination of employment at the
agreed date irrespective of whether alternative
employment h.a seen secured.
4.8 These cash payments include an individual's
statutory entitlement to redundancy payments.
5.	 Other Considerations
5. 1
	 Where an employee whose eniploynient has ceased
by way of redundancy has outstanding prefer-
ential borrowings with the Bank in the form of
either housing loans or personal loans, then
such borrowings shall continue upon extsting
terms for a period not exceeding two years from
date of dismissal or until such date as the
employee obtains permanent alternative employ-
ment, whichever date is the earliest.
5.2	 In the case of budget accounts, VISA cards,
and other borrowings which are not necessarily
at preferential rates of interest but where
the borrowing authorised may have had regard
to the specific status of an employee as an
employee of the Bank, then such borrowing shall
continue upon existing terms without amendment
within the normal constraints and parameters
of the customer relationship irrespective of
circumstances of departure.
5.3	 The Bank will undertake to maintain insurance
for employees whose employment ceases by way of
redundancy' in respect of the death of the employee
dismissed as redundant for a period of one year
from the date of dismissal.
	
Such insurance will
be at the rate of one year's salary as earned
in the twelve months prior to employment ceasing.
ppendix 2
Ernployn1enttnAccQr d nce 'ith Suh —Clue 1Q5
1.	 Salary - All Grades
Present salary' together wjth salary' expectations
within a personalised salary range will be
maintained.
2.	 Annual Leave
Existing Annual Leave Entitlement will be maintained.
3.	 Other Terms
Other current terms of employment relating to the
status of the employee (expenses provisions, loan
limit entitlements, etc.) will be maintained. 	 Other
current benefits related to the nature of the job
performed (Bank car, shift allowances, etc.) shall
not be maintained although the Bank may exercise
discretion in ensuring that the withdrawal of such
benefits does not occasion unreasonable hardship or
distress.
•0
Appendjx 3
1.	 SeleCtiQn for Voluntary edundancy
1.1	 Selection of employees for voluntary redun-
dancy shall be made on the basis of the list
of criteria as set out under Clause 2 below.
These criteria are not listed in any order of
preference.
1.2 The selection of employees will be made by
the responsible line management together with
the Head of Personnel of the Co-operative Bank
Group or his nominee.
1.3 Whenever reasonably practicable, special
consideration shall be given to registered
disabled staff.
2.	 Selection Criteria
2.1	 In circumstances when staff surpluses exist,
consideration shall be given to the following;
Length of service to be on the basis of
continuous service not cumulative service
Age
Capability and performance
Qualifications and experience
Conduct
Attendance record
Time keeping
(Note:	 The above l j t s. not exhautiye
and other factors may' be apprQprtate
dependent on the circumstances.)
2.2 The Bank will have regard to cases of personal
and financial hardship insofar as it is possible
to have this regard.
3.	 Right to Retain Employees
The above order of criteria is subject to the right
of the Bank to retain staff on the grounds of
individual ability or specialist knowledge in order
that the Bank is able to maintain the long term
viability of its operating and business position
insofar as this may be determined or affected by
the assessed capability of the employees remaining
within the organisation to affect that long term
viability.
Fppendix 4
Individual Appeal PrQcedure
1.	 Functions of the rndividual Appeal Procedure
The rndividual Appeal Procedure shall cover appeals
from employees under the following Clauses of Section
2 of this Agreement:
Sub-Clause 9.1
Employees who consider they have unreasonably been
denied selection for Voluntary Early Retirement in
response to an invitation to apply for Voluntary
Early Retirement.
Sub-Clause 10.8
Employees who consider that they have been offered
Suitable Alternative Employment or Other Alternative
Employment unreasonably or have been unreasonably
denied offers of Suitable Alternative Employment or
Other Alternative Employment.
Sub-Clause 11.1
Employees who consider they have unreasonably been
denied selection for redundancy in response to an
invitation to apply for redundancy.
Sub-Clause 11.3
Employees who consider they' have been unreasonably
refused early release following receipt of notice
of termination of employment.
2.	 Form of Appeal
An employee thQ wishes. tQ lodge an appeal shall do
so in writi'ng tQ the I{ead Qf PerQnnel stating the
following:
2.1	 The Clause under Section 2 of this Agreement
under which the Appeal is made,
2.2 The reason for making the appeal.
2.3 Any personal or other ctrcumstances he/she
wishes to bring to the attention of the panel
as outlined below.
3. Ti'me Limits on Appeals
To be agreed between the Parties.
4. Composition
The panel shall consist as follows:
General Manager (Administration) - Chairman
General Manager of appellants own division
(or their deputies)
A full time paid official of the Union
An official of the Union
In addition, the panel shall appoint an officer of
the Bank to act as Secretary to deal with admin-
istration and to make 	 record of discussions.	 The
panel shall have the power to invite attendance from
representatives of the Rank as. may be appropriate
in specialist areas. 	 In the eyent of an appeal not
being satisfactorily determined by' the Panel , then
th.e Panel shall be entitled to request the attendance
of an independent chairman, agreed by the Parties and
appointed from outside the Bank, who shall be
empowered to determtne the appeal.
5. Appeals Procedure
Upon receipt of a written appeal the Head of Personnel
shall instruct the Secretary' to arrange a suitable
date for the hearing.
	 This date should, wherever
possible, be not more than ten working days from
receipt of the appeal by' the Head of Personnel.
6. The Appeal Hearing
6.1	 The appellant shall normally be expected to
attend for an interview when the appeal is
considered but if he or she so wishes the
opportunity to attend may be waived.
6.2 At the hearing an employee making the appeal
may, if he/she so wishes, be accompanied or
represented by a paid Union official or other
official.	 If preferred by the appellant,
support may be provided by any employee of
the Bank who is willing to attend the hearing
in a personal capacity.
6.3	 Following the hearing of the appeal and all
relevant presentations thereto, the Panel
hearing the appeal will either confirm the
decision or allow the appeal.	 A decision in
writing will be conveyed by the Secretary of
the Panel to the employee as soon as possible,
and a copy sent to the Individual supporting
the appellant or the paid Union official or
other official as appropriate.
6.4 A note of th.e hearing shall also be taken.
The ecretary shall supply copies of the note
to the employee, and tQ the ndividua1 supporting
Fthe appellant or paid Union official or other
offici'al as appropri.tee wjthjn 10 days, where
pQssible, after each hearing.
APPENDIX 6.4
MOBILITY OF LABOUR
An Agreement for Mobility of Labour
Between the Co-operative Bank plc
and the
Banking, Insurance and Finance Union
FSECT tori 1
Defi'ni'ti'Qn	 nd 5ttement
1.	 The Parties
This agreement is entered into by the Co'-operattve
Bank plc (referred to hereinafter as the "Bank")
and the Banking, Insurance and Finance Union
(referred to hereinafter as the "Union").
2.	 Previous Agreements
This Agreement is not intended to subvert existing
and prior agreements made between the Parties as
they relate to the Bank's entitlement to manage its
banking activities to maintain optimum efficiency
and the Union's entitlement to facilities for
negotiations on all matters affecting employees
of the Bank or any particular class of such employees
unless specifically stated in this Agreement.
3.	 General Principles
3.1	 It would be unrealistic to do other than recognise
that the staff of the Bank Group comprise both
of staff who join for an extended career within
the Bank and who wis h to maximise their devel-
opment to the limi t s of their personal potential,
and of staff who join for a job with finite
employment prospects	 There are also staff that
fall between these two extremes and staff whose
respective posit i Q ns and perceptions of their
job/career amht'on varies accordtng to time, age,
domestic circumstances, etc.
32 Where a member of st a ff j CQmmtted to a
long term and upward career wjth.jn the Bank,
then i't must be recognised that the Bank
consists of some 3,500 staff in sotiie hundred
separate geographtcal locations and that a
reasonable degree of Job and geographical
mobility will enhance the career prospects
of a member of staff. If a member of staff
wishes to be employed upon a career basis
and to maintain expectattons of salary and
progression in line with that career, then
subject to Sub-Clause 3.3 below it must be an
intrinsic element of his employment that he is
mobile.
3.3	 It is recognised that particular consideration
may be required to career development and mobility
of labour as regards specialist careers and
progressions.	 It is recognised also that prog-
ression is not excluded within certain limited
locations where relevant work is available and
having regard to particular personal/domestic
circumstances that may change from time to time
in determining the availability of employees for
job and geographical mobility.
3.4	 If a member of staff wishes to accept the limit-
ations on his ultimate progression within the
organisation that are inherently present, if
he is not prepared to make an employment commit-
ment to mobility, then there are sufficient
opportunities for security of employment and
limited career prQspect for the majority of
people in th.t category but that member of staff
cannot as.k the Bank to realise epectattons
they' may' have of salary and status progression
fn the same way that the more iiiobtle employee
could do so.
35	 t is recQ9nied tht from tijije to tjnj the
par ti: cu ar perCe.pti:QnS Ifld expecttion Qf
indiwtdua1 me.m.ers of staff w'i1l cflnge but
in general the Bank would expect 1
 in employ'
ment terms, and in order to fund its future
need for management, t differentiate between
staff according t these paranieter.
4.	 Obectives and Scope
4.1	 The objective of this Agreement is to set up
arrangements and introduce revised terms of
service, specifically enhanced mobility
requirements, to enable the Bank to improve
the on-going utilisation of its manpower
resource and the training and development of
individual employees.
4.2 This Agreement applies to all staff employed
by the Bank.
4.3 The Bank recognises the Union as being entitled
to represent the interests of their members who
are within the scope of this Agreement and its
provisions.
5.	 The Bank shall, pursuant to this Agreement, amend
Clause 1 of the Statement of Terms of Employment
(form EMP 257.) and jncluded at Appendix 1 of this
Agreement, to read	 follows;r
"1. EMLO'(MENT	 '(our employment wjth the Company
j's. initially' in the pottion of
	
. .	 •
and your tnt'ti.al place of work will be at our
... branch/office,
You wi,Jl he r e q u ire d tQ undertke.	 t the
direction Qf the CQmpny-,
	 nd	 ll dute
wh.i,ch reasQnbly fall dtMn th.e scope of your
capabil I'ties.
The Company undertakes to offer to you oppor-
tunities as- may- exist for Job and career
development and seeks to provide for the long
term needs of the Company in skill and
management terms. Commensurately, you may
be required at the direction of the Company
to work at any of the Company's Untted Ktngdom
locations.
(** delete if inapplicable) 'I
6.	 The Bank shall, at its discretion, reissue the
Statement of Terms of Employment as amended at Clause
1 and undertakes to draw the attention of all members
of staff to the amended clauses. Each member of staff
shall be required within the contractual notice
period due to hm to acknowledge receipt of the
amended Statement of Terms of Employment in accordance
with the provisions of the Statement of Terms of
Employment with the respective deletion in the amended
Clause 1 made or not made.
7.	 Each member of staff of the Bank may, by submission
to Personnel Department in writing, have his Terms
of Employment as stated in the Statement of Terms of
Employment changed at any' time should there be a
change in employaientJprofes.tona l Jp e rsQ n al or domestic
circumstances that may' merit such changes
8.	 Staff who have not accepted the general mobility
provisons as contained at Clause S above, may at
any time record a ljmited or specific vailabi1ity
for mQi li. ty wthn the fa c ul t i e s Qf the Bank'
appraisal systems r bk" se.parat amendments in
writing to Personnel Department t the latest
recorded appraisal form.
9. Where an employee moves restdence, the conditions
set forth in the Personnel Manual, under P5F,
pertaining to staff who move at the Banks request,
will apply.
10. Amendment
This Agreement may be amended by either Party giving
at least 28 days notice of a proposal to do so. A
proposal to amend the Agreement shall be dealt with
under the Procedural Agreement.
11. Termination of Agreement
This Agreement may be terminated by either the Bank
or the Union by not less than six months notice in
writing.
Signed for and on behalf of the Bank:
Sig	 or and on b.	 1f of the Union;
Dated:
ICOOPERATIVE BANK GROUP
	
Appendix 1
(Co-operative Bank p.l.c. - First Co-operative Finance Limited)
Statement of Terms of Employment, pursuant to the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978.
The following are particulars of the terms and conditions of employment on which the Co-operative Bank p.l.c./
First Co-operative Finance Limited of 1 BALLOON STREET, MANCHESTER, M60 4EP (the Company) employ:-
(Mr/MrslMiss/Ms)...........................................................................................................(the Employee)
asat .............................................................................................19.....(current date) your employment
havingbegun on .........................................................................................................................19.....
The Company, therefore, regards previous employment with
whichbegan on..........................................................................................................19.....as ranking as
continuous with your current employment within the terms of the Employment Protection (Consolidation)
Act 1978.
	
1	 EMPLOYMENT. Your employment with the Company is initially in the position of........................
-------------------------------------------and your initial place of work will be at
our---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Branch/Office.
You will be required to undertake, at the direction of the Company, any and all duties which
reasonably fall within the scope of your capabilities.
2 REMUNERATION. Your remuneration is at the following rate within the Grade stated, and is in
accordance with collective agreements () made between the Company and the Banking, Insurance
and Finance Union (BIFU) as they exist at any one time:-
£ ......................................................................................................................per annum
........................................................................................Grade.
If Section 4(c) below applies you will receive, in addition to the remuneration stated above, a shift
payment of % of basic salary per annum, which at present rates will be £
This payment will remain in operation for so long as you are assigned to the shift system stated.
Your remuneration will be paid four-weekly in arrears and credited to your current account
	
3	 OVERTIME. If worked, will be paid in accordance with the collective agreements () reached between
the Company and BIFU as they exist at any one time.
	
4	 HOURSOF WORK
Normal hours of work:
(a) are in accordance with collective agreements (C) made between the Company and BIFU as they
exist at any one time and are currently............................hours per week.
(b) are the normal daily hours of the department in which you are employed and any additional
hours necessary for the proper discharge of your duties.
Ic) You are required to work a shift system on the following basis ..............................................
which constitutes an average of......................hours per week.
Hours of work, where specified, constitute the normal hours, but these may be adjusted as necessary,
to meet the exigencies of the business.
5 HOLIDAYS. You are entitled to statutory and customary holidays as they exist at any one time. In
addition, vacation leave will be granted and paid in accordance with the collective agreements ()
reached between the Company and BIFU as they exist at any one time.
6 SICKNESS OR INJURY. In cases of absence through sickness or injury, you must advise your Branch/
Departmental Manager as early as possible on the first day of the reasons and likely duration of your
absence. If the absence extends beyond 7 days you are required to produce a statement(s) authenticated
by your Doctor as to the reasons for your continued absence. Any periods of absence up to 7 days will
require the completion of a Form of Self Certification upon your return to work. The duration of
sick leave and the amount of sick pay are as detailed in the Company's regulations ()•
EMP 257 (12/82)
PART A
APPENDIX 7
POLICY COMMITTEE
APPENDIX 7	 U
Agenda for meeting to be held on
Tuesday, 1st December, 1987 at 11:30 a.m.
1. Minutes of Meetings
1.1.	 Minutes of previous meeting dated 27.10.87 (own papers)
1.2.	 Minutes of special meeting dated 18.11.87 (own papers)
2. Matters Arising
3.
3.1.	 quick Results - own papers
Week No.45 ended 21st November, 1987
3.2.	 Number of Accounts - week ended 20th November, 1987
3.3.	 Manager Accounts - Period 10- own papers
4. Strategic Considerations
PL
RCS
PL
4.1.	 Employee Relations Strategy - own papers 	 RCS
4.2.	 Communications Strategy	 RCS
4.3.	 Relocation Policy	 RCS
4.4. EFTPOS UK	 LW
4.5.	 Budget Commentary - verbal 	 CJBR
5. Operational Considerations
5.1.	 Chief Executive's memoranda re Minutes of meetings of Product &
Technology and Human Resources Committees - own papers
5.2.	 Product & Technology Committee - Minutes of Meeting dated	 TBA
24th November 1987, for ratification - own papers
5.3.	 Human Resources Committee - Minutes of Meeting dated 25th 	 RCS
November, 1987, for ratification - own papers
6. Draft Board Agenda - 8th December, 1987
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6.1.	 Leasehold Land & Buildings - Transactions	 LW
7. Other Business
7.1.	 Hull Branch - Fire Escape	 LW
7.2.	 Large Exposures - Report to the Bank of England, etc.
	 CJBR
7.3.	 DP Costs Per Account	 CJBR
7.4.	 Any Other Business
8. Date of Next Meeting
Tuesday, 5th January, 1988, at 11:30 a.m.
APPENDIX 8
HUMAN RESOURCES COMMITTEE
APPENDIX 8	 U
Agenda for meeting to be held on
Wednesday, 25th November, 1987, at 10:30 a.m.
(in the office of Mr. R.J. Gorvin, 4th Floor)
1.	 Minutes of Previous Meeting
dated 21.8.87, own papers
2. Matters Arising not covered by this Agenda
3. Strategic Considerations
	
3.1.	 Personnel
3.1.1. Co-operative Bank Pension Scheme - verbal
3.1.2. Organisation/Headcount - verbal
3.1.3. Communications Strategy
	
3.2.	 Training
No papers
3.3.	 EmployeeRelations
3.3.1. Staff Suggestion Scheme
3.3.2. Staff Housing Loan Scheme
3.3.3. Maternity Booklet
3.3.4. Messengers' Uniforms
4. Manpower Planning
No papers
5. Operational Considerations
KMF
RCS
KJL
ML
JUL
JUL
JUL
	
5.1.	 Personnel Administration Operating Report
	 KMF
	
5.2.	 Training Department Operating Report
	 KMF
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5.3.	 Statistics 1983 - 1987	 RCS
6. Other Business
6.1.	 Any Other Business
7. Date of Next Meeting
Wednesday, 25th January, 1988 at 10:30 a.m.
APPENDIX 9
PRODUCT & TECHNOLOGY COMMITTEE
APPENDIX 9	
U
Agenda for meeting to be held on
Tuesday, 16th August, 1988, at 10:30 a.m.
at CO-OPERATIVE UNION, HOLYOAKE HOUSE,
HANOVER STREET
1. Minutes of Previous Meeting
dated 28.6.88 (own papers)
2. Matters Arising
not included in the Agenda
3. Strategic Considerations
3.1.	 EFT-POS
3.1.1. EFT Steering Group Meetings, 20th June and 11th July - Short summary of
minutes
3.1.2. EFTPOS
3.1.3. Co-op EFTPOS Pilot - EFTPOS Tariff Review
	
PC
3.1.4. ATM Availability 	 PJS
3.1.5. LINK Fees (6 monthly report)
	
PC
3.1.6. Terminal Integration
3.2.	 Products & Services
3.2.1. RSPB Visa Card - PPIA
3.2.2. Plastics Strategy - Card Issue Programme
	
PJS
3.2.3. Debit Card
3.3.	 Technology
3.3.1. Information Services
	 KB
4. Other Business
4.1.	 Any Other Business
APPENDIX 9	 Ill
5.	 Date of Next Meeting
Tuesday, 13th September, 1988, at 10:30 a.m.
